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ABSTRACT
This thesis tells the story of the Community Development Program (CDP) of the
Department of Indian Affairs . The Program was initiated in Canada in the early 1960s
during a time of international popularity for the community development approach, and a
national sentiment that the federal government ought to do something to positively change
the situation for Indian people in Canada . The Program is probably best remembered for
the commotion that its young practitioners caused when they began to encourage
community development on Canadian Indian Reserves .
The question that guides the research asks whether or not the CDP was different from
previous policies of the Department of Indian Affairs . The author asserts that the CDP was
novel in its organization, the problem it sought to address, and the way in which it treated
Indian people. Data were gathered through interviews with former employees of the
Department of Indian Affairs and through archival research into the files of the Department
and its former employees .
The author uses the theoretical framework developed by Jurgen Habermas and adapted
by John Forester to interpret both traditional Canadian policies directed towards Indian
people and the Community Development Program .
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the government of Lester Pearson approved a policy to establish the
Community Development Program (CDP) through the federal Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) .
The submission which sought Cabinet approval stated that the CD Program was "designed
to employ, to the greatest extent possible, all the available human and material resources in
Indian communities in each province" (Canada, 1964 : 1). This was to be done through "the
participation by the Indians themselves in efforts to improve their level of living with as
much reliance as possible on their own initiative
; and the provision of technical and other
services in ways which encourage initiative and establish a basis for self-sufficiency"
(Canada, 1964 : 3). One of the proposed effects "was to step up mobilization of Indian
initiative and to further promote self sufficiency" with the end result of accelerating the
"transfer to Indian communities of responsibility and authority for the management of their
affairs, with concurrent limitations in government controls" (Canada, 1964 : i) . In short, the
CDP was to be a
. . .conscious effort by government to guide the forces of change in the best
interests of Indian communities and the country at large . .. In undertaking
this program, [the] Indian Affairs Branch will remain concerned not only
with the economic and technical prerequisites and consequences of change
but also with its social and cultural dimensions (Canada, 1964 : 4) .
According to a government official of the time, the CDP was sold to Cabinet as being
"inversely proportional to welfare payments - if the community development component
increases, welfare decreases" and in fact, "the government bought it" (Uppal, 1994 : 1) .
Indeed the Cabinet submission stressed the fiscal benefits of the CDP, such as reducing
welfare and health care expenditures, making other programs more efficient, and enabling
the federal government to offload the costs associated with First Nations to the provinces
(Canada, 1964 : i ; 1-5)
.
Although the CD Program was sold primarily on its economic merits, Walter Rudnicki,
author of the CD Cabinet Submission has stated that the Indian Affairs Branch was "under
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severe criticism because mentally they were just coming into the eighteenth century, and
they were under constant criticism for . . . [their] condescending approach to Indian peoples"
(Rudnicki, 1994: 1). As a result, "somebody there decided that they should try to at least
appear progressive . . . So they thought that they had better get on the band wagon and
appear to be doing community development" (Rudnicki, 1994 : 1). Thus, by 1963, plans were
being made to develop the CDP .
The first Community Development Officers (CDOs) took to reserves in July of 1965
(Lloyd, 1967:31) . In total, there were 67 CDOs, most of whom were recent university
graduates (Canada, 1968:73, Tennant, 1990 :141; Buckley, 1992 :102). The CDOs frequently
came into conflict with Indian Agents and other "old-style" bureaucrats, who viewed the
program and workers as disruptive forces . This dissatisfaction with the CDP led to its being
downgraded to focus on leadership training by 1968, and its complete demise in most
jurisdictions by 1970 (Weaver, 1981:28; Buckley, 1992 :103) .
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION / HYPOTHESIS
In her book on Canadian Indian Policy, Helen Buckley characterized the Community
Development Program as a Third World solution to Aboriginal issues by which the
Department of Indian Affairs " . . .revealed its continued obsession with `backwardness' and
its devotion to the principle that solutions must not occasion hardship for employers or loss
of investment in resource industries" (1992 : 102-3) . The research question that guided this
investigation is a simple one, and it may be stated in the terms used above by Buckley : 'Was
the CDP another `backward' policy from a retrograde bureaucracy?" The hypothesis
that guided this project may be stated in opposition to Buckley's assertion . I hypothesize
that the CDP was different in kind from traditional IAB policies, and indeed there are a
number of examples of this difference . CDP employees were different from those found at
the IAB - they were more radical and more interested in change than with keeping their
jobs and maintaining the status quo . The CDP defined the problem differently - it sought
not to eliminate reserves and find more efficient means of assimilation, but rather to end
the status of Indian peoples as "bystanders on the national scene ." The most remarkable
difference between the CDP and the "backward" policies of the IAB, however, is found in
how Indian people were treated. For the very first time in the history of the Indian Affairs
in Canada, the Department listened to Indian people on a national level . The CDP was an
admission that Indian people knew what was best for Indian people . The whole Program
was designed to listen to Indian people, rather than to prescribe how they should live . This
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alone is enough to set the CDP apart from traditional policies of the IAB in a meaningful
way.
C. Wright Mills, noted Sociologist and commentator on scientific method, insisted that
research must begin with "elaborated hypotheses documented at key points by more
detailed information" (Mills, 1959 :72). Towards this end, a'logic in use' process which is
both deductive and inductive was employed in this investigation. That is, the research was
guided by a hypothesis that was revised during and following the data gathering .
The investigation at hand tests whether the CDP was yet another backward-minded
and ill-conceived strategy characteristic of the IAB and its bureaucrats, or whether it
represented a departure from the policies that preceded it .
Of course, being able to state that the CDP was or was not different from the policies
and programs that preceded it at the IAB does not in itself provide for a rich analysis . The
interesting discussion concerns how it differed, what these differences meant for Aboriginal
peoples, and the insights and lessons that might be gained from understanding the CDP .
As will be elaborated on in the following section, the research question was answered by
first establishing some common themes among IAB policies and comparing these with the
description of the CDP created through an examination of archival and interview materials .
1 .3 METHODS
The exploration that follows may best be described as an example of evaluation research
carried out thirty years after the program in question concluded . As most evaluation
research is conducted either during the life of a program, or shortly after it is finished, this
project may also be characterized as a social history (Babbie, 1983 : 305 ; Judd et al .; 1991 :
322) .
Judd et al .. (1991 : 329) identify two types of evaluation research - summative and
formative. In the former, the outcomes or effects of a program are evaluated in order to
answer the question of whether or not the program worked . Formative evaluations, on the
other hand, seek to understand what a program is, how it worked and how it might be made
better. The research that follows has both elements, although the summative or outcome
evaluation, which characteristically uses quantitative techniques to determine the effects of
a program, is less developed . No attempts were made to determine if the CDP produced any
quantitative change in the lives of Aboriginal peoples . As I point out in the final chapter, a
more detailed summative analysis of the CDP presents an opportunity for further research .
Researchers who use applied research, which includes the evaluative form discussed
above, " . . .wish their work to be used by those who make or change social policy
. They are
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interested in affecting how legislators, judges, and administrators think about some social
problem or issue" (Judd et al .; 1991 : 322). In addition to telling the story of the CDP, I have
in small part attempted to provide a better understanding of contemporary social structures
through the use of a comparative and historical analysis (see Mills, 1959) . As such, this
analysis may prove useful to policy-makers who might experience a sense of "deja vu" when
they undertake seemingly innovative programs or policies that have actually come and gone
in years past (Weaver, 1981 :xiii) .
1.3.1 DATA COLLECTION
Data were drawn from both archival sources and less structured interviews . Interviews
were conducted with a total of five people involved with the CDP . Archival data were
collected from the National Archives in Ottawa, the records of the Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development, and the private files of Walter Rudnicki, former
Director of the Welfare Division at the Indian Affairs Branch . The files included general
policy files on the CD Program of Indian Affairs, and regional files for Ontario, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and the Yukon . These files contain information on :
•
	
the original rationale for the program ;
• goals and objectives ;
• organizational structure and implementation plans of the Program ;
• progress reports ;
• minutes of CD meetings in communities ;
• budget information ;
• details of the Program in different regions ;
• the training of CD Os ;
• federal policy regarding community development ;
• evaluation reports ;
• minutes of interdepartmental meetings ; and
• various reports on community development in general and at the IAB in particular .
1.3.2 VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS
The interview component of this research involved interviews with five former
Community Development workers at both the regional and agency level, and with officials
in charge of the Program at headquarters in Ottawa . Two of the interviewees were
interviewed a second time by telephone . All of the interviews lasted between two and four
hours, and were guided by a number of open-ended questions . Interviewees were given the
opportunity to review and comment on the transcripts of the interviews .
The interviews provided information on the political climate surrounding the
development, execution, and demise of the program, on specific initiatives undertaken by
the CDOs, and on the relations between Indian Agents, CDOs and Aboriginal peoples .
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Conspicuous in their absence are any interviews with Aboriginal peoples from the
communities in which the CDP was active . Without a doubt, this research would have been
stronger and more meaningful if the experiences of those people in the communities in
which the CDP operated were included . Such information would have made for more valid
conclusions about whether or not the CDP represented a departure from the policies and
practices of federal policy . As it is, the experiences of Aboriginal peoples have, where
possible, been included as recollected by those involved in the CDP . As a result, my
conclusions are valid only in that they are based on the experiences of those involved in the
CDP from the government side and reflect their experiences. I do not attempt to make a
statement as to whether the CDP differed from previous IAB policies and programs from the
sole perspective of members of Aboriginal communities .
Mills (1959) identified that data collected through historical analysis are malleable and
subject to the interpretations of the analyst and the memory of the informant . The use of
both archival resources and interviews allowed for a cross-verification of information
between interview and archival sources, and among separate interviewees, to ensure that
results were valid .
1.4 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY
I have attempted in this investigation to strike the balance between theory and method
that is necessary for research that is neither `very detailed exposition . . . [or] . . .very grand
conceptions"(Mills, 1959: 71) . Mills railed against the empty contributions of theory
unaccompanied by method, or what he called "thinking without observing ." Mills heaped
equal disdain upon `abstracted empiricists' " . . .who would observe without thinking" (Mills,
1959: 33) .
For Mills, compiling 'facts' about history is no more historical analysis than is
abstracted empiricism the beginning and end of sociological investigation . Given that data
that are collected about history are malleable, Mills argues that a well-developed theoretical
framework is indispensable to interpreting historical facts in a way that will produce
information on social structures .
Just as Mills advocates a balanced use of theoretical and empirical analysis, he also
suggests that historical investigation has a 'time and a place' and must be used properly .
Having stated this, though, it is clear from reading The Sociological Imagination that Mills
places enormous importance on historical-structural analysis . In the final instance, it is the
biographies of individuals that Mills is concerned with . These biographies, though, cannot
be understood apart from "the historical structures in which the milieux of their
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[individuals] everyday life are organized" (Mills, 1959 :158). In asserting that neither
structures nor individuals can properly be understood without reference to the other, Mills
is ensuring a place in social inquiry for human nature, which Mills recognizes as
"frighteningly broad" (6) .
The notion of comparative analysis is an important part of the sociological imagination -
it enables investigators to understand structures, institutions and individuals by locating
and characterizing them historically and culturally . By using historical analysis to compare
present and past structures and their effect on individuals, the sociological investigator is
able to locate and characterize contemporary institutions and individual actions in a
historical context. This, Mills (1959) says, enables the social scientist to identify salient
trends and comment on the present as well as offer 'from what' and 'to what' statements .
The theoretical framework developed by Jurgen Habermas fits well with Mills's
assertion that theory and method must exist in a balance . While Habermas's work can be
seen as highly theoretical, he himself maintains that the ultimate test of a theory is the
degree to which it may be the basis for successful research programs . Further, for a critical
theory to be useful, individuals must be "able to recognize their own lives in the descriptions
provided by theory" (Seidman, 1989 : 7) . That Habermas wishes his work to reflect daily life
and be part of active research programs illustrates the "tentativeness and fallibility" of his
ideas - a characteristic that reflects the theory's dynamic qualities (White, 1988 : 4-5) .
A couple of themes in Habermas's work stand out as important and particularly
applicable to this investigation . They are communicative action - a combination of
communication and labour (action) that is a fundamental human characteristic, and the
idea that the whole of our society is the lifeworld, which contains sub-systems, such as the
"capitalist economic system and a rationalized (in Weber's sense) state administration"
(Forester, 1993 : 116 cites Thompson and Held, 1982 : 278-9-80) .
Habermas characterises modernity by the uncoupling of certain spheres of action from
the lifeworld through the media of money and power . Although subject to a number of
periodizations, modernity is generally held to encompass the period starting in the 16th or
17th century to the present .
John Forester has adapted Habermas's theory especially well for an investigation into
policy-making and planning which is "structurally sensitive but phenomenologically
sensitive" (Forester, 1993 : 171) .
6
1 .5 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
Chapter two establishes the theoretical framework to be employed in this investigation .
I begin with a review of the theories that have been popularly used to interpret
governments and Aboriginal policy in Canada, pointing out relative strengths and
weaknesses for each . I conclude with an introduction to the basic concepts developed and
used by Habermas, and the way in which these will be used in the investigation that
follows .
Chapter three contains a review of the relevant literature as well as a brief history of
the Canadian State's approach to Aboriginal issues . This setting of the historical stage
allows me to identify some common themes and establish a baseline against which the CDP
may be compared and contrasted .
Chapter four tells the story of the CDP, informed by the documents associated with the
program, the little that has been written by previous commentators, and the recollections of
those involved with the program with the federal government . In addition to telling the
story of community development at the Indian Affairs Branch, I also provide an analysis of
how the CDP differed from or was similar to state sponsored policies and programs that
preceded it .
The concluding chapter summarizes my conclusions, identifies some areas for further
study, and offers some insights which might be useful for contemporary policy-makers .
7
CHAPTER 2 - THE THEORY
The last 50 years have seen a remarkable change in the relationship between the Indian
Affairs Branch (IAB), and the people to which it ministered . In fact, at an operational level,
the IAB has gone from dictating most every circumstance on reserve, to a situation where
most on-reserve responsibilities have been devolved to First Nations . In Saskatchewan, for
example, First Nations now administer over 80% of the budget of Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada .
Given the change undergone by First Nations, the IAB, and their relationship in the last
50 years, it is not surprising that Aboriginal issues and the nature and role of the state have
held significant interest for social scientists seeking to understand the Canadian milieu .
Analyses have tended to be grounded in one of three theoretical currents - Chicago School,
Internal Colonial Model, or Political Economy . In part one of this chapter, I will discuss how
these three perspectives have been used to understand the IAB and then assess their
strengths and weaknesses in terms of an interpretation of the state in general . In the
second part of this chapter, I will propose an alternative to these three perspectives based
on the work of Jurgen Habermas . The third and final part of this chapter will outline the
framework that will be used to interpret the CDP .
2.1 CANADIAN STATE THEORIES AND THE IAB
The question guiding this research may be stated as follows : Was the CDP a departure
from traditional state policy towards Aboriginal peoples? In order to answer that question, I
believe a firm understanding of the nature of the state and bureaucracy in the policy-
making process is required . Discussion in this first part will centre on how the theories that
have been used to interpret Aboriginal issues in Canada deal with the nature and role of the
state in the policy-making process .
2.1 .1
	
CHICAGO SCHOOL
Chicago School theorists have employed the concept of assimilation to explain how
groups of people become more 'culturally' alike . Researchers working from this perspective,
such as Nagler (1975), sought to identify barriers to assimilation, and in turn suggested
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techniques to facilitate the assimilation of Aboriginal peoples into mainstream society .
According to Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 :2) these theorists have addressed two areas :
"the dynamics of the processes of assimilation . .. [and] the social and economic consequences
of assimilation or the lack of assimilation ." As a result, these theorists are interested in the
state only to the extent that it is involved in the assimilation process .
There have been a number of criticisms levelled at Chicago School formulations,
especially with reference to how useful the concepts of culture and assimilation are, and
whether or not they can even be operationalized (see Li, 1988 ; Wotherspoon and Satzewich,
1993). For example, Nagler (1975 :1, 55) seems to contradict himself when he argues on the
one hand that Aboriginal people are unable to assimilate into mainstream society because
they are culturally different from non-Aboriginal people, but says on the other hand that
Aboriginal peoples "have a range of traditional cultures" and "are not members of any
distinct cultural, racial or ethnic group ." Within Chicago School formulations, the role of
the state remains limited to how well or badly the state facilitates the 'inevitable' process of
assimilation . According to Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 : 6), these weaknesses in the
Chicago School approach led to the development in the 1970s of the Internal Colonial Model .
2.1.2
	
INTERNAL COLONIAL MODEL
As an alternative to the Chicago School, the Internal Colonial Model (ICM) has gained
popularity among many who seek to explain relations between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people (Kellough, 1980 ; Bienvienue, 1985 ; Brady, 1984 ; Boldt, 1981a, 1981b,
1981c, 1982) . The ICM has been used most notably by Frideres (1988a, 1988b, 1990) to
interpret both historical relations between 'colonizing' and 'host' populations, and
contemporary Aboriginal issues. The ICM :
presents the Indian Reserve as an internal colony that is exploited by the
dominant white group in Canada . White Canadians are seen as the
colonizing people, while Natives are considered the colonized people
(Frideres, 1988a: 366) .
Working from this perspective, Frideres (1988b : 86) argues that there has emerged a
white power elite in Canada which directs decisions in "a political system that is so closely
tied to the economic system that it cannot afford to give the less powerful groups in society
any support or protection ." Further, Frideres maintains that "decisions are made within a
specific context that will not allow certain alternatives even to be discussed . It is, then, the
structural relations that determine the field within which the relevant decisions are made"
(Frideres, 1988b: 86) .
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Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 :8-11) have indicated a number of problems with the
ICM. First, it is unclear when the colonization process began . Second, relations between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples are assumed to have remained static since initial
contact. Third, the applicability of the ICM to off-reserve Aboriginal peoples is questionable .
Fourth, the perspective reifies the categories of 'white' and 'native' in which "the White
colonizers own, direct, and profit from industries that depend upon exploitation of colonized
Natives" (Frideres, 1988:370). In doing this, the model fails to recognize that not all 'whites'
benefit from the oppression of Aboriginal peoples . Fifth, Wotherspoon and Satzewich
indicated that the nature and role of the state is under-theorized ; by this, they mean that
Frideres's articulation of the state is 'voluntaristic' and does not incorporate political,
economic or social relations (Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993 : 10-11) . According to
Wotherspoon and Satzewich, this implies a conception of the state which emphasizes "mean-
spirited, malicious, ethnocentric . . .racist politicians . . . or bad planning" - thus missing the
possibility that failed or damaging policies are structurally determined, rather than the
result of 'bad planning .' While this criticism may hold for many of the commentators who
employ a humanist or non-structural approach, I believe that it applies more to those who
leave their theoretical assumptions unstated (see Buckley, 1993, for example) than it does to
Frideres's work . Indeed, Frideres (1988b : 83) argues for an analysis at the level of
institutional structures "rather than focusing on the individual as the unit of analysis ."
The flaw in the Internal Colonial Model is not that it focuses on individuals (because it
does not), but rather in its assumption that the process of colonization (and its corollary, the
role of the state) has been static over the last 300 years (Wotherspoon and Satzewich : 8-9) .
This makes the articulation of the state in the ICM unduly deterministic or functional .
2.1 .3
	
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 : 9) propose a political economy alternative to the ICM
which suggests that it was not until the "ruling class deemed that further economic
expansion should occur" that the way of life of Aboriginal people came to be defined as a
problem (Wotherspoon & Satzewich, 1993 :9). This approach focuses less on racism as the
guiding principle of state policy and more on political and economic factors .
There is only a limited amount of literature that deals with Aboriginal issues from a
political economy perspective . What does exist assumes that Aboriginal peoples are either
"subsumed under general patterns of development, or are marginalized from the whole
process of class and nation formation" (Wotherspoon & Satzewich, 1993 :12; Abele and
Stasiulus, 1989 : 245). Wotherspoon and Satzewich suggest instead that:
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Racist ideas, and the practices based on those ideas, are not autonomous,
but rather have been formed within the context of the emergence and
reproduction of a particular mode of production . Thus, the history of Indian
administration is tied to the development of a capitalist mode of production
characterized by racism and class and gender relations (1993 :17) .
Similarly, Abele and Stasiulus (1989 : 241-2) argue for an analysis of Aboriginal issues
from a political economy perspective that incorporates race and ethnicity as more than just
"add-ons." They suggest that an investigation into class, gender, racial and ethnic relations
between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal Canadians may provide insight into the
wider area of Canadian social formation .
2.1.3.1
	
The State in a Political Economic Analysis
From a political economic perspective, the foremost consideration when discussing the
state is that it has supported the development of capitalist relations of production (Mahon,
1977:165) . From here it is helpful to separate explanations of the state into two groups -
instrumental and structural .
There are many contributors to the debate on the level and type of autonomy possessed
by the state in a capitalist system . Ralph Miliband has become associated with an account
in which the state "meets the instrumental needs of capital" (Albo & Jenson, 1989 :182,
emphasis mine) . This approach, articulated in the Canadian context by Leo Panitch,
stresses the importance of the ties between state personnel and the capitalist class : "[olne
sees . . . that the linkages between the state and the dominant class have been, and remain,
not general and abstract but particularly close and intimate" (1977 :9) .
As with most of his contemporaries, Panitch (1977 : 4) employs the concept of 'relative
autonomy' to distinguish between the state acting on behalf of the bourgeoisie, and acting at
their behest . Using the framework of accumulation and legitimization developed by James
O'Connor, Panitch portrays the "two basic and often mutually contradictory functions" of the
state - facilitating capital accumulation, while maintaining a social harmony which enables
accumulation over the long term (Panitch, 1977 :8). With this framework, government
policies can be characterized as fulfilling one or more of three distinct functions : i) capital
accumulation; ii) social harmony; or iii) employing coercion to maintain social order
(Panitch, 1977 :8) . In his later work, Panitch moves away from this deterministic account,
arguing instead that state activity can be best understood through the relations (and
struggles) between classes, with the role of the state being reduced to facilitating
accumulation (Albo and Jenson, 1989 :196) .
As Stasiulus (1988 : 228-9) points out, the major criticisms of the instrumentalist
approach, are i) that it makes the assumption that there is a "monolithic and far-sighted
11
capitalist class"; and ii) that it denies that groups other than the capitalist class influence
policy or initiate social change .
Nicos Poulantzas, on the other hand, used the concept of relative autonomy to develop a
structuralist theory of the state . From this perspective, relative autonomy refers to "that
form and degree of institutional autonomy relative to the dominant classes and fractions
necessary to organize their hegemony" (Jessop, 1982 : 182). According to Jessop (1982 : 142),
the structuralist perspective is a response to economically deterministic 'state derivationist'
approaches. There was a need to "break with cruder forms of state theory and develop more
sophisticated analyses of the capitalist state and its role in social reproduction" (Jessop,
1982: 142). Unlike Miliband, Poulantzas eschewed both economic determinism and the
importance of the class position of social actors or managers within the state (Poulantzas,
1972:239; 243-4) . Instead of treating government agencies as "technical instruments of the
state," Poulantzas understood them in terms of their "social bases" and as to how "their
functions and effects are influenced by their links to the economic system and civil society"
(Jessop, 1982: xiv, 146) .
Rianne Mahon (1977) has adapted the structuralist position to the Canadian situation .
She proposed that the state is not a neutral arbitrator involved only in accumulation,
legitimation, or coercive functions (Albo & Jenson, 1988 :189), but rather is a "condensate of
relations of power between struggling classes" (Poulantzas, 1976 :74). As such, state activity
is seen to be directed at locating compromises between interests which nonetheless reflect
the "unequal structure of representation" and favour the "bourgeois hegemony" (Mahon,
1977:170-1) . The state as manifestation of power relations within society produces two
pronouncements on relative autonomy : "of the various apparatuses and branches vis-a-vis
each other within the state system and. . . . of the ensemble of the state vis-a-vis the
hegemonic class or fraction" (Poulantzas, 1973 :47; see also Jessop, 1982 : 155) .
From here, Mahon articulates a form of state autonomy which arises, in part, from the
depoliticization of the government and the ascendancy of a civil service organized to allow
policy development based on compromises which "secure hegemony . . .to a particular
structure of domination" in which the interests of capital are not likely to be harmed
(Mahon, 1977 :172). Accordingly, bureaucrats perform two contradictory functions : they
represent an interest ; and also 'coerce' that interest into accepting compromise . The relative
autonomy of the state means that branches of government represent the dominated as well
as the dominant fractions of society, albeit in a way which highly limits the participation of
the dominated in "general policy development" (Mahon, 1977 :183) . Thus the state does not
always implement policies which benefit capital accumulation (Urry, 1981 :105), but ensures
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unity by forcing one element or class of society to make concessions for the good of the whole
(Mahon, 1977:169) .
This perspective sees seemingly autonomous actions of the state as the result not only of
working class struggles, but also of the need to "maintain the hegemony of a particular
fraction . . .[-] the weighty authoritative part" (Mahon, 1977 :169). Unlike its instrumentalist
counterpart, Mahon's analysis does not need to classify policies in terms of accumulation or
legitimation . Instead, one condition (such as the welfare state) or one policy could
simultaneously serve both functions (Albo and Jenson, 1989 :198-9) .
Poulantzas (1976 :73-75) identified the bureaucracy as containing many different offices,
secretariats and ministries, each representing different (and often contradictory) interests
(see also Ritzer, 1988:269; Jessop, 1982 : 232). Although the bureaucracy may "appear as an
impersonal, neutral institution embodying . . . general interest" it operates "according to a
hierarchically structured" set of norms (Jessop, 1982 : 163). Further, the branches of the
state may each represent a number of interests, but they are also compelled to work
towards compromise - to temper various interests with the overall interest of unity . This
does not mean that the different interests or their representatives are equal - to the
contrary, the hegemonic (bourgeois) interests have a relative advantage (Mahon, 1977 :170-
1,173) .
Within the Canadian State, Mahon (1977 : 175) claims that the Ministry of Finance
(including the Treasury Board) occupies the most important position . This means that
Finance makes relatively fewer concessions than other agencies in the compromises that
characterize the state (171) . Further, within the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (DIAND) - itself at a disadvantage relative to other agencies such as Finance -
the interests of Aboriginal peoples have traditionally been subordinated to the interests
represented by the Northern Development Branch, which has a mandate to encourage large
resource exploration corporations to develop the North (190) . This means that not only is
DIAND on the short end of unequal representation relative to other state agencies, but also
that the interests of Aboriginal peoples have historically suffered from under-representation
within DIAND (191) .
Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993) have adapted Mahon's work to interpret relations
between the Canadian State and Aboriginal peoples . They see the state as maintaining a
balance between both representation and social control of Aboriginal peoples, and suggest
that historically, issues of control have been of primary importance to IAB, although issues
of representation have become increasingly important since the Second World War (41) . In
this context Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 :34-36) argue that while the relationship
between the state and First Nations has arguably been one of "total domination and
subordination", it is different only in magnitude, but not in kind, from the relationship
which the state has with other subordinate groups .
2.1.3.2
	
Problems with the Political Economic Analysis
Although both instrumentalist and structuralist accounts of the state claim to employ
the concept of relative autonomy, both formulations hold that in the last instance, the
"state's necessary and primary role [is] guarantor of the capitalist system" (Albo and Jenson,
1989 : 199 ; see also Jessop, 1982 : 155-191). Herein lies the central difficulty in the
structuralist argument - "its functionalist tendency to regard every task and practice of the
state as contributing to the cohesion and maintenance of capitalist society" (Stasiulus, 1988 :
230). This suggests not a relative but rather a token autonomy for the state . These
'functionalist' analyses of the state "lack detailed consideration of the space for change," and
represent an "a priori definition of the role of the state as the reflection and reproduction of
capitalist social relations" (Albo and Jenson, 1989 :199) . Jessop (1982 : 227) concurs, saying
that
. . . .although many theorists invoke relative autonomy to explain the alleged
functionality of the state for bourgeois reproduction, such an approach
merely ascribes a 'relative autonomy' to the state in order the better to
guarantee its subordination to the imperatives of the capitalist economy and
bourgeois political domination . . .
Barrow (1993: 70-71) points to three additional weaknesses with the structuralist
formulation . Firstly, he says that "it is not at all clear how one can know with any certainty
what functions are actually necessary to the continuation of a capitalist social formation ."
This renders problematic the structuralist claim that the state is guarantor of the capitalist
system. Secondly, as
most apparatuses consist of several institutions, and most institutions are
multifunctional . . . . one would have to conduct comparative multi-
institutional studies which demonstrate that these institutions are a
coherent 'apparatus' directed by the state fulfilling a common function .
A study of this sort does not exist . Finally, he argues that when the structuralist theory is
applied to actual policy analysis, it is 'virtually impossible' to show that "specific institutions
or policies are required by the functional needs of particular capitalist societies" (Barrow,
1993 : 71) .
In addition, these accounts often remain silent on how and where individual action,
particularly among bureaucrats, fits into theories of the state, or they "exaggerate the
professional managerial class's total subjection to economic imperatives" (Cohen, 1985 :163) .
Urry (1981 : 103 - 104), for example, introduces the sphere of circulation into his analysis of
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state policies, but maintains that the tasks performed by bureaucrats are "closely specified,
and there is little possibility of innovative action ." Hence, some political economic theorists
employ the same sort of determinism previously identified as a flaw in the Internal Colonial
Model. Skocpol summed up these criticisms when she wrote
The fatal shortcoming of all Marxist theorizing (so far) about the role of the
state is that nowhere is the possibility admitted that the state organizations
and elites might under certain circumstances act against the long-run
economic interests of a dominant class . . . (Barrow, 1993: 126 cites Skocpol,
1973 : 18) .
2.1.3.3
	
Reconsiderations of the State
In response to these perceived limitations, a number of alternatives have begun to
surface which emphasize the autonomy of the state to act in its own interests, highlight the
conflict within bureaucracies, and carve out a space for human agency and its ability to
shape state action (Albo and Jenson, 1989:199-200) .
Barrow (1993: 96) identifies post-Marxist analyses that offer alternatives to their
instrumentalist and structuralist forbears . These seek to "develop a theory of the capitalist
state that can identify the limits of its policy-making capabilities ." The organizational
realist approach, associated with the writings of Theda Skocpol, sees the state as an actual
organization, full of actual actors, which endeavours to "extend control and political
authority over particular territories and the people residing within them" (Barrow, 1993 :
125-6 cites Skocpol and Amenta, 1986 : 131) . Stepan's (1978: xii) neo-Weberian account sees
the state as more than the 'government' - it is also
the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that
attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public
authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within
civil society as well .
Recognizing that if the state merely worked in the interests of the dominant class,
there would be little reason to study the capitalist state, theorists employing the
organizational realist approach seek to establish the possible (although not disinterested)
autonomy of the state in capitalism (Barrow, 1993 : 126 ; Skocpol, 1985 : 15) . Working from
the assumption of possible autonomy, organizational realists still allow that socio-economic
relations influence and limit state structures and activities (Evans, et al ., 1985 : viii) .
According to Skocpol (1985 : 9), state autonomy may be best understood by looking upon
states as organizations with objectives that are not "simply reflective of the demands or
interests of social groups, classes or society ." This sort of autonomy is not fixed - it may
come and go depending on structural potentials ; it may occur completely in the state; it may
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be circumscribed ; or it may occur in "the intellectual activities of civil administrators
engaged in diagnosing societal problems and framing policy alternatives to deal with them"
(Skocpol, 1985 : 14, 11) . As Helco (1974 : 305-6) puts it, governments do more than simply
wield power; they make social policy decisions which provide solutions based on more than
satisfying diverse wants . According to his investigations, it has not been interest groups
which have stimulated the most policy changes, but rather bureaucrats, drawing on
"administrative resources of information, analysis and expertise," who have initiated new
policies which respond not to the social structure, but rather to the government's perception
of past policy failures .
It is important to note that the possibility of autonomy does not mean that state policies
do not at times seek to achieve that which is beyond their reach, or that some policies do not
have unintended consequences . To the contrary, state policies can be "stupid and
misdirected . . . . fragmented and partial" and even counterproductive. Nonetheless, at times
they may also be "coherent and appropriate" (Skocpol, 1985: 15, 16) .
The conclusion that I have reached is that it is best to understand the state as a possibly
autonomous site (with possibly autonomous actors), even though this autonomy may be
fettered by very real political and economic factors . This, in turn, allows an analysis of the
CDP which does not have to find that the program served, in one way or another, the
interests of the dominant class in Canada .
The task of the next part of this chapter is to advance an alternative to the three
theoretical perspectives presented at the beginning of this chapter (Chicago school, ICM,
and political economy) . This alternative, which must recognize the possible autonomy of the
state, is based on the writings of Jurgen Habermas .
2.2 HABERMAS IN GENERAL AND PLANNING IN PARTICULAR
2.2.1
	
TRANSITION TO HABERMAS
Jurgen Habermas has produced, in the last 25 years, a body of work that has at its core
a sustained commitment to universal rationality . With this comes a belief that only when a
"general notion of reason can be invoked can we hope to sustain a good society" (Seidman,
1989: 1; White, 1988 : 1). Arato and Cohen (1992 : 200) have used Habermas's work to
reconstruct a concept of civil society that allows "one to articulate the positive side of the
achievements of modern civil society without closing off the possibility of an imminent
critique of its specific institutional configurations ." It is perhaps this feature of Habermas's
critical theory - the acknowledgement of positive and progressive aspects of modern society
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while conceding that negative elements must be subject to criticism - which makes it such a
sophisticated and powerful analytical tool (Seidman, 1989 : 6). This also makes Habermas's
theory appealing for the study of public policy - an area where there are not always clear
lines between what is good and what is bad .
Just as important for the investigation at hand is the fact that Habermas's work is
particularly well suited to understanding the processes and consequences of policy-making
in a capitalist state . The framework which Habermas has developed lends itself to an
analysis which can entertain both structural and action-oriented considerations in what
Forester (1993) refers to as a structural phenomenology (see also Seidman, 1989 : 7). John
Forester has produced an impressive number of articles and books since the early 1980s
using Habermasian concepts applied to accounts of planning practice . Forester's work
integrates an analysis of the factors that influence planning in a modern capitalist
democracy with descriptive and prescriptive elements of everyday planning (See Forester,
1993) .
According to Forester, both dualistic and pluralistic neo-Marxist (i .e . functionalist and
structuralist) theories of the state lack the 'analytical space' to understand the planner or
the planning organization . Arguing for a "structurally sensitive but phenomenologically
compelling" analysis, Forester (1993 : 171) says that
structural Marxists have stressed issues of structure and function to the
neglect of actions; Weberians generally have done the opposite . The task of
critical theory of planning is to give an account of planners' actions that is at
once structurally located and phenomenologically sound - an account that
does not decide a priori whose interests, for example, planners effectively
serve (if they serve any) .
Forester (1993 : 85) says that planners find themselves occupying the 'middle ground' -
between individuals acting in a vacuum (action accounts), and accounts where structures
wholly determine actions (political economic accounts) . Accordingly, for a critical theory of
planning to be helpful it must "locate concrete policy initiatives, policy development, and
implementation in the framework of social learning and social action" (Forester, 1993 : 140) .
Before I undertake an extensive discussion of the application of critical theory to policy
analysis and planning practice, those parts of Habermas's theoretical project which lend
themselves to a critical theory of policy analysis must be explained .
2.2.2
	
KEY HABERMASIAN CONCEPTS AND THEIR DERIVATIVES
The analysis of the CDP that will be undertaken in the following chapters will make
extensive use of John Forester's critical theory of policy analysis . In preparation, this
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section discusses both key Habermasian concepts, and Forester's use of these concepts to
construct a critical theory of policy analysis .
2.2.2.1
	
Reconstruction of Historical Materialism
In order to construct a critical theory which has both structural and action elements,
Habermas reconstructs and combines both historical materialism (the structural element)
and speech act theory (the action or phenomenological element) (Forester, 1993 : 136) . In
fact, it is most accurate to say that Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism
includes a reconstruction of speech act theory . In this, he attempts to strike a balance
between the structural / productionist emphasis of Marx's formulation with interactionist
and reproductionist considerations .
Habermas justifies this reconstruction of historical materialism on the basis that
Marxian social theory has not been able to "anticipate or account for the principal events of
recent history" (Seidman, 1989 : 10), including the so-called new social movements (such as
the abortion debate, which tends to occur for the most part outside of the context of
production). In order to have "sufficient access to institutional and cultural dynamics"
Habermas insists on a theory with a higher level of abstraction than is offered by Marx's
formulation of the forces and relations of production (Seidman, 1989 : 10) .
While Marx's distinction between the forces and relations of production corresponds to
notions of labour and interaction as the "two key aspects of the self-formative process of
human beings in society", Habermas maintains that Marx's analysis is 'unbalanced' owing
to the dominance that Marx affords to labour over interaction (Giddens, 1982 : 150-1) . This
leads Marx to assume that "changes in the productive forces are the engine driving social
development" (Seidman, 1989 : 10) . In his [re] formulation, Habermas incorporates non-
production, or cultural, elements to allow for an "account of sociocultural dynamics . . . [which]
reconsiders the relation between individual action, culture and social structure" (Seidman,
1989: 11) .
The upshot of this is that Habermas clearly distinguishes between the production work
that people do - based on instrumental rationality or purposive rational action - and the
social interaction which people engage in - based on communicative action or symbolic
interaction (Forester, 1993 : 136-137 cites Wellmer, 1976: 245-6; Seidman, 1989 : 12) . Thus,
Habermas understands action on two levels - task-oriented instrumental action necessary
for material reproduction, and communicative action necessary for "institutional-normative"
reproduction .
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While Marx claims that labour is a condition of human existence, or even that it is the
essence of humanity, Habermas argues that labour is characteristic of other hominids as
well. In his reconstruction, both labour and communication (or communicative action) are
seen as fundamental human characteristics (Seidman, 1989 : 13). In contradistinction to
Marx, then, Habermas sees communication - not the labouring proletariat - as the
'liberating force' for humanity (Heller, 1982 : 32-3) . In fact, he says that when interaction is
collapsed into labour, then technical knowledge derived from instrumental rationality comes
to dominate the social as well as natural sciences . The result is that "social problems come
to be seen as 'technical' problems" (Giddens, 1982 : 151). This dominance of instrumental
rationality is at the heart of Habermas's idea of lifeworld colonization, but this will be
discussed later on in this section .
2.2.2.2
	
Value and Goal Rationality
Believing that a "strategic understanding of rationality is somehow inadequate,"
Habermas, following Max Weber, distinguishes between goal and value rationality (White,
1988: 25; Heller, 1982 : 33) . Goal rationality (or instrumental rationality) begets purposive-
rational action (known more simply as labour or work) . This sort of action is oriented by
"technical rules, and is founded on empirical knowledge" (Giddens, 1982 : 152). The second
sort of rationality - value rationality - is associated with interaction, or to use Habermas's
term, communicative action . According to Habermas, this refers to "the interaction of at
least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations"
(Habermas, 1984 : 86). This interaction is governed by 'binding consensual norms' which
allow communication between individuals to occur (Giddens, 1982 : 152) . The gist of these
norms is that: i) when people communicate, it is with the understanding that what is said or
claimed could in theory be tested, and that the better argument would prevail ; and ii) that
people agree to communicate as if their claims were being tested, or that they have tested
the claims themselves (Forester, 1993 : 138) .
These consensual norms are possible because when a speaker says something s/he also
does something . Habermas says that what the speaker is doing is making a series of validity
claims aimed at achieving understanding - this is communicative action (Habermas, 1989 :
143). There are three claims made by the speaker : truth; normative legitimacy; and
authenticity (White, 1988 : 28). It is these claims to validity that allow Habermas to speak of
a communicative rationality - a speaker is rational if s/he is able to
put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it by
pointing to appropriate evidence [and by] following an established norm is
19
able when criticized, to justify his [/her] action by explicating the given
situation in the light of legitimate expectations (Habermas, 1984 : 15) .
2.2.2.3
	
Li feworld, System, and Colonization
These validity claims correspond to three structural components (culture, society and
personality) in what Habermas refers to as the lifeworld . The lifeworld is a term that
Habermas uses to refer roughly to society (Habermas, 1982 : 278) . In his introduction to the
first volume of Habermas's The Theory of Communicative Action, McCarthy (1984: xxiiii,
xxiv) refers to the lifeworld as a reservoir of knowledge based on culture and language,
produced and reproduced by communicative action, which "individuals cannot 'step out' of ."
According to Arato and Cohen (1992 : 201), lifeworld "refers to the reservoir of implicitly
known traditions and taken-for-granted background assumptions which are embedded in
language and culture, [and] drawn upon by individuals in their everyday lives ." Habermas
says that modernity is characterized by an uncoupling of certain spheres or sub-systems
from the lifeworld - a process which leaves the lifeworld as just "one subsystem among
others" (Habermas, 1984 : 154). While the lifeworld remains the "subsystem which defines
the pattern of the social system as a whole," the economic (money) and bureaucratic (power)
spheres become hived off from the lifeworld, and thus also from the norms and values of the
lifeworld: "those subsystems of purposive rational economic and administrative
action . . . become independent of their moral-political foundations" (Habermas, 1984 : 154) .
Although uncoupled from the lifeworld, the economic and bureaucratic spheres are still
anchored to the lifeworld through "private households and the legal system" and are
dependent upon it for their reproduction (Habermas, 1982 : 280 ; Forester, 1993 : 116) .
Once this uncoupling has occurred, it is possible to contemplate the process of lifeworld
colonization. Simply put, this is when the instrumental rationality of the economic and
bureaucratic systems begins to direct actions in the lifeworld . As the lifeworld may only be
reproduced through communicative action,
system incursions amount to an assault on the communicative
infrastructure of the lifeworld . . . .destroy[ing] traditional forms of life and
contribut[ing] to the appearance of unique problems associated with identity
formation, anomie, psychopathologies, and the loss of meaning (Seidman,
1989: 25) .
2.2.2.4 Reproduction Processes
Prior to the discussion of lifeworld and system, it was pointed out that each validity
claim referred to within communicative action corresponds to a component of the lifeworld .
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These are also associated with reproduction processes . McCarthy (1984: xxv) puts it
succinctly
Thus, to the different structural components of the lifeworld (culture,
society, personality) there correspond reproduction processes (cultural
reproduction, social integration, socialization) based on the different aspects
of communicative action (understanding, co-ordination, sociation) which are
rooted in the structural components of speech acts (propositional,
illocutionary, expressive) . These structural correspondences permit
communicative action to perform its different functions and to serve as a
suitable medium for the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld .
Forester (1993 : 138) offers a slightly different interpretation of the claim-making
processes involved in communicative action, identifying four, as opposed to three, validity
claims, and reproduction processes . Citing Habermas's earlier writings, Forester (1993 : 125 ;
136) says that practical "communicative action has a double structure" - content and
context. The dialectic between content and context corresponds to the dialectic between the
forces and relations of production, or instrumental and communicative action .
Using the example of a planner, Forester says that "What a planner talks about is the
content of what is said ; when and in what situation and with whom the planner talks begins
to define the context of what is said" (Forester, 1993 : 90). Each element has two claims .
Within the content of communication there is : i) a claim upon attention (where attention is
called to something) ; and ii) a factual claim (where a statement is made about something .
The content of what speakers say occurs in a certain context, which includes: i) the claim to
legitimacy (speakers claim to be speaking legitimately in context); and ii) the expressive
claim (the speaker as self colours what s/he says - to express or suppress emotions, for
example) (Forester, 1993: 90-92; 139) .
The second, third and fourth validity claims that Forester identifies are associated with
culture, society and personality (the three components of the lifeworld), and with the three
reproduction processes identified above by McCarthy (cultural, social integration, and
socialization) . It is within these "dimensions in which social and political conflicts are
concretely fought out" (Forester, 1993 : 117) .
Possibly because Forester has applied Habermas's formulation to policy and planning
studies, he has incorporated an additional validity claim, associated with an additional
reproductive process . The validity claim (identified as the first 'content' claim above - the
claim upon attention) corresponds to issue definition as a social reproduction process . The
process of framing or defining the issue at hand, whether through the use of professional
jargon or an appeal to expertise, reproduces "patterns of attention, patterns of popular
orientation" (Forester, 1993 : 126) . Table 2 .1 shows the structural components of the
lifeworld and the processes associated with them .
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Table 2.1 Structural Components of Lifeworld and Associations .
Forces of
Production
(Instrumental
Rationality)
of
Communicative
Action
Reproduction
Processes
	
Claims
Validity
Claims
Achieved
Through
Outputs
Derived from Forester, 1993, Chapter 6
With respect to the reproductive processes, Forester (1993 : 116-117) says that validity
claims each have an output. Factual claims made in the dimension of cultural reproduction
are meant to shape beliefs or worldviews . Social integration is associated with claims to
legitimacy, which give way to consent or allegiance for "streams of social action ." The
reproductive process of socialization produces claims of "expressiveness [or] sincerity" which
define our identities, characters and/or personalities. Although Forester neglects to offer an
output for the claim upon attention (issue-definition), the output would be the ability to set
agendas or define problems - directing people's attention to a particular issue or set of
issues, while at the same time diverting their attention away from other issues .
For the analysis at hand, it is most important to note that Habermas's combination of
structural and communicative theories of society enables an analysis of policy issues which
is sensitive to both structural and phenomenological issues (Forester, 1993 : 139) . It is
within this context that Forester introduces the idea of a 'communicative infrastructure' of
social action and social reproduction .
2.2.2.5 Communicative Infrastructure
The most important consideration for a critical theory of policy is that it "locate concrete
policy initiatives, policy development, and implementation in the framework of social
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learning and social action" (Forester, 1993 : 140). Forester says that while Habermas's
formulation provides for an understanding of social learning (structural) and social action
(phenomenological) it is silent with respect to the institutions which mediate between the
two (e.g ., factories, schools, churches, government agencies) . According to Forester, a given
policy may alter the institutions that connect actions to structures, thereby altering
systemic relations and social actions . In order to assess concrete policies, an account of the
mediating institutions - the communicative infrastructure - of society is required. To put
this in the terms of the study at hand, Forester's framework generates questions as to how
the CDP affected: i) the state vis-a-vis the mediating institution of the IAB and its
treatment of Aboriginal issues (including its systemic relations) ; and ii) relations between
and within Aboriginal people and agents of the state (social actions) .
Forester suggests that there are four families of institutions that mediate between
structure and action. Again, these institutions reflect the dichotomy between
content/context; system/lifeworid ; and forces/relations of production. The two 'system' and/or
production oriented institutions are : i) administrative, technological and scientific
organizations ; and ii) financial-economic organizations . The two 'lifeworld' or reproductive
institutions are i) legal regulatory agencies and ii) social-moral organizations . Forester says
that while a certain type of action and interaction is associated with each mediating
institution, each mediating institution will "involve each of the four claims constituting
communicative action" (175) .
To reiterate, policies are seen to alter the structures and social actions of a society by
altering the institutions that mediate between the two . While it is not likely that a single
policy, such as the one which gave rise to the CDP, will in itself spur a wholesale change in
society, it is possible that a policy can change a mediating institution, like DIAND . In
Forester's words
each particular policy proposal promises to influence these institutions
either to enable or disable, empower or disempower, specific possibilities of
popular political debate and mobilization, of popular challenge or traditional
class struggles (1993 : 145) .
It is true that mediating institutions develop differentially . For example the forces that
control capital may be able to 'set agendas' in the production and reproduction of knowledge
(e .g ., in university laboratories) - so this ability to set agendas is not absolute . It is also true
that there are "pockets of resistance" to this agenda-setting which are able to organize
attention in other directions (1993 : 144) .
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2.2.2.6
	
Levels of Analysis
Seeking to understand policy initiatives in terms of social reproduction may direct us to
investigate what policies do and how they work . It does not, however, tell us where to
actually begin our investigation. If an analysis is to be informative and useful to planning
practitioners and academics alike, it cannot be limited to highly theoretical discussions of
the structures which circumscribe the activities of planners and planning agencies. It must
also deal with issues such as the nature of bureaucratic agencies and the possibilities of
independent action . Further, analysis on three levels - structural, organizational and
individual - need not conflict with, but ought to complement, each other .
Throughout his discussion of planning as communicative action, Forester understands
policy-making as a mechanism of shaping attention to issues in a certain way rather than as
information processing. In this sense, he understands planning and policy-making as "the
organizing (or disorganizing) of citizens' attention to possibilities of action" (Forester, 1993 :
30). At each level - structural, organizational and individual - the analysis may be organized
around the four reproduction processes which shape the practice of planning or policy-
making: issue definition ; beliefs ; consent; and trust .
At the structural level the ability to shape attention depends on the ability to "invest or
control various forms of capital . For as capital is accumulated, controlled, and invested, so is
the social capacity to pay attention concentrated, organized, allocated and invested" (1993 :
30). In a way that mirrors what functional Marxists say about the accumulation and
legitimation functions of the state, Forester says that at the structural level attention is
organized in two ways : productively and reproductively . In the first instance, attention is
organized in the interest of one group to the exclusion of another . In the second instance,
attention is organized so that social and political relations are reproduced to sustain the
productive organization of attention . An analysis at the structural level suggests that the
researcher ask questions regarding how structural factors influence the activities of
planners, and how planners might respond to structural obstacles (Forester, 1993 : 31), and
more specifically, how planners might attempt to define the issues, or might respond to
attempts by others to define issues in a certain way .
Mandates, responsibilities and precedents shape attention at the organizational level .
Organizations are able to reproduce themselves through communicative interactions within
their membership and between their members and the public . As such, an organization may
shape the beliefs and activities of its members as well as the way they interact with their
clients. The actual analysis at this level might focus on how organizations influence the
beliefs of their members and as a result the beliefs of the publics ; how members and the
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public might influence and change the organization ; and how organizations maintain their
legitimacy.
Finally, analysis at the individual level would focus on the factors which affect how
actors are more or less successful in shaping the understanding, beliefs, consent, and trust
of people both within and outside of their organization . Some individuals may work well
within the constraints of a particular organization, while others may be stifled . Still others
might contribute to changing or redirecting an organization while the actions of their
colleagues might promote stasis . A complete analysis of planning practice must take into
account issues at the individual level, in addition to analysis at the structural and
organizational levels (Forester, 1993 : 31-34) .
2.2.2.7
	
Background Consensus
Understanding how policies alter mediating institutions is only part of a critical theory
of policy analysis. Forester uses the term `background consensus' to refer to the definition
and historical constitution of 'policy problems .' Accordingly, a policy problem (a claim that
something is not right) can be understood in terms of its definition by the following four
validity claims (See Table 2.2) :
1. Attention-directing claims communicated either verbally or non-verbally (i .e . through
behaviour such as investment of money) . This claim formulates how the problem is to be
understood in the first place (for example, is the 'Indian problem' understood as a
problem of assimilation, institutionalized racism, cultural adaptation, greed, biological
inferiority, colonization, bureaucratic incompetence, etc .)
2. Cognitive claims of fact established through `scientific' research, study and reports .
3. Legitimacy claims based on normative authority (i .e ., authority based on legislation,
legal decisions, and cultural and social norms) .
4. Expressive claims made by individual actors (i .e ., actors expressing their interests and
intentions such as co-operation, conflict, solidarity, opposition . . . )(Forester, 1993: 147) .
Table 2.2 Processes of Background Consensus.
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The background consensus pertaining to a particular problem will depend upon
historical experience - how a problem has been framed and interpreted by different studies
and/or experts, how it has been treated by official agencies, and how individuals act and
react in regards to the issue . Already established relations of power constitute background
consensus which accompany "established political, social and cultural institutions" (149) . In
other words, the status quo exists as a result of the power relations that exist between
institutions . Those individuals, groups or movements that challenge the status quo also
challenge established power relations . In response to challenges, the communicative
infrastructure may resist and label the challengers as "naysayers, complainers,
troublemakers, opportunists, heretics, traitors, agitators, crazies, 'weirdos', the simply
'unreasonable' and so on"(149) .
If the background consensus is what social movements must challenge, then the
maintenance of background consensus is also the maintenance of power . Those individuals
'in power' may invoke "precedent, incentives, sanctions, exclusion, ostracization, stigma
[and] threat" in order to maintain background consensus and established power relations
(150) . If background consensus is lost, then change will occur - possibly through the
initiation of a social struggle .
2.3 ROAD MAP FOR ANALYSIS
The purpose of Part 3 of this chapter is to clearly lay out the analytical framework that
will be used to interpret the CDP . All too often theory seems to be irrelevant to the real
world. Forester suggests that this might be due to a misconception that theory corresponds
to the real world (Forester, 1993 : 40-1) . Forester proposes instead that theory should be
used to "pattern attention selectively to meaningful parts of our world ." In this sense, an
analytical framework ought to "sensitize us to the important variables in a situation ." The
analytical framework outlined below identifies the important issues . The most important
aspect of the critical framework to be employed here is that it will
lead us to examine the systematic, policy institutionalized reproduction of
citizens' power and powerlessness : of citizens' knowledge or ignorance, free
consent or oppression, co-operation or manipulation, attention to or
distraction from pressing social needs, and the corresponding suppression or
realization of socially and politically generalizable interests (Forester, 1993 :
160) .
The analysis will be undertaken in two steps - both corresponding to the discussions
above in Part2 . The first step will be to establish the background consensus . This involves
setting the historical context, including the Canadian government's treatment of Aboriginal
26

issues in general, and a more detailed analysis of the background consensus with respect to
the CDP in particular. Following Forester's lead, the background consensus will be
characterized in terms of the four claims-making activities identified above : i) attention
directing; ii) cognitive ; iii) legitimacy; and iv) expressive . This analysis is undertaken in
chapter 3 .
The second step of the analysis will locate the CDP within the context of the
communicative infrastructure of society and the four reproductive processes (issue
definition, beliefs, consent and trust) that Forester has identified . As policies are seen to
alter the communicative infrastructure of society, the task in the second step of the analysis
will be to show how the CDP differed from previous IAB policies with respect to the social
reproduction of issue definition, belief, consent, and trust, as well as what impact the CDP
had on the mediating institutions which implemented it (i .e ., the IAB). To put this in a
slightly different way, the communicative infrastructure is seen to mediate between actions
and structures . Evaluating how a policy alters the communicative infrastructure includes
evaluating how a given policy alters or impacts both systemic relations (including the
reproduction of issue definition and belief - e.g ., relations between Canada and First
Nations) and social interactions (including the reproduction of consent and trust - e.g .,
relations between and among Aboriginal peoples and agents of the state) . The analysis of
how the CDP differed from previous policies of the IAB will constitute the body of chapter 4 .
All three levels of analysis - structural, organizational, and individual - will be
considered with respect to background consensus (Chapter 3) and the investigation into the
CDP (chapter 4) .
2 7
CHAPTER 3 - LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter is divided into two parts . In Part 1, I look to the relevant literature to
identify the debates on the nature and history of Canadian policy toward Aboriginal
peoples. Part 2is dedicated to exploring the background consensus surrounding the
Community Development Program . This includes a discussion of the Canadian scene in the
period from the Second World War until the establishment of the CDP in the early 1960s .
The discussion in this chapter will be set in the context of the four processes of social
reproduction (issue definition, cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization)
and the three levels of analysis (individual, organizational, and structural) as discussed in
chapter 2 .
3.1 INDIAN POLICY IN CANADA - PRE CONFEDERATION TO
MODERNITY
Buckley (1992: 102-3) characterized the Community Development Program as a "third
world solution . . . which revealed the IAB's continuing obsession with `backwardness' ." The
investigation at hand tests whether the CDP was, in Buckley's words, yet another
backward-minded and ill-conceived strategy characteristic of the IAB and its bureaucrats,
or whether it represented a departure from the policies which preceded it. I hypothesize
that the CDP is different in kind from traditional IAB policies . In order to test this, it is
necessary first to establish the nature of state policies towards Aboriginal peoples prior to
the CDP .
Although almost none of the literature dealing with Aboriginal issues cites Habermas
(the exception being Ponting 1986: 143, and Wotherspoon & Dickinson, 1991), retrofitting
these analyses to identify the different sorts of social reproduction which are central to
Habermas's and Forester's work is not difficult .
3.1 .1
	
BEFORE CANADA WAS CANADA.
Most of those who seek to understand the position of Aboriginal peoples in Canada turn
at some point to the history of their relations with the Canadian State . Many also look to
the policies of the Confederation and pre-Confederation era to understand more recent
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trends. The earliest policies in what was to become Canada reflected the colonial
government's military dependence on Aboriginal peoples . For their part, the British sought
to keep Aboriginal peoples "content, so that when war broke out with the Americans, they
would fight on the British side, or at least not on the American" (Upton, 1973 : 55). The
decreasing importance of First Nations as military allies precipitated the first major shift in
Aboriginal policy . Miller (1989 : 100) and Upton (1973 : 51) agree that it was around 1830 -
after Aboriginal people's importance as military allies began to wane - that the British and
civil governments in Upper and Lower Canada first became interested in isolating
Aboriginal peoples on reserves for assimilation through proselytization and education (see
also Frideres, 1988 : 28). Although Aboriginal peoples were still involved in trade and
exploration, this role was eclipsed in importance by the freeing up of land for settlement
(Miller, 1989 : 189-90) . Rather than becoming the 'homelands' promised by the colonial
powers, Indian Reserves became sites for "social and cultural [re-] engineering" (Tobias,
1987 : 148-50 ; see also Tobias 1976 : 22; Dyck, 1991 : 81; Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993 :
28). The initial focus of this resocialization was to de-emphasize traditional subsistence
practices, which the colonialists perceived to be antithetical to the "burgeoning capitalist
economic system," in favour of pseudo-mainstream pursuits (Frideres, 1990 : 99 ;
Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993 : 81). This was also the beginning of the state's attempt to
restructure kinship units in Aboriginal communities into the Eurocentric family ideal
(Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993 : 83; Dyck, 1991 : 26). Besides the other features of state
policy, there was an overriding tendency to emphasize the individual to the detriment of the
community; to deal with individuals rather than First Nations (Tobias, 1987 : 148-50 ; see
also Tennant, 1990 : 139) . According to Dyck (1991 : 88), state policies sought to rid
Aboriginal peoples "of `backward' forms of communal organization by aggressively
promoting the liberal ideal of possessive individualism ." Interestingly, this current was still
alive in 1969 when the federal government introduced its White Paper, which maintained
the focus on the individual rather than the community (Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 16)
The pre-Confederation period marked the introduction of an organized, rational and
bureaucratic element into the daily life of Aboriginal peoples . Even before 1867 the colonial
state began, to borrow the words of Barrow, to push its "institutional rhizomes ever more
deeply into the soil of civil society", and more specifically into the lifeworld of Aboriginal
peoples (Barrow, 1993 : 7). This altered the social relations of the first societies in North
America, which had been reproduced for millennia prior to the arrival of Europeans through
the "economy of the hunt" and the distribution of spoils though the "familial social
structure" (Habermas, 1989 : 116-118) .
Although the nature of pre-contact social reproduction among Aboriginal peoples is not
the subject of this investigation, it is clear that with the colonization of the Americas came
the subsequent colonization of Aboriginal peoples' lifeworld by economic and bureaucratic
systems. By the time of Confederation, the accumulation of capital had become increasingly
important, and the lifeworld of Aboriginal peoples had consequently become problematic . It
may be useful to recall the definition of lifeworld from the second chapter as "the reservoir
of implicitly known traditions and taken-for-granted background assumptions which are
embedded in language and culture, drawn upon by individuals in their everyday lives"
(Arato and Cohen, 1992 : 201). Forester (1993 : 30) points out that "As capital is accumulated,
controlled, and invested, so is the social capacity to pay attention concentrated ." This ability
to "pay attention" (i .e ., the ability to set agendas, and/or to define issues or problems in one
way as opposed to another) is organized both productively and reproductively. In our case,
colonial powers produced certain situations, such as Aboriginal people confined to Indian
Reserves, and it also began to reproduce social relations of dominance and control. In the
time leading up to Confederation, the basis of these relations changed from being symbiotic
in nature, to relations characterized by coercion and dependence . In pre-Confederation
Canada, this meant that Aboriginal issues came to be defined by those more interested in
land settlement than in living with Aboriginal peoples (this remained the fact, in spite of the
text of the Treaties signed with First Nations) .
3.1.2
	
PROTECTION, CIVILIZATION, AND ASSIMILATION
Following Confederation, protection and isolation accompanied civilization and
assimilation as the central pillars of state policy towards Aboriginal people in Canada . At
least until the early 20th century, and by some accounts up to 1945 (Fleras and Elliot, 1992 :
10), the state took up the role of 'protecting' Aboriginal peoples from the "rapacious
members of the newly dominant society" and the effects of "certain accoutrements of
civilization" such as liquor, taxes, and fee simple land possession (Miller, 1989 : 191 ;
Johnson, 1984 : 2 ; Tobias, 1976 : 14; Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 16-7
; Upton, 1973 : 59; Fleras
and Elliot, 1992: 77) .
In the 19th century it was thought that reserves would provide a protective
environment in which Aboriginal peoples might be `reshaped' to "reflect the civilized ways of
life and ideals of Euro-Canadian society" (Dyck, 1991 : 26; Tobias, 1976 : 22) . It was believed
that only after civilization was achieved would assimilation be possible (Tobias, 1987 : 148) .
By the 20th century, however, this approach had been rethought and policies aimed at
getting Aboriginal people off reserves came into favour. Perhaps because it was believed
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that 'civilization' had been accomplished (at least for Aboriginal peoples east of Lake
Superior), conventional wisdom within the government changed . The prevailing view
asserted that assimilation could only be achieved if Aboriginal people were removed from
the "protective environment of the reserve" (Tobias, 1976 : 22-3) .
The contradiction between the objectives of assimilation and protection has not gone
unnoticed (Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 12) . Indeed, the contradictory nature of the state
when it comes to Aboriginal issues is a recurring theme in the literature . With regard to
assimilation, the basic contradiction is between the persistence of assimilation as a policy
objective and the lack of steps taken to actually bring Aboriginal peoples into mainstream
society.
Before assimilation as a policy objective is discussed, it should be noted that the concept
is open to considerable criticism . Besides being inherently ethnocentric (Li, 1988 : 7), it is
very difficult to operationalize . In other words, it is next to impossible to determine the
characteristics which are both necessary and sufficient for assimilation, and therefore it is
impossible to say when an individual or group has become 'assimilated' . As Wotherspoon
and Satzewich (1993 : 4) point out, "there is considerable potential for shifting the goal posts
of assimilation to make it impossible to achieve ."
This difficulty accepted, it is odd at the very least that the isolation of Aboriginal
peoples continually increased in spite of the state's supposed commitment to assimilation .
Tobias (1987) maintains that with each successive failure to achieve assimilation, the
Canadian government devised new plans - with each being no more successful than the
previous. Ponting and Gibbins (1980 : 18) state that the IAB stubbornly initiated
assimilationist policies in spite of constant failure . They say that because of their "isolation,
racial and linguistic distinctiveness, marginality in the labour force, and the gulf between
Native and European cultural patterns, Indians proved to be a difficult group to assimilate ."
Other factors also militated against assimilation : the Canadian public was generally
unreceptive to Aboriginal peoples ; Aboriginal people perceived little to be gained through
assimilation ; and the Indian Act frustrated rather than facilitated the integration of
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. "Not uncharacteristically, the government tried
simultaneously to achieve conflicting policy goals . In the end assimilation - not to mention
Indians - was the victim" (Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 18-19) .
Dyck (1991) has framed his discussion of relations between First Nations and the state
in terms of his concept of tutelage . According to Dyck a tutelary system is based on an
unequal power relationship where one party is subject to the will of another . In Canada this
relationship is based on the premise of Euro-Canadian moral and cultural superiority
(Dyck, 1991 : 24-5) . As policy, the objective of tutelage "has been to reshape Indians so they
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may acquire and reflect the civilized ways of life and ideals of Euro-Canadian society" (Dyck,
1991: 26). The task remains of explaining how 'assimilationist' policies could co-exist with
the reality of dependent and isolated Aboriginal communities . Dyck's (1991 : 31-2) analysis
has both structural and organizational elements . In structural, or political economic, terms
Dyck points out that the position of Aboriginal peoples in Canada has been the result of
their economic marginality - itself a result, in part, of the appropriation of land and
resources from First Nations. Citing organizational factors, Dyck says that as soon as the
military threat posed by Aboriginal peoples subsided and their land was occupied, the
Agents of the Indian Administration operated outside of public scrutiny . This allowed
Agents of the state to explain policy and program failures as the fault of Aboriginal peoples
rather than as the result of structural limitations, ill-guided policies, or incompetent and/or
malicious officials . For their part, officials of the IAB often claimed that while the present
generation of Aboriginal peoples was not capable of assimilating into 'white' Canada
because of their customs and traditions, the next generation might succeed if only the rules
set down by the IAB were strictly enforced . This provided the justification for the
continuation of a paternalistic (tutelary) relationship between the IAB and Aboriginal
peoples (Dyck, 1991 : 87-88) .
An analysis of education policies directed towards Aboriginal people reveals similar
themes. According to Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1992 : 123) schooling was used for
"purposes of political containment and . .. [tio ensure the stability of native populations in
isolation for some future possible use ." Tobias (1976) asserts a similar thesis - claiming that
state legislation hindered rather than furthered the integration of Aboriginal peoples into
'mainstream' society .
For his part, Frideres (1988: 253-254) believes that the manifest or stated objectives of
state policies are accompanied by latent objectives . The most powerful of these latent
objectives within the IAB is the control and regulation of Aboriginal peoples - or, in the
language of Habermas and Forester, it would be the reproduction of consent . As such,
Frideres says that within the IAB, success has been measured in terms of how well the
Aboriginal population has been controlled, rather than how well the programs accomplish
their objectives (see also Ponting and Gibbins, 1980) . Wotherspoon and Satzewich make a
similar point with reference to the capitalist mode of production :
[W]hile political, organizational, and legal factors are rarely fully cohesive,
rational and successful, the thrust of state activity in the area of indigenous
affairs has been an attempt to reproduce a group of peoples who are
politically and economically manageable within the broad framework of
national and international capitalist development (1993 : 110) .
Thus, although the latent and manifest objectives may contradict one another, there is
no apparent contradiction between the latent objectives of the IAB on the one hand and the
development of global capitalism and the reproduction of consent, on the other . Irrespective
of whether the 'real' objectives of assimilationist policies were integration or isolation, it
became obvious to many, even prior to World War I, that the government's treatment of
Aboriginal peoples had the opposite effect of assimilation (Miller, 1989 : 213) .
3.1.2.1
	
Social Integration and Socialization
Two of the reproduction processes discussed in chapter 2 - social integration and
socialization - can be identified here . Although referred to as social integration, the term
should not be taken to mean that the reproduction process is one that integrated Aboriginal
peoples into mainstream society . Rather, it is a process based on claims of normative and
institutionalized legitimacy, which reproduce patterns of consent, allegiance or deference .
The reproduction of the policies of assimilation, protection and civilization were established
via the institutions of society - the legislatures, the courts, and the government agencies .
They were based on the Indian Act, established in the Parliament in Ottawa, enforced by
the courts, policing agencies, and most often the IAB, and carried out by the officials of
various government agencies, usually Indian Agents . Regardless of their assimilationist
rhetoric, these policies accomplished the reproduction of patterns of consent and deference
to the status quo among Aboriginal peoples .
The second reproduction process is well illustrated with respect to education . While
education is part of the process of social integration and the reproduction of consent, it may
also be seen in terms of socialization and identity formation . Corrigan et al . (1987: 23) state
that "[s]chooling seeks to make selves . It aims at moral regulation, at the construction of the
principles of the existence of the self in such a way that `self-rule' or `self-government' would
result." Satzewich and Mahood (1995 : 4) say that throughout the history of Indian
administration in Canada, education has been "the chief means by which Indian children
were to be socialized into becoming Christian, English-speaking workers, farmers and
homemakers ." This applies especially well to residential schools, where the lives of
Aboriginal students were closely specified - often for 10 or 12 months of the year .
3.1.3 THE INDIAN ACT AND THE INDIAN AFFAIRS BRANCH:
CONTRADICTION AND CONFUSION
While the previous section emphasizes structural factors in the history of relations
between Canada and First Nations, other commentators pitch their analysis at the
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organizational and individual level . Harold Cardinal (1969 : 65), interpreted the activities of
the federal Indian administration in the following manner :
[T]he approach of the federal government to the problems faced by our
people suggests a bewildered horse doctor. Because he doesn't know what he
is doing, and because the last thing he will admit is that he doesn't know
what he is doing, he scurries about surveying and resurveying the symptoms
and prescribing piecemeal remedies . He never gets around to examining the
causes of the ailment; consequently he never has the right remedy .
Unfortunately the problem affects the horse even more than it does the
doctor. The horse dies .
The analogy highlights Cardinal's emphasis on a dysfunctional and retrograde bureaucracy .
While this organizational account differs from the structural accounts offered above by
Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993) and Frideres (1988), they are not incongruent with each
other .
This points to a second theme found in the literature - that the bureaucracy responsible
for the administration of Aboriginal affairs is home to a number of contradictions . Before
weighing the puzzling nature of the IAB, it might first help to consider the sort of planning
activity historically practised at the IAB. Forester (1993 : 19-24) distinguishes between a
number of different models of what planners do and how they do it . The different models
reflect the different ways of thinking about planning. The means-ends approach, originated
by Alexander Hamilton - Secretary Treasurer to George Washington - has been the most
enduring approach to planning (Friedmann, 1987 : 3-4) . It is also the model which best
characterizes the activities of the IAB, at least until the 1960s and probably beyond . Based
on instrumental rationality, the means-ends approach draws a distinction between values
(policy objectives) and facts (the means to accomplish the objectives) . The model is
predicated on the assumption that while the ends may be value laden, the means used to
achieve them are value neutral and may be selected by technicians using the "least cost"
principle (Friedmann, 1987 : 4). As such, means-ends planning is dependent on a set of
stable ends (Forester, 1993 : 20) .
There are a number of problems with planning as a "scientific endeavour" as found in
the means-ends approach : i) often the ends are not a'given' and they are not stable
- on the
contrary, in many instances there are conflicting ends (i .e ., protection, assimilation, and
settlement) ; ii) there are always competing and conflicting means for any end (and the ends
are subject to change with the preferences of publics, politicians and planners) ; iii) neither
the means, nor those who make decisions about which means to use, can be considered
neutral; and iv) means-ends thinking tends to emphasize activities surrounding the means
while minimizing discussion about the desirability and/or attainability of the ends (Forester,
1993: 20). Forester (1993
: 20) says that "[w]hen we think this way, we act as if we could
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bury our heads, be neutral, and apply `means' and let someone else worry about the `ends' ."
This problem becomes especially pronounced when one set of means is used to satisfy
multiple and different ends. Take as a case in point, the example of Indian Reserves. On one
hand, reserves were to provide Aboriginal peoples refuge from the undesirable elements of
the newly developing Canadian society, in order that they could be `civilized' and prepared
for assimilation into Canadian society . On the other hand, restricting Aboriginal peoples to
Indian Reserves freed up land for settlement and economic development for a rapidly
growing country. It is not difficult to see that the latter took precedent over the former, if
indeed the former was ever even a serious consideration . It is even less difficult to see that
the means in this example are anything but value-neutral .
According to Dyck (1991: 75) the administration was "not only mean and avaricious in
purpose and pompously moralistic in tone, but. . . . also frequently racked with internal
inconsistencies and paradoxes ." Historically, Ponting and Gibbins point out that following
Confederation, the Department of the Interior was charged with the twin responsibilities of
protecting Aboriginal peoples and encouraging white settlement (1980 : 15) . Fleras and
Elliott (1992: 81-2) claim the post WWII Department of Indian Affairs had multiple
mandates and competing agendas . The IAB is required to both observe the Indian Act, and
in recent years to encourage self-sufficiency among Aboriginal people . According to Fleras
and Elliot (1992: 83),
[t]he department finds itself in the unusual position of intermediary
between the state and the Aboriginal nations . This middle ground means
that it must fulfil its obligations to the government and state, yet at the
same time be responsive and answerable to its Aboriginal clients - without
much support from either sector .
This is likely enough to ensure that bureaucrats will come into 'direct collision' with
each other and with Aboriginal peoples . The IAB has been accused of doing both 'too much'
and 'too little' for Aboriginal peoples - creating a situation of dependence in the first
instance, and for failing to meet even its basic fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples in
the second. Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 : 41) point to the intersection of class, gender
and race when they state that "policies that directly or indirectly impinge on Indian people
reflect, then, the outcomes of complex struggles and contradictions within DIAND and the
civil service more generally ." They also use the concept of unequal representation as
articulated by Mahon (1977) . Simply put, this is the idea that state institutions perform the
contradictory functions of representation and control, and that economically powerful
groups are better represented, while less powerful groups are subject to more control . These
factors are exacerbated by the fact that as a bureaucracy, the Department exhibits the
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rigidity and inefficiency that characterizes all large bureaucratic organizations (Fleras and
Elliott, 1992 : 82) .
Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 : 82) see the contradictions in the IAB and its policies
as deriving from a basic contradiction within the Indian Act : "it obligates the state to
recognize the 'special status' of those it defines as Indians, while at the same time the state
is authorized to set the conditions for the extinguishment of any distinct status" (See also
Johnson, 1984 : 1). The first Indian Act was created through the consolidation of a number of
separate pieces of legislation in 1876, shortly before the creation of the first IAB in 1880 .
This meant that colonial policies from prior to Confederation predetermined the Indian Act
of 1876 (MacInnes, 1946: 388; Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 8; Tobias, 1976 : 16) . It was from
the Indian Act that the IAB derived its paternalistic character, and through the Indian Act
that the IAB pursued the contradictory goals of assimilation and protection (Fleras and
Elliott, 1992 : 76; Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 12) . The Indian Act of 1876 had three key
features: it defined who was an Indian ; it protected Indian lands (but usually only when it
was convenient and did not affect profitability or settlement) ; and it established a single
authority over Aboriginal peoples (Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993: 30-34) . It was this
final feature, the "sweeping power that it gave to administrators" which Ponting and
Gibbins (1980: 11) refer to as the most remarkable and influential . The Indian Agents
became the "new white chiefs" who displaced traditional leaders (Manuel and Posluns, 1974 :
54), to such an extent that eventually the main function of elected Band Councils was to
administer monies from Ottawa, making them "more accountable to federal authorities than
to the local community" (Fleras and Elliott, 1992 : 78) . The Indian Act was, and probably
still is, the most powerful tool in the reproduction of consent among Aboriginal peoples to
the legitimacy of their relationship with the state .
3.1.4
	
DETERMINANTS OF STATE POLICY
Explanations for the nature of state policy concerning Aboriginal peoples generally fall
into two categories . The first seeks to explain policies in terms of racism and ignorance,
while the second emphasizes political and economic factors . The perceived moral and
cultural superiority of European colonists is often cited as the primary impetus for the
definition of an 'Indian problem' consisting of some moral deficiency in Aboriginal peoples .
Official policies based on these racist and ethnocentric assumptions tend to propose 'social
Darwinist' solutions which entail changing Aboriginal peoples . (Dyck, 1991 : 24-25, chapter
3 ; Fleras and Elliott, 1992 : 3-4; Marule, 1978: 103-3; Upton, 1973 : 51)
Frideres (1988 : 2-3) believes racism was the fundamental guiding principle of Canadian
Aboriginal policy, with Canadians at large and the policy-makers among them believing
that Aboriginal people were "biologically and socially inferior." As a result this provided "a
sound rational basis for discrimination against Natives at both the individual and
institutional level ." These racist attitudes serve "those who want to remain in power and
maintain the status quo that excludes Native Canadians ."
Those commentators who take racism and ignorance as the starting points for their
investigation into the administration of Aboriginal affairs in Canada tend to conduct their
analyses at the individual and organizational level . This means that ineffective and
malevolent policies are seen as the result of racist institutions, staffed with racist people .
The second way of explaining state policies looks to political and economic factors rather
than to racism . Researchers who follow this line of inquiry tend to locate their analysis at a
structural level where attention is organized in two ways : productively and reproductively .
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the dualistic nature of the structural organization
of attention resembles what Marxists refer to as the accumulation and legitimation
functions in capitalist society. Productively, attention is organized in such a way that the
goals of one group (which may be economic) are more likely to be realized than the goals of
another group. One example of this might be with respect to employment - while full
employment might benefit most members of our society, under-employment serves to keep
the cost of labour down and thus be beneficial for those who own the means of production .
Reproductively, attention is organized so that social relations that have produced allegiance
and consent are reproduced politically and socially . In other words, there is a reproduction
of the social relations that are necessary for the maintenance of a given set of productive
relations .
While accepting that racism and ignorance figured into the administration of Aboriginal
affairs in Canada, structural analyses point to political and economic factors, suggesting
that state policies are "shaped and constrained by the nature of the distribution of economic
power" and that "the history of Indian administration is tied to the development of a
capitalist mode of production characterized by racism and class and gender relations"
(Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993 : 36, 17) . Analysts using a structural approach further
note that the shift from exchange-based merchant forms of capitalism to production-based
industrial capitalism required a change in the policies towards Aboriginal peoples and the
land that they occupied. In this sense, the reproductive organization of attention (e.g .,
policies that reproduce social relations) follows from productive requirements (Wotherspoon
and Satzewich , 1993 : 18-22) . During merchant capitalism, it was advantageous to capital
and the Crown for Aboriginal people to occupy a large land base to enable them to provide
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as many trade goods as possible from hunting and trapping . With the advent of industrial
capitalism and its requirement of private property, it became advantageous to negotiate
Treaties with First Nations that would see Aboriginal peoples restricted to reserves . The
fact that reserves were used as a "location where Indian people were to be resocialized"
confirms for Wotherspoon and Satzewich that state policy sought to place Aboriginal peoples
in certain positions within the capitalist relations of production - usually as farmers and
wage labourers (1993 : 28-29; see also Dyck, 1991 : 81) . This view is shared in part by Fleras
and Elliott, who see the state as constrained by virtue of its position within a capitalist
economic order (1992 : 82-3) . Others, such as Dyck (1991 : 29-30) point simply to the material
greed for land among the colonizers and the effect that this had on state policy (see also
Upton, 1973 : 56) .
Another political economic theme, put forth by Internal Colonial theorists but pitched at
an individual / organizational level, is that IAB bureaucrats have acted to prevent economic
development schemes from succeeding to ensure that their jobs at the IAB remain secure
(see Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 and Frideres, 1988) . Pointing out the unlikelihood of IAB
bureaucrats ever purposely working themselves out of their jobs, Wotherspoon and
Satzewich (1993: 250-3) are critical of this 'conspiratorial' approach to the extent that it
forgoes structural political and economic factors and instead locates the responsibility for
ineffective state policies with individuals . This does not mean that an analysis should not
occur at the individual or organizational level, but it is problematic when it pre-empts a
structural analysis . Cardinal's (1969 : 66-7) assessment of federal Aboriginal administration
also casts doubt on the conspiratorial formulation offered by ICM theorists . He says quite
simply that policies and programs did not fail as a result of sabotage by IAB officials, but
rather because the IAB "has been so busy trying to manage its own growth that it never has
had time to worry much about Indian growth ."
Satzewich and Mahood (1995 :1) have managed to bridge the gap between individual,
organizational and structural analyses with respect to Indian Agents and the residential
school system . While they recognize that Indian Agents were often akin to "petty tyrants
who ruled over mini-fiefdoms and were bent on destroying the spirit and initiative of Indian
people," they argue that a more sophisticated understanding of the role of the Indian Agent
is required. They argue that rather than being in complete control, Indian Agents had the
responsibility of dealing with a number of competing interests, from "the interests and
resistance's of Indian people . . . [to] the varied interests of different social classes, corporate
entities, municipalities and church and missionary organizations" (2) . Forester (1993 : 30-1)
says that given the way structural factors direct attention with respect to policy problems
(or define the policy problem), it is interesting to investigate how policy-makers anticipate
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and respond to these factors. In much the same way, Satzewich and Mahood (1995 : 26) state
that :
if the position of Indian Agent is to be understood dialectically, as a social
position which was charged with fulfilling a contradictory mandate of
representing and controlling Indian people, then what becomes interesting
about the role of Indian Agent is the way in which they managed and tried
to resolve the pressures and contradictions they faced .
In many instances the balance struck between competing interests limited the Agent's
ability to act on behalf of Aboriginal peoples . Satzewich and Mahood (1995 : 13-14) cite one
example of an Indian Agent in the late 1940s who submitted a report condemning
residential schools and recommended that they be closed down . The response of officials at
the IAB was to pass the report on to the religious order responsible for the operation of the
school. The Bishop of this order indicated to the Agent that he ought not be concerned with
the operation of the school . The result was that while the Agent "remained interested in the
care of the children in school . . . [he] did not publicly challenge the continued existence of
residential schools again ."
This contradiction was to be found not only among the front-line agents of the IAB, but
also among its executive. The Superintendent General of the Indian Department, although
charged with the twin responsibility of acting as the "guardian of Indian rights" and
representing the government, "found it impossible to advance the interests of both parties at
the same time" (Johnson, 1984: 14 cites Canada, Sessional Papers, 1947) .
3.1.5
	
SUMMATION OF PART 1
This concludes the first part of this chapter dealing with Canadian State policies
towards Aboriginal peoples prior to WWII . There are some themes that clearly characterize
this period. First, the state became increasingly active in all aspects of the social
reproduction of the lives of Aboriginal peoples, especially after military alliance became less
important. Second, economic factors - initially in the context of the fur trade and later with
respect to settlement - were a determining factor in the everyday lives of Aboriginal peoples
.
Increased state and economic involvement in the reproduction of the lifeworld of Aboriginal
peoples forced an abandonment of traditional forms of social reproduction . A notable
example of this was the banning of the Potlatch ceremony on the northwest pacific coast .
This ceremony was central in the social reproduction of Aboriginal society . According to
Tennant (1991 :7-8), the potlatch was the "hallmark of coastal society" and served to
:
legitimize political rank and authority, that is, to validate the rightful
possession of prestige and the use of chiefly power and influence . At some
time in his early life the heir presumptive to a chieftainship would be
presented formally to a group of guests at such an affair .
With the banning of the potlatch, coastal Aboriginal peoples were deprived of a key
institution of their social reproduction .
The third theme that may be pulled from the literature is that racism and ignorance
influenced the nature of Aboriginal policy in Canada . It served as a justification for the
unfair treatment of Aboriginal peoples and led to the definition of Aboriginal issues as an
"Indian problem" to be corrected through resocialization . Fourth, the policies of the IAB had
the effect of producing and reproducing consent among Aboriginal peoples, both as
individuals and as a population, to existing power relations . In the words of Wotherspoon
and Satzewich (1993), the policies of the IAB placed more emphasis on the social control of
Aboriginal peoples than on their representation . The final theme has to do with the IAB as
an organization . The IAB was ill-equipped to represent the interests of Aboriginal peoples in
the face of structural factors that were forcing changes destined to have a significant and
deleterious effect on Aboriginal peoples . Indeed, it appears that the IAB was organized in
such a way as to prevent its officials from being agents for Aboriginal peoples . In other
words, the IAB was successfully producing and reproducing consent, allegiance, and
deference among its Agents as well as Aboriginal peoples .
3.2 ABORIGINAL ISSUES AND THE CANADIAN SCENE : 1945-62
Although it can be argued that the entire history of relations between First Nations and
the Canadian State influenced the development of the CDP, the events that occurred after
WWII had a more direct impact . The second part of this chapter considers the events - in
Canada and internationally - which can be seen to have influenced the development of the
Community Development Program . These events and the atmosphere they occurred in and
created can be seen to constitute the background consensus as discussed toward the end of
chapter 2. In brief, Forester uses the term background consensus to refer to the definition
and historical constitution of 'policy problems .'
The years during the Great Depression and the Second World War had drawn
government attention away from Aboriginal issues to such a degree that only "aimless" and
"ad-hoc" decisions were made with respect to policies (Johnson, 1984 : 14-15; Tobias, 1976 :
24). With the end of the Second World War government officials had more time and
resources to re-dedicate to Aboriginal issues, and as such these issues received renewed
bureaucratic attention . The end of the war also brought a renewed emphasis on expanding
the Canadian infrastructure, especially into northern areas that were predominantly
populated by Aboriginal people . Waxing public interest in Aboriginal issues accompanied
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the increased bureaucratic attention . John Blackmore of the Social Credit Party stated in
the House of Commons in 1947 :
The Canadian people as a whole are interested in the problem of Indians ;
they have become aware that the country has been neglected in the matter
of looking after the Indians and they are anxious to remedy our
shortcomings. Parliament and the country is "human rights" conscious
(Canada, 1979: 133) .
The discussion in the remainder of this chapter concentrates on how the administration
of Aboriginal affairs came to be problematized, and how community development came to be
seen as a part of the solution to that problem .
3.2.1
	
1945 - A NEW WORLD ORDER AND A NATION TO NATION
RELATION .
Dyck (1991 : 98) points out that federal 'tutelage' had traditionally been based not on
relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, but rather on relations between
Aboriginal peoples and those who administered Indian Affairs . This relationship, he argues,
has given way to one between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, with the future
prospects of the former partly dependent on the sentiments of the latter . Wotherspoon and
Satzewich (1993) speak of a shift in the balance between the representation and control of
Aboriginal peoples by the state, with the former gaining importance after the second world
war. This shift occurred after Aboriginal peoples fought in the war in significant numbers
for three reasons . Firstly, Aboriginal peoples in the armed forces provided for regular
contact between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians . For Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples alike, this may have been their first regular contact with each other .
Secondly, Canadian soldiers fought against fascism in Europe . With its defeat, `white'
Canadians began to question the government's racially based policies towards Aboriginal
peoples. On the international stage, the birth of the United Nations in 1945, and a new
world order dedicated to decolonization and human rights made Canada's policies and
administration of Aboriginal affairs seem "archaic, ineffective, and indefensible" (Dyck,
1991: 104) . According to Satzewich and Mahood : "State polices that were based explicitly on
assumptions of the `racial' and cultural inferiority of Indian people were seen as anathema
to many Canadians" (1995 : 6). By the early 1960s, groups such as the Indian-Eskimo
Association began to form (Weaver, 1976 : 24-5). These urban, non-Aboriginal groups, fuelled
by the "anti-poverty craze" produced "sophisticated, organized urban voters, whose view
may have been entirely different" from that of Aboriginal peoples, but "who were,
nonetheless, pointing to the same problems" in the Canadian administration of Aboriginal
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affairs (Manuel and Posluns, 1974 : 129). Thirdly, having fought for Canada in the war,
returning Aboriginal veterans were unwilling to accept their second-class status, and fought
to change it (Fleras and Elliot, 1992 : 42) .
Following the social and material destruction of the Second World War, nation states
began to play a larger role in providing social services directed towards the rebuilding of
cities and economies in Europe and Japan . Elsewhere, former colonies were rapidly
decolonizing and development planning "became a popular instrument for accelerating
economic growth" (Friedmann, 1987 : 7). During the Second World War, the Canadian state
began to provide universal social programs . Dyck (1991 : 80) notes that this had a dramatic
effect on many Aboriginal communities, especially those in the north, where some Bands
experienced a marked increase in their standard of living, without having to give up
hunting and trapping. This meant that while benefits of federally initiated programs were
felt by Aboriginal peoples, they did not become "entirely dependent clients of a closely
supervised mode of federal tutelage ."
3.2.2
	
THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF 1946
Interest groups began to pressure the government to pay more attention to the
legislation, policies and administration of Aboriginal affairs which were increasingly
perceived as unfair and ineffective (Johnson, 1984 : 15). Although calls came forward for a
Royal Commission to investigate the issue and to revise the Indian Act, the government
response was to create a Special Joint Commission of the Senate and House of Commons
(SJC) to study relations between First Nations and the Canadian government and to advise
on changes to the Indian Act and the administration of Aboriginal affairs (Johnson, 1984 :
16) .
Although the SJC resisted Aboriginal participation at almost every turn - it defeated a
motion to have permanent Aboriginal representation to monitor the proceedings of the
committee, with one member saying that "I think it is useless to have Indians sitting around
here," - Aboriginal representatives did make their views known, either through
correspondence or in person (Johnson, 1984 : 17-26) . In fact, many members of the
Commission realized that Aboriginal participation was necessary if the findings of the
Committee were to be seen as legitimate . Thus, although the activities of the Committee
should hardly be described as a "systematic effort by Government to consult with Indians"
(Canada, 1979 : 134), the fact that Aboriginal peoples made presentations at the hearings
regarding their vision for the future was a high water mark for the state in terms of its
consultation with Aboriginal peoples .
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The Committee heard many different messages from people representing many different
First Nations . If there was a unifying theme, though, it was that there should be self-
government for Bands and tribal Councils (Johnson, 1984: 26). In a statement that
foreshadowed the activities of the Community Development Program to come almost two
decades later, Andrew Paull of the North American Indian Brotherhood told the Committee
that the foremost consideration of the IAB should be to :
lift up the morale of the Indians in Canada . That is your first duty . There is
no use in passing legislation about this or that if you do not lift up the
morale of the people . The only way you can lift up the morale of any people
is to let their members look after themselves and look after their people
(Johnson, 1984 : 21 cites Canada, 1946: 427) .
Although the SJC was launched to consider a new direction for Aboriginal policy, its
assimilationist and paternalistic predilections were borne out in its recommendations . In
the most important respects, the positions of government and First Nations could not be
reconciled . The government believed the project of 'civilization' to be almost complete, and
as such, thought that legislation that continued to recognize differences between Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal peoples should be discontinued . Consequently, issues of federal off-
loading and provincial cost-sharing found their roots in the federal government's belief that
provincial governments would begin to extend services to Aboriginal peoples as 'regular'
Canadians, with reserves still being viewed as necessary for the transition only (Tobias,
1976: 25-6) .
The positive recommendations that were made by the SJC, such as increased Aboriginal
involvement in local affairs and new relations between the state and First Nations, were
acted upon "slowly and bureaucratically" by the IAB (Johnson, 1984 : 54-5) . In the end,
Canada stuck to stubborn assumptions about the desirability of assimilation and
integration for Aboriginal peoples - thus ignoring for the first of many times to come,
government sanctioned research into Aboriginal issues and the recommendations of
Aboriginal political organizations (Miller, 1989 : 221-2) .
In 1951, when the revised Indian Act was introduced, it was evident that many changes
had been made ; 50 sections had been eliminated, the Minister's powers had been greatly
reduced, and some of the most aggressive provisions for assimilation had been removed
(Johnson, 1984 : 51) . The Act of 1951 was supposed to be a major rethinking of Canadian
policy towards Aboriginal peoples, and on the surface, it was . Conspicuous in its absence,
however, was a provision for some sort of self-determination . Close scrutiny reveals that
although some of the more restrictive features were removed, the changes to the Indian Act
were more apparent than real. In many important ways, the 1951 Act bore a strong
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resemblance to the 1876 version (Tobias, 1976 : 25; Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 12-3 ;
Johnson, 1984 : 51-55) .
3.2.3
	
ABORIGINAL RESISTANCE
Contrary to much popular belief, Aboriginal people did not constitute a homogenous
underclass of oppressed and powerless peoples . A conference held by the IAB in Ottawa in
February of 1951 to discuss revisions to the Indian Act included representatives from
individual First Nations and Tribal Councils, as well as : the Queen Victoria Treaty
Protection Association, the Indian Association of Alberta, the Native Brotherhood of British
Columbia, the North American Indian Brotherhood, the Indian Association of Manitoba,
and the Union of Saskatchewan Indians . Representatives of these groups made persuasive
calls for Aboriginal self-government, a restructuring of the Indian Act and the Indian
Affairs Branch, and a reduction in the discretionary powers of the Superintendent General .
Thus, while there were "real differences in the power possessed by Indian people and
state authorities, it is equally true that Indian people . . .engaged in various forms of
resistance to state policies and practices" (Satzewich and Mahood, 1995 : 1-2; see also Dyck,
1991 : 4). Titley (1986 : 202) points out that the "first stirring of a new Indian militancy was
making itself felt" during D .C. Scott's tenure as Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs
(1913-32). Aboriginal leaders such as Deskeheh, F .O. Loft, and Andrew Paull were not only
opposed to the way in which Aboriginal affairs were administered in Canada, but were
effective in their opposition . Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993 : 226) concur. They say that
although Aboriginal political organization and resistance prior to 1960 were "primarily local
in nature" Aboriginal peoples did "engage in struggles, both organized and not, to force the
Canadian state to recognize the existence of their Treaty and Aboriginal rights and to
eliminate restrictions on their civil and political rights ."
3.2.4 ENFRANCHISEMENT
Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1990 : 38) propose that following the Second World War,
and especially since federal enfranchisement in 1960, a shift occurred in the dialectic
between the social control and representation of Aboriginal peoples, with the latter growing
in importance . Frideres (1988 : 251) says that a policy of decentralization designed to
promote self-sufficiency among Aboriginal peoples found its roots in a 1959 incident when
Prime Minister Diefenbaker (while on a foreign tour) faced strong criticism of Canada's
policies toward Aboriginal people . This led Diefenbaker to establish a second joint
committee of the Senate and House of Commons (1959-61), to investigate and advise on the
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administration of Indian affairs (Daniel, 1980: 136) . The result was the federal government
enfranchising (granting the right to vote) all Aboriginal peoples and the recommendation
that the IAB "should cease to provide special services to Natives and instead should rely on
and share the existing services of other agencies, including the provincial governments" to
"help Indians to retain and develop their Native characteristics while simultaneously taking
on the full rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizens" (Frideres, 1988: 251, 35) . Thus,
greater self-sufficiency for Aboriginal people increased the provincial cost-sharing and
concurrent federal off-loading trend set by the 1946-49 SJC and continued by the 1959-61
SJC .
The federal vote for Aboriginal peoples is seen by some as having great significance in
terms of the IAB's treatment of Aboriginal people (Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 1993 : 38) .
Prior to 1960, enfranchisement was used to 'lure' Aboriginal people into Canadian society,
although it was clear that the policy was a complete failure at " . . .attracting Indians into
Canadian society at large" (Hawthorn et al ., 1958: 482 ; See also Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 :
22). Hawthorn et al. (1958: 483) pointed out that in British Columbia, enfranchisement
affected Aboriginal people in two ways : it gave them full drinking privileges and prevented
their living on the reserve . Although there doesn't seem to be much evidence in Department
correspondence to show that the franchise changed the way that the IAB interacted with
Aboriginal peoples, it was certainly of "major symbolic significance" (Tennant, 1990 : 148 ;
Ponting and Gibbins, 1980 : 13) .
3.2.5
	
THE UNITED NATIONS TAKES UP THE CAUSE
Changes were taking place in Canada in the way that the state, non-Aboriginal and
Aboriginal Canadians understood each other . At the same time, the community
development movement was coming into its own at the international level . The idea itself
was not new - the "cooperative movement, the extension movement, and the self-help
movement" had all been popular in the first half of the twentieth century in Canada . It was
not until 1948, though, that the term community development was coined (Ponting, 1986 :
140) . It was another seven years before community development achieved "international
respectability" through a 1955 United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs publication entitled
Social Progress Through Community Development (Ponting, 1986 : 140). The UN defined
community development "as a process designed to create conditions of economic and social
progress for the whole community with its active participation and the fullest possible
reliance upon the community's initiative" (UN, 1955 : 6) . According to this document, the
UN's Economic and Social Council and the Social Commission had been interested in the
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role of the local community in "improving the economic and social conditions of their people"
(UN, 1955 : 1). Concentrating at first, in 1951, on the "use of community welfare centres as
effective instruments to promote economic and social progress throughout the world," the
UN later became convinced that community welfare centres should be only one element of a
wider process of "social progress through local action" (UN, 1955 : 2) .
The success of community development was dependent upon a number of assumptions .
The first was that in "practically all communities . . .there are resources that can be tapped if
the people want to and know how to" (UN, 1955 : 6). Second, was that `social progress' would
more likely occur if initiated locally than if it was based upon outside aid . The third was
that problems in multiple areas such as public health, education and agriculture could not
be solved in isolation from each other . As such, community development would "involve all
of the community's various aspects, and would take into consideration the effects of change
in one upon the others" (UN, 1955 : 7) .
The UN document foresaw 10 basic elements for a successful community development
programme. These were :
1. Activities undertaken must correspond to the basic needs of the community ; the first
projects should be initiated in response to the expressed needs of the people .
2. Local improvements may be achieved through unrelated efforts in each substantive
field; however full and balanced community development requires concerted action and
the establishment of multi-purpose programmes .
3. Changed attitudes in people are as important as the material achievements of
community projects during the initial stages of development .
4. Community development aims at increased and better participation of the people in
community affairs, re-vitalization of existing forms of local government and transition
towards effective local administration where it is not yet functioning .
5. The identification, encouragement and training of local leadership should be a basic
objective in any programme .
6. Greater reliance on the participation of women and youth in community projects
invigorates development programmes, establishes them on a wide basis and secures
long-range expansion .
7. To be fully effective, communities' self-help projects require both intensive and extensive
assistance from the Government .
8. Implementation of a community development programme on a national scale requires :
adoption of consistent policies, specific administrative arrangements, recruitment and
training of personnel, mobilization of local and national resources and organization of
research, experimentation and evaluation .
9. The resources of voluntary non-governmental organizations should be fully utilized in
community development programmes at the local, national and international level .
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10 . Economic and social progress at the local level necessitates parallel development on a
wider national scale .
Many points in the above list bear a striking resemblance to the calls by Andrew Paull
of the North American Indian Brotherhood in the late 1940s for the government to lift up
the morale of Aboriginal people through self-reliance . In fact, many of the points in the
above list fit well with contemporary models of self-government (see the Federal Policy
Guide on Self-Government, Canada: 1995) .
Before the end of the decade in Canada, Harry Hawthorn and Jean Lagasse had taken
to heart the advice of the United Nations and incorporated community development into
their studies of the Aboriginal peoples of British Columbia and Manitoba .
3.2.6
	
HAWTHORN AND LAGASSE STUDY THE "INDIAN PROBLEM"
By 1958, Harry Hawthorn, C .S. Belshaw, and S .M. Jamieson had turned in their report
The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment . A group of
social scientists led by Jean Lagasse produced a similar report for the Manitoba government
in 1959 entitled The People ofIndian Ancestry in Manitoba . Both recognized that a new
approach must be found for dealing with Aboriginal issues in Canada .
The Hawthorn Report, which was completed in 1956, but not published until 1958, was
one of, if not the first to recommend the use of community development with respect to
Aboriginal peoples in Canada . One of the key recommendations of Hawthorn et al .'s report,
commissioned federally by Citizenship and Immigration (then responsible for Aboriginal
issues and home to the IAB), was that the LAB embark "on a scheme of community
development" (Hawthorn et al., 1958: vii) . Although the tone in the report was not outright
critical of the IAB, the report did remark that the IAB's terms of reference were too narrow -
confined to issues of property protection rather than the "major ills of society" (Hawthorn et
al., 1958: 429) . Hawthorn et al. realized that a change in the function of the IAB would have
to occur in order for the "radically different" programme of community development to be a
success . Specifically, they said that community development would be "useless unless it is
built into the very framework and spirit of the administering agency, and governs its whole
outlook" (Hawthorn et al., 1958: 429) .
Recommending that the present system of welfare provision be discontinued in favour of
a form that "would contribute to the integration of the individual into the wider
community," Hawthorn et al . (1958: 429) believed that community development could offer
an escape from the "implications of colonialism, imperialism, paternalistic administration
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and assimilation through disintegration ." It was clear to Hawthorn et al . that although the
agents of the IAB were not mean-spirited, their actions with respect to Aboriginal peoples
were paternalistic . It was also clear that "the only method of reducing paternalism in the
administration is the increased association of the Indians in decision-making and executive
responsibility . A mere increase in good will cannot accomplish this" (Hawthorn et al ., 1958:
491). Again, it was thought that community development was particularly well suited to
achieving this .
Lagasse's report reflected similar thinking . The central themes of the report were that
the standard of living for Aboriginal peoples was unacceptably low, and that a new approach
must be found if this was to be changed . Two years after the publication of the report,
Lagasse wrote,
The post-war era has brought Canadians in contact with many
underdeveloped areas and underprivileged people throughout the world . The
sight of poverty abroad reminded them of poverty at home . While the legal
responsibilities for Indian Affairs remains with the federal government,
other levels of government and ordinary citizens are now accepting some
responsibility as well, but much progress still remains to be done in that
direction (1961 : 233) .
One of the recommendations made in Lagasse's report was that "the provincial
government establish a community development program to help people of Indian ancestry
solve their own problems" (Lagasse,1959 : 106). Hawthorn et al. had made similar
recommendations - that provincial government's take more responsibility in providing
services for Aboriginal peoples (1958 : viii). In Manitoba, this recommendation was accepted
and fulfilled with the initiation of a community development program at the provincial level
under Lagasse's direction . Recalling the 1959 report, Lagasse stated that
The new approach, community development, was introduced in the report as
something that the United Nations had utilized in the newly independent
less-developed nations and that should be adapted by the province of
Manitoba to deal with the Indian and Metis question (1971 : 227) .
In his explanation of why a community development program was implemented in
Manitoba when it was, Lagasse (1971 : 228) points to three factors: public opinion ;
governmental support ; and the Aboriginal population . In regards to the public opinion,
Lagasse points out that the Greater Winnipeg Welfare Council, the Manitoba Branch of the
Canadian Association of Social Workers, the Manitoba Council of Women, and the Greater
Winnipeg Ministerial Association had all been conducting studies into the situation of
Aboriginal peoples from the early 1950s onward . These groups presented their findings and
recommendations to members of the provincial, not federal, government . At 10 percent,
Manitoba had the highest concentration of Aboriginal peoples of any province . This gave "a
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sense of urgency to every discussion about the native question" (Lagasse, 1971 : 228). The
public attention to Aboriginal issues, in combination with the lack of information on the
province's behalf prompted the province to commission Lagasse's 1959 study, which in turn
led to the implementation of a community development program .
The second factor was the change of attitude in the provincial government . Lagasse
notes that prior to 1956 a number of civil servants had produced internal reports
recommending action by the province on Aboriginal issues that went unrecognized by an
uninformed provincial Cabinet . Although the responsibility for the welfare of status Indians
was supposed to be a federal one, in Manitoba, "the Premier himself intervened with the
reminder that he had been elected by all the residents of the province and could not agree
that any segment of the population escaped his jurisdiction" (Lagasse, 1971 : 230). Of course,
elected representatives to the federal government could not say the same thing, as
Aboriginal peoples were not enfranchised until 1960 . With the political will in place, the
suggestions of civil servants no longer fell on deaf ears. Bureaucrats were now challenged to
come up with ideas for change (Lagasse, 1971 : 230) .
The final factor was the readiness and willingness for change among Aboriginal peoples .
Despite being poorly off relative to their counterparts in other provinces Aboriginal
communities in Manitoba had "more motivation for self-betterment than existing
government programs were providing for"(Lagasse, 1971 : 230). According to Lagasse, this
made community development especially attractive to Aboriginal communities, whose
people recognized what it had to offer .
3.2.7
	
THE STATE OF THE STATE AT THE INDIAN AFFAIRS BRANCH
More than any other bureaucratic agency at the time in Ottawa, the IAB had at its helm
an old guard. When Walter Rudnicki went to work as the Director of the IAB's Welfare
Division in 1962, the IAB was "headed by a fellow called Colonel Hubert Jones, who had
kept his military title . The place was shod through with military people - Major Davies,
Captain Battle and so on" (Rudnicki, 1994) . The situation was such that some people in
Ottawa had taken to referring to the IAB as "Colonel Jones' lost battalion" (Weaver, 1981 :
46) . Despite its best efforts, however, the IAB could not resist change indefinitely ; it had
reached a point where it had at least to appear to be transforming itself . Sally Weaver says
that the commissioning of the second Hawthorn Report in 1964 triggered a period of
innovation . It is more likely that by this time the `winds of change' had already begun to
blow. In their 1958 report, Hawthorn et al . foresaw a "period of transition" for the policies
and activities of the IAB (Hawthorn et al ., 1958 : viii). These findings were echoed by the
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SJC of 1959-61 that produced recommendations designed to speed up the integration of
Aboriginal peoples into the mainstream of Canadian society (Weaver, 1993 : 77). By 1962 one
senior official at the Branch said he felt as though the IAB was at a "dead end" (Weaver,
1993 : 76). M.A. Tremblay, co-author of the Hawthorn Report, recalled the pressures being
brought to bear on the IAB of the time :
. . .there were pressing demands on the part of the indigenous communities to
have sizable increases in their share of the 'national income' and because
there were rising conflicts in the federal-provincial relations concerning
their respective jurisdiction in the fields of health and welfare, education
and economic development. It was at a time, too, when many Indian leaders
expressed their concern over the fact that despite growing capacity for self-
government Indian communities were submitted to greater bureaucratic,
administrative and economic controls. There was also, on the part of many
whites, a growing fear that the 'economic burden' of the indigenous
communities was to become intolerable on the part of the white taxpayer
(Weaver, 1993: 76) .
Walter Rudnicki gave a similar, although less generous account . He said that the IAB
was under very severe criticism because mentally . . . they were just starting to
come into the eighteenth century, and they were under constant criticism for
the things they were doing - their notion of progress was leadership training
- a very . . . condescending approach to Indian peoples (Rudnicki, 1994)
.
Rudnicki believed that at the time Indian Agents and the reserve system served to
contain the Aboriginal population, who were treated as "apprentices in training to be white
men." It is not surprising, then, that the IAB was located in the Department of Citizenship
and Immigration . It is Rudnicki's opinion that the whole purpose of the IAB was to "make
Indian people good Canadian citizens . . . like immigrants, once they met certain
standards . . .they could, instead of going to citizenship court, become enfranchised and
become Canadian citizens" (Rudnicki, 1994) .
Commenting on the administration of Aboriginal affairs in Canada, Manuel and Posluns
(1974: 128) wrote that 1962 was the "The Year When the Winds of Change Were Noticed ."
This is a sentiment that Rudnicki must also have felt in 1962 . Before going to the IAB
Rudnicki had been in Arizona, Mexico and South America studying community development
on a World Health Organization travel scholarship . He had also run the Welfare Division of
Northern Affairs. One of the reasons he gave for going to the JAB in the first place was the
pending retirement of Colonel Jones . Although he says that he was "forever wrong" for
believing it, Rudnicki thought that Jones's retirement would mark a change in attitudes at
the IAB. Upon his arrival, Rudnicki found things even worse than he had imagined
-
Col. Jones had what amounted to fingernail inspection every morning .
Actually he didn't inspect fingernails, but it was the same sort of thing . You
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stood at attention when he was around - you got up when he walked in and
this sort of thing, because he was a colonel . And Indian people showed up
there, with hats in hand, very deferential and intimidated . And so in this
kind of context we had to develop a kind of community development
(Rudnicki: 1994) .
Although Rudnicki does not believe that any of the "mandarins" at the IAB had "the
faintest idea of what community development was all about," it was accepted as a
reasonable and appropriate course of action . This happened in large part because
community development had become "one of the things that people were talking about" and
was perceived to be positive . According to Rudnicki, the CDP was initiated simply because
"somebody there [the IAB] decided that they should at least appear progressive ."
3.2.8
	
SUMMATION OF PART 2
Towards the end of the second chapter, I discussed Forester's concept of background
consensus . Forester sees background consensus as composed of four validity claims . In
other words, people understand an issue or situation in terms of four validity or
"communicative claims that . . . constitute its presentation" (Forester, 1993 : 146) . Briefly, this
means that the way that people understand a situation will determine the way they react to
it. Reactions can be either positive or negative . Negative reactions are associated with
sentiments that change is needed - that there is a problem that must be solved or a
situation that must be remedied . Positive reactions on the other hand would support the
maintenance of the status quo . There are, of course, few if any examples where popular
reaction is unanimous . Rather, a balance exists between the forces that advocate change
and those that advocate stasis . Even when change is called for in one or more, but not all, of
the dimensions, it may not be forthcoming . Change may be desired by some individuals, and
it may also be supported by studies and research, but if it is not facilitated or allowed by the
courts or legislature and is not initiated by those who have the political and / or economic
power, then it is likely to be thwarted .
Even when the reaction to a situation is largely negative and the need for change
apparent, there will be different ideas about the appropriate direction for change, and the
best way to get there . The means by which a person or organization seeks to accomplish an
objective are intimately related to how a problem is understood . As Forester says, "shaping
strategies of action follows directly from attention to problem definition" (45) .
The first claim which can be said to define background consensus is the attention
directing claim, which "formulates the framework in which `the problem' is to be understood
in the first place" (Forester, 1993 : 146-7) . After the Second World War, the "problems"
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associated with Aboriginal issues were defined in a number of ways . Aboriginal political
organizations making presentations to the first SJC emphasized the Aboriginal right to self-
determination and self-government . Members of the SJC continued, however, to see the
problem as one of civilization and assimilation, to be `solved' through revisions to the Indian
Act (Johnson, 1984: 54). Many Canadians continued to see the problem as coming from
Indians themselves, while others had begun to suspect that the problem lay in the way in
which Aboriginal people were treated by Canada, and by Canadians .
Although consensus did not exist on what the `problem' was (or what the solution might
be), there was agreement that a problem did exist . This recognition was substantiated by
cognitive claims which are based on `facts' arrived at through the likes of studies, reports
and hearings. As Wotherspoon and Satzewich note in the introduction to their book, there
has been no shortage of studies of Aboriginal peoples ; indeed many people feel that "Native
peoples have been studied to death" (xi) . Between 1946 and 1964, there were many major
studies of Aboriginal issues initiated in Canada, five of which were discussed above - two
Special Joint Committees, Hawthorn et al .'s study in British Columbia, Lagasse's study in
Manitoba, and finally the Hawthorn report, which was commissioned in 1964. Each study
either established or took for granted that there were problems with the daily lives of many
Aboriginal peoples, the Indian Affairs Branch, and the Indian Act . For example, Hawthorn
et al.'s (1958: 199-20) study found that only very limited funds were accessible by the Band
Councils. Amongst the Bands which composed the Babine agency there was a total of $5001
for 2416 people - $2.07 per capita . This was seen by Hawthorn et al . (1958: 458) as a
tremendous difficulty . The researchers were astonished :
. . . to find that all business of a financial kind is transacted through the
superintendent's office, and that officials of the Band Council seldom come
face to face with representatives of the groups with whom they have
business. This is one of the most revealing lacks in the administration of
Indian Affairs, since it documents with clarity our contention that the focus
of administrative action is not the education of the Indian, except in the
narrow/formal sense, but the manipulation of his [sic] property .
From these "claims of truth" came solutions (or recommendations) . Given the findings of
studies produced by numerous organizations, including the United Nations and the World
Health Organization, community development began to be widely held as a panacea for
poverty. This was quickly picked up on by those within Canada studying Aboriginal issues
.
Sally Weaver (1978: 2) has identified three policy directions in the IAB of the 1960s . In the
first, Aboriginal peoples were considered to have 'special rights' which were "evident in the
Indian Act, the separate bureaucracy, the reserve system, and the Treaty system ." The
second direction was a manifestation of the 'welfare state' in the Indian Affairs Branch . This
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implied an improved standard of living for Aboriginal people, through provision of welfare .
The final direction was a response to "heavy criticism" of the government "for its excessive
patronage of Indians" in which policies would be focused on reducing "Indian dependency on
the Branch itself and the special service it offered." It was with respect to this final policy
direction that community development achieved its greatest popularity as a means for
reducing dependence among Aboriginal people on federal support .
Where cognitive claims generate statements about the way things are, the third sort of
claim - the legitimacy claim - makes statements about the way things ought to be. Following
the Second World War, the population of Canada began to recognize that socio-economically ;
too many Aboriginal peoples had more in common with residents of the third world than
with the majority of Canadians . Some of these people formed or joined public interest
groups, such as the Indian-Eskimo Association and worked as advocates for Aboriginal
interests . Others simply let their political leaders know that the racist and unfair policies of
the IAB were unacceptable especially in light of the forces that the allies fought against in
the Second World War .
These claims about how things ought to be found their way into the domain of
normative authority - most noticeably in the form of legislation and court decisions . An
obvious example is with respect to federal voting privileges . Up to 1960, the right to vote
was associated with enfranchisement or full citizenship . Unless an Aboriginal person
renounced their status and waived their taxation privileges they were not allowed to vote
(Hawthorn et al ., 1958: 482-3) . Due to public and international criticism this policy was
eventually changed through legislation in 1960 . More recently in Canada claims about the
way things ought to be with respect to Aboriginal issues have been given normative
authority through the courts, with legislation that reflects the legal decisions following . This
is especially true with respect to Aboriginal title and resource use, reflecting court decisions
such as those in Delgamuuk (1993), Guerin (1985), and Sparrow (1990) (See Thomas Issac,
1995) .
The fourth and final sort of validity claim that is seen to compose background consensus
is the expressive claim that indicates the "intentions and perceived interests of affected
parties." These are expressed as "conflict and cooperation, wishes and preferences, demands
and challenges, actions of solidarity and opposition" (Forester, 1993 : 146-7) . The interests
here are those of Aboriginal peoples, the agents of the IAB, and the members of the general
public .
First Nations across Canada are not a homogenous group . Different geographic locations
reflect differing economies, access to resources, treatment received from the IAB, and
different traditional cultural practices . The members of a particular First Nation also have
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diverse interests . As would be expected, then, there were points of convergence and
divergence with respect to their interests in the period from 1946-64 . As Johnson (1984)
pointed out in his investigation of the 1946-49 SJC, Aboriginal representatives who
appeared at the committee hearings expressed many different and sometimes opposing
interests . This accepted the desire for self-determination - the right to make their own
decisions and to take control of their own affairs - was a common theme .
The interests of the agents of the IAB are less clear cut . There was a tremendous
pressure felt by IAB bureaucrats to change the way that Aboriginal affairs was
administered in Canada. At the same time there was resistance to change among many IAB
bureaucrats, and among other non-Aboriginal actors in Aboriginal communities, such as
religious figures . With change came the prospect for reduced job security. Many knew that it
was not a simple task to change the way a large and expanding bureaucracy like the IAB
operated. While some or most of the old guard may have resisted change, there were others
who embraced the chance to effect change . Lagasse (1971 : 228) said that one of the reasons
that a community development program succeeded in Manitoba in 1959 was that
bureaucrats who had previously had their ideas for change ignored were now being asked to
come up with "ideas, clues, solutions and program outlines ." As will be discussed more in
the next chapter, the IAB of the 1960s was home to conflict and contradiction that pitted
bureaucrat against bureaucrat .
The interests of the general public were reflected in the interests of the politicians who
represented them . Politicians began to initiate changes in the IAB and to the Indian Act
.
This action was precipitated by a public desire to see the conditions for Aboriginal people's
change to be more in line with the wider Canadian experience
. The action also reflected a
desire to curb the rising cost of the administration of Aboriginal affairs
. Canada began to
off-load costs to the provinces. As will be seen in the next chapter, the federal government
attempted to `sell' cost-sharing to the provinces based on the assumption that Canada's
Aboriginal population would be increasingly independent and self-sufficient
.
Although community development was not the only strategy by which the different
parties sought to satisfy their interests, it was seen by many as a way to effect change
.
Others merely had no objections to it . There is little evidence to show that Aboriginal
peoples were consulted, or that they supported the establishment of a community
development program . Rather, the program was treated with the skepticism or indifference
that would be expected of a `new' program from an old bureaucracy
.
The purpose of the second part of this chapter was not to show that community
development was inevitable, but rather was to identify the factors that made it possible
. It
is now time to discuss the Community Development Program (CDP) which was initiated by
the IAB in 1964 under the guidance of Walter Rudnicki .
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CHAPTER 4 - THE STORY & THE ANALYSIS
This chapter has two objectives . The first is to tell the story of the CDP . The second is to
characterize the CDP according to a number of criteria outlined below, and then to compare
and contrast it with previous Indian policy in Canada, and ultimately decide whether the
CDP was a departure for the IAB . Towards the end of the second chapter, I noted that an
investigation into policy-making could be organized according to three levels of analysis and
four processes of social reproduction. The three levels of analysis are structural/ political
economic; organizational/ bureaucratic ; and individual . At each of these levels, planning as
a process of communicative action can be seen to work practically in four areas : issue
definition or understanding ; the shaping of world views or beliefs ; securing legitimacy,
allegiance or consent ; and establishing sincerity or trust.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the communicative infrastructure of society may be seen
to be composed of that which connects actions to structures in society, and which "a given
policy may alter" (Forester, 1993 : 140). If one were to imagine a table with three levels of
analysis on one axis, and four processes of social production and reproduction on the other,
the resulting points of intersection would provide an analogue for the communicative
infrastructure of society in the form of a matrix . The production and reproduction of
understanding, belief, consent, and trust occurs at each of the three levels . At the structural
level the impact of political and economic interests on issue definition, belief, trust and
consent may be investigated. The same processes of social production and reproduction may
be evaluated at the organizational level . For instance, an organization within a bureaucracy
may be examined in terms of how it influences the way its agents, clients, and the public
understand a certain issue or problem . At the level of the individual, our attention is
directed to the way in which people act to shape other's understanding, beliefs, consent and
trust, and how other forces act to influence their own understanding, beliefs, consent and
trust .
Although the first task of this chapter is to tell the story of community development at
the Indian Affairs Branch, it is useful to keep the idea of a communicative infrastructure of
society in mind .
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4.1 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT MEETS THE INDIAN AFFAIRS
BRANCH
For officials at the Indian Affairs Branch, reaction to the announcement of the
Community Development Program must have come as a welcome change from the
disapproval that had come to characterize the public's attitude towards their bureaucracy .
After all, "thoughtful Canadians [had] been guiltily aware that Canada was not doing what
should be done for her Indian citizens . . ." Citizenship and Immigration Minister Rene
Tremblay's public announcement of the Program came as a relief to Canadians who had
been waiting for the government to propose something positive (Globe and Mail, 1964) . The
announcement met with approval from both the public and politicians . All opposition
parties welcomed the CDP and applauded its announcement in the House of Commons, but
as one columnist with the Toronto Telegram wrote, "a member of Parliament is no more
likely to come out against `doing good' for Indians than he is to oppose motherhood"
(Telegram, 1964) . Conspicuously absent from the reportage was reaction from Aboriginal
peoples .
The Program came along at a time when Canadians were seriously reconsidering how
they related with Aboriginal peoples . One commentator of the day wrote that "we cannot
impose our standards upon them and make them over into brown replicas of ourselves,
because what we have and admire may not strike them as desirable, and they may be quite
right" (Globe and Mail, 1964) . According to the Cabinet document, the Program itself was
. . .designed to employ, to the greatest extent possible, all the available
material and human resources in Indian communities and in each province .
One of its effects would be to step up mobilization of Indian initiative and to
further promote self-sufficiency . One of its end results would be to accelerate
transfer to Indian communities of responsibility and authority for the
management of their affairs, with concurrent limitations in government
controls (Canada, 1964: 3) .
It was believed that through a community development process Aboriginal people,
at their own initiative, would wrest control of their affairs from various agents and agencies
of the state . This would occur through a process whereby Aboriginal peoples would identify
their problems on their own and generate their own solutions, with decisions being made
increasingly at the local level . The IAB, with its new Community Development Officers
(CDOs), would provide 'technical and other services in ways which encourage initiative and
establish a basis for self sufficiency" (Canada, 1964: 3) .
Among the purported benefits of the Program were that it would : provide a co-ordinated
approach to Aboriginal issues for the IAB; initiate fruitful contact with the "outside world"
for Aboriginal peoples ; increase responsibilities for Bands and Councils
; complement
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existing services ; curb "the alarming incidence of social pathologies;" provide the basis for
negotiating cost-sharing agreements with the provinces ; and bring the needs of Aboriginal
communities into line with the needs of non-Aboriginal communities (Canada, 1964 : 4-5) . In
sum, officials at the IAB believed that the CDP represented a "conscious effort by
government to guide the forces of change in the best interest of Indian communities and the
country at large" (Canada, 1964 : 4) .
4.1.1
	
CABINET APPROVES THE SUBMISSION
The CDP was announced in the House of Commons on July 7, 1964 . Lester Pearson's
Liberal government had approved the Program and $3 .5 million for the first three years of
its operation on March 17, 1964 . The Program was housed at the IAB - at that time located
under the Hon . Rene Tremblay within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and
later in the 1964/65 fiscal year within the Department of Northern Affairs and National
Resources. Work on the Program had begun two years earlier when Walter Rudnicki was
invited to join the IAB . Rudnicki was a "self-styled maverick" with "strong opinions on
Indian Affairs" who almost single-handedly brought community development to the LAB
(Weaver, 1981: 66). Although the `mandarins' of the IAB were of little help to Rudnicki in
getting a community development program started at the Branch, there were three people
who contributed to the Program's initiation. The first was the new Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration, Guy Favreau . While the Branch had been allowed to stagnate under
previous Ministers, Favreau was a progressive sort who "had in the back of his mind that he
was going to shake up that system" (Rudnicki, 1994 : 3). Favreau was in favour of
community development for the Branch and went to bat for the Program at the Cabinet
table . Favreau found himself in the company of a number of other progressive Ministers, all
of whom wanted to "allay some public criticism" by being seen to be initiating some change
in the administration of Aboriginal affairs (Rudnicki, 1994 : 4) . With Favreau's support, the
other Ministers approved the Cabinet submission and the CDP .
The second person instrumental in the development and implementation of the CDP
was Claude Isbister, the new Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration . Whereas
Favreau had sold the CDP at the political level, Isbister's support was key within the
bureaucracy. Isbister came to the job already supportive of CD and his support was
essential to selling the CDP to the bureaucrats while implementing it within their midst.
The third person who was important to the development of the CDP, albeit indirectly,
was Colonel Hubert Jones . As I discussed in the previous chapter, Colonel Jones ran a tight
ship at the IAB . His presence as the head of the IAB hindered if not precluded change
. In
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1963, Jones retired as the Director of the Branch, and was replaced by R .F. Battle (himself a
member of the `old guard') (Canada, 1979 : x, Rudnicki, 1994) . The Colonel's contributions to
the CDP are worthy of remark only because his departure enabled the Program's
implementation .
4.1.2
	
THE "PROBLEM" AS DEFINED BY THE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
The actual Cabinet submission proposing the CDP was written in its entirety by
Rudnicki in about 10 days (Rudnicki, 1994) . The submission offered a clear and novel
definition of the "Indian problem" to which community development was cast as a solution .
According to the Cabinet submission, the "problem" was not seen as stemming from a lack of
integration (or assimilation) into mainstream society, but rather it was the fact that
Aboriginal people had been denied the opportunity to participate in Canadian society . The
submission stated that :
Indian communities generally remain outside the mainstream of Canadian
economic, social and cultural events . As an ethnic group, Indians are, in a
sense, bystanders on the national scene . There is increasing evidence that
dissatisfaction over their spectator role is finding expression, both among
Indians themselves and in the general public (Canada, 1964 : 2:1) .
Another indication of the absence of any assimilationist underpinnings in the CDP was
its recognition "as a general principle" of reserves as Aboriginal communities . The
submission stated that "it is neither desirable nor practicable to abolish reserves ." Rather,
the "broad purpose [of the CDP] would be to integrate reserves into the life of the nation and
to enable them to contribute fully to national progress" (Canada, 1964 : 3-4) . In the 1960s,
the recognition of reserves as Aboriginal communities was still decried by those who felt
that the only plausible future required "integrating Indians into Canadian life" while
"allowing the reservations to wither away" (Telegram, 1964) . Others, though, believed the
assimilationist approach to be flawed, and welcomed its abandonment by the CDP :
An important feature of the [Community Development] program is that it is
reserve-oriented. The reserve is recognized as a community . Too many non-
Indians declare that the Indian problem would be solved by moving the
Indians off the reserves and thrusting them into the white man's society .
The Indians want to retain their own culture, just as do other minorities,
and there is no reason why they should be expected to conform to the white
man's mould (Star Phoenix, 1964) .
In the words of Walter Rudnicki, "There will still be Indians on reserves . But they'll be less
dependent Indians" (Globe and Mail, 1965) .
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Lest it appear that the objectives of the CDP were purely philanthropic in nature, it is
important to note that political and economic factors loomed large : it was made clear that
the benefits of the Program would appeal to policy-makers and their political masters . The
submission stated that,
One result of being left in the wake of national progress is that Indians
increasingly are becoming a "high-cost" and "multi-problem" segment of the
population . This obtrusive fact is finding its way constantly into the public
media. It is a fact which obstructs the way to greater provincial involvement
in Indian services (Canada, 1964 : 2 :1) .
The submission pointed out that the socio-economic circumstances of Aboriginal peoples fell
well below those of non-Aboriginal Canadians in a number of important respects (income,
housing, telephones, toilets, etc). While pointing out the implications for Aboriginal peoples
in areas such as life expectancy, the submission also noted that poverty among Aboriginal
peoples had implications which would continue to "touch the pockets of taxpayers" (Canada,
1964 : 2:1) . Citing the costs of such palliative measure as child welfare services, policing and
incarceration, health services and "broad rehabilitative measures," the submission noted
that IAB's spending had increased by 260% in the previous 10 years .
According to Kris Uppal, who was involved with the CDP at the regional level, Rudnicki
'tried to establish a model in which community development would be inversely
proportional to welfare payments - if the community development component increases,
then welfare decreases" (Uppal, 1994) . Indeed, one of the proposed benefits, as cited in the
Cabinet submission, was that
the incidence of social pathology as reflected in welfare, health and crime
statistics is expected to be curbed and, in time, reduced to more normal
national averages . Community development costs, therefore would be offset
by reduced expenditures in other areas (Canada, 1964 : 5) .
The apparent expectation was that the fiscal benefits would in time accrue to the
overburdened taxpayer . It was no coincidence that Canada's desire to initiate positive
change within Aboriginal communities coincided with a desire to limit federal expenditures
on Aboriginal peoples .
There was also another, and perhaps more attractive, economic benefit for the federal
government . As I noted in the previous chapter, the Special Joint Committee, Lagasse and
Hawthorn reports all recommended that provincial governments begin taking more
responsibility for Aboriginal issues . Weaver (1981 : 27) notes that the objectives of
community development and "off-loading" the expense and responsibility for the welfare of
Aboriginal peoples were related . As Aboriginal peoples became more self-reliant, their
requirement for welfare services would approximate that of other Canadians, paving the
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way for the provinces to provide the same services to both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
peoples . The Cabinet submission is clear on this :
In aiming to improve the status of Indians, a form of social and economic
gain is held forth to the provinces . Current indications are that this would
establish the necessary basis for negotiating the extension of provincial
services to Indians .
The effect of community development in bringing Indian communities to
economic and social parity with neighbouring non-Indian communities provides the
needed rationale to the federal government for extricating itself gradually from
compensatory payments to provinces which extend services to Indians (Canada,
1964: 5). For a government wishing to limit expenditures on Aboriginal peoples, off-
loading was the easiest and quickest way to do this .
Up to now, I have discussed how the "problem" was defined in the CDP Cabinet
submission . Of equal import is how issues were defined in the community development
process. In describing a successful community development process, Hawthorn et al . stated
(1958:432) that
It is better, we would say, at this stage of Indian development, to leave
people with substandard housing, or without roads or bridges or irrigation
systems, if the only way of getting them is for the superintendent or his
Agent to move into the community and lay down the law . . . This kind of direct
administration, by far the most common. . . has certain immediate results in
dealing with specific limited problems of a material kind . It does nothing
whatsoever to develop initiative and responsibility.
It was natural, then, that the CDP sought "the participation by the Indians themselves
in efforts to improve their level of living with as much reliance as possible on their own
initiative" (Canada, 1964: 3) .
Forester holds that problems do not "speak for themselves" and neither are they "given,
waiting to be broken down and solved" (1993 : 21). Rather, problems are shaped by the ways
in which we speak of them, by the power relations which surround them, and the interests
which are impacted by them (Fischer and Forester, 1993 : 1). Possible solutions and
resolutions - courses and types of actions - are derived from problem formulations . It is
important that the CDP envisioned a future where Aboriginal people would have the last
and loudest say on what their problems were, how they were to be solved and in what order .
It is ironic that such a program was not developed using extensive consultation with
Aboriginal peoples . At the time consultation with Aboriginal peoples on the issues that
affected them was a relatively new idea . Further, processes for such consultations were
poorly developed or non-existent . Precisely for this reason, one of the most important
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features of the CDP was the establishment of Indian Advisory Committees (IACs) to the
Director of the IAB .
4.1.3
	
INDIAN ADVISORY COMMITTEES
It is perhaps the IACs that had the most enduring impact on the relations between
Canada and Indian peoples . While the advisory committees may seem out of place as a part
of a community development process, their inclusion in the CDP is a testament to Walter
Rudnicki's tenacity and ability to win the day with his proposals . Weaver (1981 : 66) cites
Rudnicki's "skills in arguing and rationalizing his own positions" when she writes
His maverick quality came from his activism and his adroit craftsmanship
for policy review, for he was more able than most in justifying his proposals
by relating them to ideas then being promoted in government, especially
those on public participation .
Rudnicki's first thought for the IACs was towards setting up national political
organizations for Aboriginal peoples, but "that scared the shit out of the management people
and they killed it before it got out of the department" (Rudnicki, 1994) . Rudnicki did,
however, manage to get the IACs included in the CDP Cabinet submission . Although there
was an increasing need for the government to consult with First Nations there was no
formal mechanism by which to do this . According to Rudnicki (1994),
at that time there was something like 2200 reserves and . . . roughly 500 . . .so-
called Bands, totally isolated from each other, out of communication with
each other, fragmented all across the country, scattered like raisins in a
cake through the whole body politic .
The committees would be chosen by Aboriginal peoples on the basis of geography and
common interest with the aim of "broad representation ." Most importantly, the cost of
attending the meetings would be borne by the federal government (Canada, 1964 : 8). The
Indian Advisory Committees were short of the national political organizations that Rudnicki
had envisaged . He knew that they would be sharply controlled . Nonetheless, Rudnicki
supported the Advisory committees believing that after the formal meetings ended "the real
meetings would start taking place in the hotel rooms, amongst themselves" away from the
controls of the IAB (Rudnicki, 1994) . George Manuel substantiates this view in his book
with Michael Posluns (1974 : 165-7) . The money available for the committee meetings
allowed a large number of Aboriginal delegates to attend, and Manuel, who for a time
occupied the co-chair of the National Indian Advisory Council, was of the opinion that "the
greatest single value that the meetings . . . offered was that the Indian leadership from all
across Canada got to know one another, and to discover where our common interests lay ."
Rudnicki (1994) commented that the so-called advisory meetings quickly evolved into
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political organizations, which was something that senior officials at the IAB did not want to
happen. Weaver (1981 : 29-30) concluded that the advisory committees sought to do at the
national level what the community development process sought to do at the local level . In
Rudnicki's opinion, the contacts and experiences which Aboriginal peoples gained through
their participation in the IACs contributed to their being able to mobilize a strong and
effective opposition to the Trudeau government's 1969 White Paper initiative to terminate
Aboriginal rights (See Weaver, 1981) .
According to Rudnicki, in addition to the IACs there was one more especially salient
feature of the CDP . It enabled the hiring of community development workers who would be
given the freedom in their job to "take on the system" (Rudnicki, 1994) .
4.1.4
	
FROM FREE RADICALS TO PAID RADICALS
The Community Development Officers (CDOs) themselves are probably the best-
remembered and most oft cited element of the CDP . According to most accounts, these
people believed themselves to be agents of change, who had some sort of mandate to shake
things up (Uppal, 1994; Tennant, 1990 : 141 ; Buckley, 1992 : 102; Weaver, 1981 : 21). One
newspaper report called them "professional troublemakers [hired] to launch a revolution
against poverty" (Globe and Mail : 1966 : 1) .
The adversarial stance of the CDOs was no mistake . From the very start CDOs were
selected for the Program as a result of their attitudes . Rudnicki (1994) said that "eve were
looking for activists who were prepared to take on the system if they had to - who wouldn't
come in completely governed and pre-occupied by annual increments and promotions and
catering to their bosses ." The hiring process was tailored to weed out those applicants who
would toe the government line . Rudnicki (1994) explained the hiring process as follows :
We formulated a whole lot of questions that would screen out the people who
we felt would become departmental people rather than advocates . I would
ask questions, like for example, you are a Community Development worker
in community X . You've been there a few months and you wanted people's
confidence and one day a Mountie shows up and says "Look, I know that
there is a still here somewhere, and we're ready to knock it off . Could you
tell me where it is?" I would ask them if they'd tell him where it is, and if
they said "oh yeah, I would tell them" then they were gone .
In the words of Peter McFarlane (1993 : 75), the CDP "would have no room for bureaucratic
snitches ."
The Cabinet submission made it clear that community development would be a
sophisticated and demanding addition to the responsibilities of the IAB . There was a sense
that community development ought not be left to unskilled or inexperienced practitioners,
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but rather that the CDOs would have to possess "extraordinary sensitivity and skilled
powers to diagnose and treat inter-related economic and social problems" in addition to
"functioning cross-culturally ."
For many of the prospective CDOs this would be their first serious job . According to at
least one Regional Community Development Specialist, these CDOs felt as though they had
little to lose and thus were less afraid of being fired for their actions (Uppal, 1994) . Further,
they were a well-educated bunch and would not have had difficulty finding work if they
were fired .
In line with Hawthorn et al .'s 1958 (489-91) recommendation for a wholesale
restructuring of the IAB, the Cabinet submission recommended a reorganization of the IAB
at the headquarters, regional and agency level . In Ottawa, emphasis was shifted from the
provision of welfare to the provision of social programs . At the regional level, the Regional
Supervisor would retain his/her administrative responsibility, but also take on
responsibilities with respect to the new social programs . The biggest change, had it occurred
to the degree that the Cabinet submission envisioned, would have been at the level of the
Individual Agency. The submission described a "cold war" between Agents and reserve
members due to the fact that most of the Agent's activities were largely administrative, and
that "Indians sought to win as many concessions as possible from the Agency staff, who in
turn, tried to ward off unreasonable demands with the policy manual" (Canada, 1964 : 9-11) .
Along with the addition of CDOs to Agency offices, the Agents themselves were expected to
practice community development and ensure that the Program was successful in their
Agencies. It was proposed that the Agents would receive a pay raise in compensation for
this increase in responsibility .
The conviction as to the required quality and preparedness of those involved with the
CDP was held so strongly that the Cabinet submission stated that, "It would be
preferable . . . not to begin a community development program than to do so with poorly
qualified staff' (Canada, 1964 : 15). In order to ensure qualified CDOs, and to "re-tool" the
IAB to handle the new Community Development emphasis, the Cabinet submission
proposed an intensive three-month course in Community Development . Had the CDP
progressed no further than the infamous training sessions, it would still provide a story
worth telling.
A fellow by the name of Farrel Toombs was contracted to conduct the training sessions .
Toombs was a Rogerian psychologist who had been an Associate Professor in both the
faculty of Medicine and the School of Business at the University of Toronto (Globe and Mail,
1965). George Manuel wrote of him :
Farrel proved to be a man with an amazing insight, and one who would not
allow himself to be swayed by the pressure of politics and yet was always
open to the needs of the group he was animating . . . .he impressed me as a
person with a high degree of humanity, the kind of humanity that seems to
transcend every situation . If there is any one man outside the Indian
community in Canada who has inspired human development within our
community it is Farrel Toombs (Manuel and Posluns, 1974 : 130) .
While Toombs was a central figure in the training sessions, to say that he led them
would be truly misleading. According to Rudnicki, the sessions that Toombs organized had
no agenda, no program, no syllabus . Everyone sat around in a circle with
Farrel there among them, and they had a three month conversation, which
often got hot and heavy . People would get angry and argue . A couple got in
the habit of going outdoors and fighting it out with their fists . As the tension
went up what was happening actually was a total mental reorientation of
the kind of work that they were doing and who they were . . . Someone called it
brainwashing at that point, although I didn't use that term (Rudnicki, 1994) .
The training sessions proved to be an omen of what was to come when the CDP swung
into action : the sessions were unorthodox, challenged their participants, and involved ample
conflict . Toombs used what was referred to as the "diagonal slice" approach, whereby the
sessions involved participants from all levels of the bureaucracy (Uppal, 1994) . Remarkably,
the session's participants included the often young and idealistic CDOs, seasoned IAB
bureaucrats (including a large number of Indian Agents), and Aboriginal peoples who were
being trained as community development assistants . This mix led to a great deal of tension
for the participants, especially among the academics and civil servants who viewed the
whole thing as a great waste of time and money . All the while Toombs steadfastly refused to
lead the sessions, forcing the participants to lead themselves . The tension built to the point
of outburst, where "disciplined civil servants cried like children" (Manuel and Posluns, 1974 :
130). One former CDO, Gerry Gambill, said that the Indian Agents found the sessions
especially awkward because they were sitting beside Aboriginal people who were taking the
opportunity to "unload a lot of personal feelings on the poor Agents" (Gambill, 1995 : 6) .
Rudnicki (1994) remembers that some strange symptoms started to appear among the
Agents, who had been included in the training sessions so that they would be prepared for
what was to come . One Agent, for example "developed this neck condition where he couldn't
turn his head - [due to] the tensions and anger and everything else that came out, because
obviously their universe was wobbling, and they didn't know what to think of it" (Uppal,
1994) .
Included in the sessions was something called sensitivity training. One former
Aboriginal CDO related the following story :
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Sensitivity training was when we got down to the nitty gritty against each
other. I confronted one man about his attitude for example . There was
something about him that didn't sit right - how could he have spent all those
years with Native people and not have allowed them to get anywhere . I said,
"You had a professional job, how could people on your reserve still be at the
same level if you were doing your job right? Nobody got ahead anywhere ." I
don't know what I said to him, but that hit him, honest to God, he just
collapsed and started to cry . I felt so horrible . He said, I've worked as an
Indian Agent for, I forget how many years now, but whenever the kids came
to me and told me they wanted to take medicine, or law, or anything like
that," he said, "stupid me, I would tell them you can't do that. You better get
into teaching or nursing or something like that . I always down played what
they could do and they lost faith in me and never came back ." He started
talking about himself more and more, and went deeper and deeper into
himself, to the point where on the last day of the session, he was in the
phone booth talking to his wife, and they had to drag him out. He was
screaming at her - this was in Quebec City and she's out in Alberta - and one
of the regular students at Laval wanted to use the phone . He kept coming
and the last time he went up the guy was punching the doors and screaming
at his wife. He went and told a guy downstairs and he called Farrel . He said,
"there's a problem in the phone booth. One of your men is going nuts or
something." They finally got him out of there and took him into Farrel's
room . He said, "all I wanted to be all my life was an artist, but my wife
wanted a fur coat, she wanted a car, she wanted . . . and he started screaming,
it's you, it's you," and all because I said to him he had all those years to work
on the reserve and nobody got anywhere . . . .That's the kind of sensitivity
training we were in (Kitchen: 1994) .
Another former CDO recalled that in the sessions the participants divided themselves
into two groups, those who thrived on the unstructured environment and went "through a
process of personal liberation and empowerment" and those, mainly bureaucrats, who found
the process frustrating, and believed it to be a waste of time and money . The conflict among
and between these two groups foretold the conflict that would occur on reserves across
Canada upon the Program's implementation . It was also in these training sessions where
some of the misconceptions about the objectives of the Community Development Program
were born. While the long-time employees of IAB felt that the training was a waste of time,
they also felt that they must have been sent to the training sessions for a reason . According
to one participant,
There was a fair amount of sentiment high up within Indian Affairs which
had filtered down to the Agents that this community development stuff was
a really clever way of getting people to do what you wanted them to do . It
was a means of social manipulation. You went in and were nice, you were
not bureaucratic, found out what people wanted, but you used that as a
means to plant the seed and get them to think that the idea was theirs . The
conclusion of the Agents who actually finished the course, is that the way to
deal with Indians is to make them think that what you want them to do is
their idea . And so that's what they got out of the course, and that was about
it (Gambill, 1994) .
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With the first complement of CDOs hired and trained, the community development process
was officially underway on reserves in July of 1965 (Lloyd, 1967 : 31) .
4.1.5
	
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN ACTION. . .& CDO INACTION
What did CDOs do? The best answer to this question is likely : nothing. As one
community development worker said,
If you were to go there today and ask them exactly what the community
development officers did there, they would tell you absolutely nothing . And
yet, to us, I know that these people have gotten ahead because that's how
community development operated. It's very difficult to pinpoint what we did
because, I'll be honest with you, I did nothing. We just saw the potentials
and pointed it out to them, and they did it . That's how we were supposed to
operate, and this is one of the reasons why Indian Affairs was so opposed to
us because they were doing it all and continuously convincing the Indians
that someday, maybe 10,000 years from now, you'll be able to do this
(Kitchen, 1994) .
That CDOs did `nothing' was especially true of their first three months in the
communities . During this time, they were to resist the urge to get involved in the
communities, or to initiate any sort of action . Their first job was to acquaint themselves
with the community, to learn about it and its history, and to begin to develop a trusting
relationship . One CDO said of his activities :
I was just finding out all kinds of things and asking CDO type questions
like, "what do you think the community needs ; why do you think that it
hasn't happened; what would you have to do if that were to happen ; or if
that's the way you feel, why haven't you acted on it ." You know, kind of
diagnosing what was going on there" (Gambill, 1994) .
Walter Rudnicki, the architect of the CDP, said that the CDOs who were successful were the
ones
sitting on door stoops talking with Indian people and empowering them .
They would say `you know, do you realise that there is nothing in the world
to stop you from going to see someone that you want to see, but are afraid to .
Or if you want to sell your goddamn wheat, go and sell it . If the Department
challenges you on it, we'll take it from there . Don't be scared of the Agent,
because if you don't like him, you have the right, as a people, to get rid of
him (Rudnicki, 1994) .
For some, the so-called "do nothing" approach was very effective - leading to change and
conflict the likes of which had not been seen on most reserves in anyone's memory . The do-
nothing approach was not without its casualties, however . In some communities CDOs
initiated little in the way of social change - finding themselves a part of the established
bureaucracy rather than as the Agents charged with changing it . Other CDOs became
coopted by the system and, for whatever reason, felt as though they could not afford to be
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fired (Rudnicki, 1994) . In many cases, these people became little more than another
dispenser for welfare . This is illustrated in a passage from an annual report to the
Provincial Co-ordinator from CDO John Burch in Hinton, Alberta :
In late fall and early winter there were many many people coming to Hinton
in search of work from the eastern and southern part of Alberta, as well as
from the western part of Saskatchewan . I was unable to do very much for
these people, other than to point out places where they could apply for
employment, or to send them to various agencies for assistance in finding
temporary accommodation and meals . . . Much of my time has been spent
assistingktransients in obtaining employment, accommodation, and
transportation (Alberta, 1967 : 2, 7) .
One active critic of the do-nothing approach was George Manuel. Considered by many to
be the greatest Aboriginal leader in recent Canadian history, Manuel signed on with the
CDP after hearing about it at a meeting in 1964 (McFarlane, 1993 : chapter 6 ; 303-5) .
Having missed the first round of training in 1965, Manuel found himself a Community
Development assistant on the Cowichan Reserve in 1966 . Manuel's abilities to mobilize and
inspire people are legendary - and it was perhaps this that led him to criticize the CDOs
who would "sit around and not do a damn thing" (McFarlane, 1993 : 78 quotes Manuel) .
On the Cowichan Reserve, Manuel worked with CDO Tony Karch who, incidentally, was
paid $800 per month compared with the $300 paid to the older and more experienced
Manuel. An article in the Victoria Colonist heralded Manuel's arrival, comparing him to
Sitting Bull, Pontiac and Geronimo (McFarlane, 1993 : 78-9). The comparison was made for
effect, to be sure, although Manuel's future activities with the CDP did provide the
newspaper with what would eventually become a story with a national profile .
Manuel and Karch used a survey of the entire population of the reserve as a means to
acquaint themselves with the community . They found the single most important issue to be
the chronic and acute lack of acceptable housing. While there was a formal mechanism to
deal with housing issues at the Band Council level, it had failed to get any houses built . By
encouraging a fellow named Abraham Joe to take the lead on the housing issue, Manuel
started a ball rolling that would see 350 houses built on the reserve in the next 15 years . At
a special meeting called by Joe to discuss the housing issue, Manuel stood up and told the
Band members that they could get al .l the money they needed for housing - "The money is
there," he told them . "All you have to do is tap it . But only you can get it" (McFarlane, 1993 :
81) . A committee was established to take action on the housing issue . Knowing that "the one
thing that drove the Department to action was public embarrassment" the committee
invited members of the press to tour the reserve . The "third world conditions" were seen
that night by millions of Canadians on the national news . Soon, the new Minister of the
Department of Indian Affairs, Arthur Laing, was taking the same tour the press had been
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on. Where the Regional Superintendent had previously told the residents of Cowichan
Reserve that they were lazy and unable to take care of themselves, and that he would not
authorize the building of another house, Laing hastily promised the Cowichan that they
would "get every house they were asking for over a five year period" (Manuel and Posluns,
1974: 145-7) . This came as a "major physical and psychological boost to the community,"
providing "not only homes, but a new self-confidence and assertiveness" (McFarlane, 1993 :
Chapter 6; Manuel and Posluns, 1974 : Chapter 6) .
In another case, the first to cause a stir in the press, the people of one reserve in the
Hay Lakes region of Northern Alberta held a demonstration and marched on the legislature
in Edmonton - the first time that anything of this sort had occurred in Alberta . One
newspaper account of the time claimed that "the march had been stimulated by the presence
of a CDO" (Mortimore, 1966: 1) . According to Rudnicki, after the CDP started,
the next thing you know, eight Indian Agents were being run out of town .
I'm not sure they actually got tarred and feathered, but they were being
chased down with sticks . Of course the bureaucrats holding down the fort in
Ottawa were horrified and terrified that these things could happen . They
hadn't expected this from community development (Rudnicki, 1994) .
4.1.6
	
GERRY GAMBILL - A CDO INACTION
Gerry Gambill was a CDO at Akwasasne (St . Regis Agency) from August, 1965, until he
was fired in December of 1966 . His experiences and some others which I will recount here
were common to the CDOs who found themselves in conflict with Indian Agents, the IAB
bureaucracy, religious figures, and some members of the Aboriginal community .
Gambill had only a passing knowledge of and little experience with Aboriginal issues
prior to his employment as a CDO . Further, because he had missed the first training
session, Gambill would work as a CDO for 9 months before he got any formal training .
Together, this meant that he had few if any preconceptions about the IAB, its Agents, or
their relations to Aboriginal people . Gambill stated that, "As far as I was concerned, I was
brought into Indian Affairs and he [the Agent] was part of Indian Affairs and we'd work
together and it shouldn't be any problem" (Gambill, 1994) . During the first three or four
months (referred to as the animation period in community development lingo), Gambill
asked many questions of the Agent about the history of the reserve and Aboriginal issues in
general. During this time, Gambill was also making friends within the community -
I went around and drank coffee with people, and they'd invite me over for
supper . . .I was . . . going around meeting people, participating in things, and I
went to community events, which ranged from Lacrosse games to bingo's, to
church events .
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This stood in marked difference to the activities of the Agents, many of whom
had worked in the community for 9 or 10 years and who had no social ties in
the community, none at all . Not only don't they have them, but they don't
want them, and considered anyone who did as obviously a loose nut of some
kind - some kind of a traitor to his own race (Gambill, 1994) .
Although at the time Gambill was not aware of any serious problems in his relationship
with the Indian Agent, he found out more than 20 years later that such problems existed . In
1988, hoping to clear up a small inconsistency with regards to the extension of his probation
as a CDO, Gambill requested through the Privacy Act his file concerning the CDP . He
expected a few papers - he received a box full . Gambill learned, among other things, that
after he had been in the community for only about three months, the priest in Akwasasne
held a meeting with Leo Bonna, who was at that time the Regional Director for Ontario, and
had formerly been the Agent for St . Regis. At this meeting the priest sought and received
Bonna's assurances that he would get rid of Gambill within three months .
The priest's unease may have had something to do with Gambill's association with the
longhouse adherents - those who continued to engage in the traditional spiritual and
cultural practices of their ancestors . One of the first things Gambill did when he arrived
was to begin to learn to speak Mohawk . He began to get invited to the longhouse
ceremonies . In a quarterly report to headquarters, Gambill identified many factions in the
community including "agency vs . reserve; island vs. mainland ; long-house vs . progressives ;
Catholics vs. Protestants." Realizing that alliance with one faction would mean alienation
from another, Gambill strove to be involved with all and aligned with none (Gambill, 1965) .
Nonetheless, Gambill's association with the traditional community flourished. Gambill was
to find out later that the long-time IAB bureaucrats did not appreciate his relations with the
longhouse adherents. In his words, "the longhouse people were viewed by the bureaucracy
as being really `tough nuts,' prejudiced against white people, I mean, you just never could
penetrate them, you know a real fortress" (Gambill, 1994) . He was contacted by Stan Bailey,
Regional Supervisor of Social Programs for the IAB and told that his association with the
longhouse adherents
. ..wasn't a very good idea, that I really should stop having contact with the
traditional people . It was too late . If he'd told me that four months earlier, I
might have thought, well, this guy knows what he's talking about . But, by
now I had been there for about a year, and as far as I could see, these were
the most solid people of the community in terms of real community interest,
and really having the character and strength, the kind of thing a community
builds on (Gambill, 1994) .
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As it turns out, there had been a good deal of suspicion of Gambill by the "triumvirate of
the Indian Agent, the priest, and the RCMP officer ." Through the Privacy Act papers
Gambill found out that
the RCMP officer had been going around the community meeting with the
righteous citizens, mostly women, and telling them what a bad guy I was,
and they had better do something about it quick or I could corrupt them and
all this kind of stuff. I didn't know this was going on, but there began to be a
certain kind of split starting to take place in the community with respect to
me.
When I went to course on the weekend, they were searching my house . They
were going into my house and searching everything, and taking out papers
of some kind, I don't know what, I don't know what would be there, but this
is all on file. This was being sent back to Ottawa . There was one person in
Ottawa [Stan Bailey] who said "my God, what's going on? What are you
people doing? You're searching his house, what business do you have?" A
real outrage kind of response, but the rest of it was "can you get me more?"
(Gambill, 1994) .
After having been with the CDP for only 13 months, Gambill's demise was imminent . It
was September of 1966 ; the second training session was underway . According to Gambill :
the lines between community development and the bureaucracy had been
drawn across the country, and we saw it as our holy crusade to keep
community development alive for Indian Affairs because this is what the
most senior people wanted us to do, and we understood that there was going
to be this resistance from the middle ground and we should be firm
(Gambill, 1994) .
In Quebec a particularly disruptive CDO working on the Pointe Bleu reserve named
Hector Boiseneau was about to be fired. He showed up at the training sessions and reported
on his problems with the bureaucracy. Boiseneau was seeking support from his fellow
CDOs . The response he received was illustrative of the division forming within the IAB . On
the one hand, there were those who offered their support and sent a delegation to Ottawa on
behalf of Boiseneau . There were those on the other hand who felt that Boiseneau alone was
responsible for his actions and refused to intervene, fearing that any involvement would
only bring trouble .
Boiseneau and fellow community development workers Maurice Coquette and Jean
Kitchen from neighbouring Mistassini had both experienced the sorts of tactics Indian
Agents and Regional Superintendents used to discredit Gambill at Akwasasne. According to
Jean Kitchen, the assistant CDO at Mistassini, forces within the Indian Agency, the
Hudson Bay company and the three churches were all working to discredit Coquette . There
were rumours spread that Coquette was gay and that the children of the community should
be kept away from him. Kitchen (1994 : 9-10) maintains that officials at the agency office
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deliberately let the pipes freeze in Coquette's trailer, and that Coquette's wife was
ostracized from the community of white women on the reserve . For her part, Kitchen claims
that because she did not drink or smoke it was difficult for her to be discredited .
Nonetheless, rumours were spread among the community that she was likely to "break up
marriages and stuff like that" (Kitchen, 1994 : 9). Further, Kitchen claims that documents
designed to cast her as a "real idiot" were forged, credited to her, and circulated to her fellow
CDOs in the region .
Meanwhile, at Akwasasne, the situation had worsened for Gambill . In August of 1966 a
majority of the Band Council passed a resolution requesting that Gambill leave the reserve .
Believing that the Band Council was under pressure from the IAB to remove him, Gambill
stayed in his position as a CDO, but he and his wife, their two children and three foster
children did move off the reserve to live . After a number of petitions had been gathered
asking him to return, he did so on October 28, 1966 (Globe and Mail, 1967). Meanwhile,
some of the women of the community had, under the auspices of the Homemaker's Club,
resolved to make arrangements for a house to be rented to Gambill for $25 a month .
By this time, Stan Bailey's boss, Arnold Fraser visited Gambill and suggested that he
take a posting in Northern Ontario . Although Gambill declined, he claims that Fraser went
to a Council meeting that night and told the Council that Gambill had requested a transfer .
Gambill, who was at the meeting, denied that he had requested a transfer . His fate with the
CDP was sealed. In early January, 1967, Gambill received a letter from Arthur Laing,
Minister of Indian Affairs, stating that effective January 15, 1967, his probation had
expired and his services were no longer required. The letter cited a " failure to achieve
harmonious working relationships with officers of the IAB" (Globe and Mail, 1967). Being a
devotee to community development, Gambill took the letter to the community and asked
what he should do . Gambill felt that if his commitment to the community was genuine then
he had no choice but to remain there even after his association with the IAB and CDP had
ended. At the time, Gambill stated that, "My friends here are real friends . I didn't just
cultivate them so I could manipulate them and try to make them do things . If I left now, it
would mean the whole thing was a pretense" (Globe and Mail, 1967) . Gambill stayed on in
the community for another 7 or 8 years, and founded the periodical Akwasasne Notes.
The situation revealed a major schism in the community - one experienced by many
CDOs across the country . Often the CDOs had to work at a level below the Chiefs and
Councils in order to work with the community (Rudnicki, 1994) . At Akwasasne there were
on the one hand the longhouse proponents who supported Gambill . Others, though, were not
in favour of his remaining . These people were often associated with the Band Council (many
of the people who held traditional beliefs refused to vote in the elections of Chiefs and
Councils because it was a system imposed by the IAB, and which ignored traditional forms
of governance) . The Band Clerk, John Boots announced that he was in favour of Gambill
staying and was promptly fired by the Council . The battle that ensued achieved a national
profile. Following a Globe and Mail article, Gambill was invited to appear on This Hour Has
Seven Days with a member of the Akwasasne community . Gambill appeared with Mike
Mitchell, a high school student he had been tutoring . Mitchell, who incidentally made an
unsuccessful bid for the leadership of the Assembly of First Nations in 1994, turned in a
stupendous performance . Mitchell and Gambill's appearance is said to have prompted Prime
Minister Pearson to write his Minister of Indian Affairs (Arthur Laing) the next day to
express his concern that the issue might cause trouble for the centennial year celebrations .
While Gambill was finished with the CDP, he went on to an even more tumultuous
career with the Company of Young Canadians . After rising quickly to the upper echelon, he
was forced to resign, again amidst controversy (Hamilton, 1970 : Chapter 13) .
4.1.7
	
THE DEMISE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AT THE INDIAN
AFFAIRS BRANCH
By January 1966, Rudnicki was no longer the Chief of the Social Programs Division - he
had left to take a position with the Privy Council Office . This departure signalled a big
change for the CDP. While Rudnicki was with the IAB he was able to protect the autonomy
of the CDOs -'Whenever things started to get hot and heavy with the bureaucrats out in
the field, I would run interference for them [CDOs]" (Rudnicki, 1994) . After he left, there
was no one who could protect the integrity of the program from the ravages of the system . In
mid 1965, a new Director named Wilf Churchman was hired for the IAB . Churchman's
arrival ensured Rudnicki's departure and the end of the CDP .
Originally, the line of reporting for the CDP had circumvented the Agents and their
Regional Offices - problems were reported directly to Ottawa. Eventually, this was changed
to a situation where the CDOs reported to the Regional Supervisors of Social Programs .
These supervisory positions were created in an attempt to buffer the CDOs from the `old
guard' at the IAB . This schema met with only partial success. While the CDOs were
administratively responsible to the Indian Agents, they were functionally responsible to the
Regional Supervisors . In some regions, such as Saskatchewan, the Regional Supervisor was
able to prevent the CDOs from coming under the influence of the Agents. In other regions
the Supervisors became coopted, leaving the CDOs prone to the preferences of the Agents
and their superiors, the Regional Directors . When Churchman became the Director of the
IAB, he changed the reporting structure so that the CDOs reported to the Regional
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Superintendents (members of the `old guard') . Having the CDOs report to the same position
as the Indian Agents brought the CDP under the control of the established bureaucracy .
Because so much of the change which the CDOs sought relied on changing the relation
between the IAB and Aboriginal peoples, the altered reporting structure effectively
disempowered the CDOs and their ability to effect change . According to Rudnicki, the best
that the CDOs could now do was to "work under cover" (Rudnicki, 1994) .
In fact, in a memo dated May 11, 1966, Churchman inquired as to the possibility of
having the Branch abandon the CDP altogether by letting the Company of Young
Canadians assume responsibility for community development with respect to Aboriginal
peoples. Although this did not happen, the days were numbered for the CDP at the IAB
under Wilf Churchman .
Back in 1958, Hawthorn et al . wrote that success in community development required
imagination on the part of administration and people, and a great deal of
ingenuity, coupled with enthusiasm for the idea. The administration will
have to consider modifying its insistence on certain standards . . . The need is
to tap enthusiasm, not restrict it by regulation, and to encourage the
outward moving ideas that will eventually make the people demand training
and high standards for themselves (Hawthorn et al ., 1958: 431) .
Dimock wrote in 1971 (111) that a "major problem in community development projects
was that the organizations sponsoring them were not able to continue to relate to them for
any period of time ." This seems to be the case with the IAB . By late 1966, officials at the
Indian Affairs Branch were putting the bureaucratic boots to the CDP and had begun a full-
scale retreat from community development. R.F. Battle, Assistant Deputy Minister of
Indian Affairs, was quoted as saying that "change needs to occur, but it needs to occur in a
responsible way. It needs to be evolutionary, not revolutionary" (Globe and Mail, 1966b) . By
February of 1967, Minister of Indian Affairs Arthur Laing began to publicly criticize the
CDP, saying that "it is not the role of the CDP to create dissension in the Indian
communities." He attempted to refocus attention away from the conflict within the IAB and
back on to the so-called `Indian problem .' He claimed that the CDP was not to be a "process
of agitation and revolt" but a means to "arouse the people from sloth and apathy"
(McFarlane, 1993: 91 cites Laing, 1967)
. Presumably, Laing was referring to "sloth and
apathy" among Aboriginal peoples, and not IAB bureaucrats .
By 1968, the CDP had ceased to exist as a source of change within the bureaucracy .
According to Rudnicki, only 15 of the 58 CDOs were working on reserves, while the rest
were stationed in regional offices or in Ottawa . K.P. Uppal, a former CDP Regional
Supervisor, says that the IAB saw the CDP as a wet blanket, and that " . . .the department
wanted to get rid of the blanket before the blanket got rid of the department" (Uppal, 1994) .
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The IAB finally found its way out of the community development business in 1970 when
it began to sign agreements to have organizations such as the Federation of Saskatchewan
Indian Nations to take over responsibility for community development . Similar agreements
had already been signed in Nova Scotia and Manitoba (Lotz, 1971 : 120). Federal funding for
community development was later cut altogether .
4.2 THE REAL ANALYSIS - CDP: AN OLD DOG OR A NEW
TRICK?
The question remains: Was the CDP another wrong-headed initiative from a retrograde
bureaucracy, or did it represent a departure from the restrictive policies of the past, towards
something which promoted self-sufficiency? If the CDP was a departure, then the question
must be asked as to whether or not the CDP ultimately changed the IAB, and further,
whether it contributed to any changes in the lives of Aboriginal peoples . In the introduction
to this chapter, I briefly explained the framework that will be used to analyze the CDP . In
choosing to look at the CDP in terms of three levels of analysis (structural, organizational,
and individual - as defined at the end of chapter 2) and four processes of social production
and reproduction (issue defmition, beliefs, consent, and trust) I am establishing a metric
against which both the CDP and Canada's previous Indian policies may be measured and
ultimately compared .
In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that all too often theory seems to be irrelevant to the
real world. Forester (1993 : 40-1) suggests that for a theoretical interpretation to be most
useful, it must "sensitize us to the important variables in a situation ." Choosing three levels
of analysis and four processes of reproduction generates a host of criteria against which to
analyze the CDP, not all of which are equally relevant . In the remainder of this chapter, I
will discuss the most interesting and relevant aspects of the CDP, guided by the nature of
the CDP itself, and the theoretical direction provided by Forester and Habermas .
Forester's conception of the double structure of communicative action - content and
context - was discussed in the second chapter
. Using the example of a planner, Forester
(1993: 90) says that "What a planner talks about is the content of what is said;
when and in
what situation and with whom the planner talks begins to define the context of what is
said." In the remainder of this chapter, I will compare and contrast the CDP with previous
policy directions of the IAB under the broad headings of Content (issue definition and belief
production) and Context (securing consent and earning trust) . At the end of the chapter, I
will address whether or not the CDP represented a change for the IAB, and discuss whether
or not the Program altered the IAB as a mediating institution .
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4.2.1
	
CONTENT- WAS THE CDP DIFFERENT?
In the third chapter, I noted that in pre-Confederation times Aboriginal issues came to
be defined by those more interested in land settlement than in living with Aboriginal
peoples. Similarly, the interests of Aboriginal peoples within the Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) have traditionally been subordinated to the
interests represented by the Northern Development Branch, which had a mandate to
encourage large resource exploration corporations to develop the north (see chapter 2) .
Overall, political and economic objectives of non-Aboriginal peoples have often been more
important within DIAND than the well being of Aboriginal peoples . One of the results of
this is that the federal government now finds itself involved in many specific land claims
which arose from the improper alienation of reserve land by Canada from First Nations,
usually to the express economic benefit of non-Aboriginal peoples . Throughout the history of
Indian policy in Canada, political and economic factors have been prominent in the
definition of issues and the shaping of relations between the Canadian state and Aboriginal
peoples. In some ways, the CDP was remarkably different from anything that had ever come
from the IAB policy shop . In other ways, though, it was unable to overcome the structural
imperatives that had determined the policies of the IAB for so long .
While the CDP may have brought innovation to the definition of Aboriginal issues, in
one important respect it closely resembled the previous policies of the IAB . From the very
earliest European contact Indian people were used in, or sublimated to, the economic
activities of white settlers . At first, Indian people were used as military allies by the colonial
powers in the defence of the new territories, and then as valuable resources in the fur trade .
Finally, as their economic usefulness as hunters and traders was outstripped by the need
for land for settlers, the Crown sought Treaties with Indian people which would see the
wholesale surrender of Indian land in exchange for a few land entitlements (reserves), and
some rights (such as the right to hunt, fish and gather off-reserve, the right to education,
and health care) .
The CDP, just as with previous policies, saw economic considerations loom large in the
definition of Aboriginal affairs in Canada . This was in spite of the fact that the supporting
Cabinet document avoided setting goals for how much money the CDP would save over the
long run. If it was not explicit, though, the assertion was implicit that employing a
community development approach would save money . While not the sole driving force
behind Cabinet's approval of the Program, fiscal considerations were more than a fortuitous
benefit of a good program . At the outset, the submission identified that :
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In the current fiscal year, relief payments represent one of the larger
appropriations for Indians, amounting to over nine million dollars . Relief
spending has tripled over the past five years, rising by an average of 39%
over the [1957-58 to 1963-641 period
. . .
.This overwhelming problem of
poverty among Indians has health implications which also touch the pockets
of taxpayers (Canada, 1964: 1) .
This implicit promise that the CDP would, over the first three years, begin to produce
savings for Canada in its expenditures on Aboriginal peoples, and would provide the
"necessary basis for negotiating the extension of Provincial services to Indians" (Canada,
1964: 5), was to become an Achilles heel of the program . It was a promise that the Program
simply could not deliver on . While it is difficult (if not impossible) to forecast the ultimate
results of any policy, it is the antithesis of the community development approach to make
any specific promises about outcomes. The very nature of community development means
that it is impossible to know or predict what will be done under its auspices . After all, it is
the community that identifies the important issues and sets the course of action - and it is a
matter of fact that the priorities of on-reserve communities were different from those of the
IAB and its political masters .
4.2.1.1
	
Defining the Issues
Nowhere did the CDP stand further apart from the IAB than with the way it defined the
problem that it sought to address. As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, the Cabinet
document that established the CDP did not offer a solution to an `Indian problem', but
sought to change the `fact' that Aboriginal peoples were `bystanders on the national scene' .
This was a basic change from the thinking that had prevailed since the turn of the century .
As early as the late 1800's and early 1900's reserves had fallen out of favour with
government officials and other `authorities' on Aboriginal issues . These people had begun to
question the efficacy of reserves as locations where Aboriginal people, safe from the vagaries
of mainstream society, could be 'resocialized' as Canadians . Instead, it was believed that
Aboriginal peoples could and should be removed from the "relative shelter" of reserves and
be forced to integrate into the mainstream of Canadian society (Tobias, 1976) . Reserves had
come. t o be seen .a s a hindrance to assimilation . Contrary to this line of thinking, the CDP
proposed not to assimilate Aboriginal peoples into mainstream Canada, but rather to
recognize reserves as Aboriginal communities and to integrate these communities "into the
life of the nation and enable them to contribute fully to national progress" (Canada, 1964 : 3) .
Organizationally the CDP offered a truly innovative definition of issues . The IAB had
tended to problematize the physical infrastructure of reserve communities - roads, sewage
systems, waterlines and the like. This was the very antithesis of community development
.
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In fact, the Cabinet document stated that the need for the CDP was " . ..based on the
recognition that in the past, purely technological approaches have frequently failed to
achieve the desired results or have caused unforeseen damage to people ." The CDP
proposed instead an approach with two essential elements :
the participation by the Indians themselves in efforts to improve their level
of living with as much reliance as possible on their own initiative ; and the
provision of technical and other services in ways which would encourage
initiative and establish a basis for self-sufficiency (Canada, 1964 : 4) .
This describes a fundamental difference between the traditional IAB approach, and the
community development approach . In the language of Habermas (1984: 154), the goal-
rationality which drove the Indian Agents suggests a situation in which "administrative
actions [are separated from their] moral-political foundation" (this also describes
Habermas's concept of lifeworld colonization) . In this context "social problems come to be
seen as technical problems" (Giddens, 1982 : 151). In other words, Agents carried out
administrative duties without considering their moral, fiduciary, or Treaty basis, and
instead focused almost entirely on "technical" aspects of reserve life . Of the Agents he
worked with, CDO Gerry Gambill stated that there was no "real strong feeling that they
were even supposed to be offering any social benefits (Gambill : 17) .
The CDP, in contrast, sought out issues of "the social organization of relationships, the
quality of life and the intangible" (Gambill, 1994) . While it might have been acceptable (or
even desirable) for Agents of the IAB to hold and act on their own opinions regarding what
was problematic on reserves, this sort of activity was strictly off limits to the CDOs . An
axiom of the community development movement was that members of the community must
identify their own "issues ." CDOs were to function as a resource to the community. At the
very most they were to encourage people to define their own issues and generate their own
solutions . According to an October, 1965, quarterly report by one CDO, his goals for the first
three months were as follows :
•
	
to develop and understanding of the people of the community ;
• to transmit to the people an understanding of my work in their community ;
• to avoid allying with any persons or groups in order to know which way the wind blows ;
• to interact with as many residents and groups as possible in places where they
customarily meet, by entering into discussion and being seen ;
• to explore possibilities for development with the people, and to explore with them their
lives and environment in a benign yet objective manner ;
• to select a group with whom I wished to work, and to invite their asking for my
assistance with a project they were working on, and to aid them in looking into ways of
dealing with their concerns (401/29-6, vol . 2) .
It is clear that CDOs had a very different set of responsibilities from the Indian Agents .
Not all CDOs stuck to the axiom that only members of a community could identify and
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define the community's issues, but it is for sure that in many cases the CDOs were
diametrically opposed to the Agents in respect to the issues they problematized .
If there was a remarkable difference between the bureaucratic position of the Indian
Agent and the CDO, so was there an equally remarkable difference between the people who
were Indian Agents and those who were CDOs . The CDOs were young, university educated,
and usually single . Agents on the other hand tended not to have gone to university, to be
older, married, and more dependent on their job. As was discussed earlier in this chapter,
the hiring process used by the IAB screened out the people who would toe the old line, and
select those who would stand up for the new community development approach in the face
of pressures to conform to the ways that it had always been done .
Many CDOs were already familiar with community development from their university
days. Armed with a measure of academic expertise, the CDOs were stirring up communities
in an attempt to initiate some sort of change . Agents tended to be cut from a different cloth
.
Stirring the community to action was not what they had been trained for (if they had even
received any training) . Indeed, the ability to follow orders without question and to quell
stirrings was a more valued skill . This may explain why the IAB had often hired men who
had military backgrounds (Gambill, 1994 :13) .
If the Agents were men well-suited to taking a hard line against what they perceived as
the unreasonable demands of Indian people, the CDOs were men and women (although only
a few) intent on turning the system on its head, and who set out to encourage Indian people
to demand more for themselves and their communities. While the task of changing the
inertia of the IAB may have been tantamount to making water run up hill, the CDOs were
up for the challenge (proving that enthusiasm can go a long way - if only for a short time) .
Where Agents were calloused and cynical about the prospects for change, the CDOs were
keen and optimistic .
These different characteristics meant that Agents and CDOs saw Aboriginal issues in
completely different ways . Where CDOs saw community development as the vehicle to
emancipation for all underprivileged people, many Agents saw community development as
little more than "a really clever way of getting people to do what you wanted them to . . ."
(Gambill, 1994), or as an unwarranted disturbance into an already unstable environment .
The fact that the CDP was even approved by the Cabinet was a testament to Walter
Rudnicki's ability to define Aboriginal issues in such a way that community development
appeared as an obvious solution
. Indeed, the structure of the CDP allowed CDOs to
participate in a new definition of issues - a definition of issues that, quite possibly for the
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first time in Canadian history placed the interests of Indian people ahead of the interests of
the state .
4.2.1.2
	
Producing Beliefs
In addition to how and which issues were problematized and priorized, the CDP
departed significantly with respect to how beliefs, understanding and knowledge were
produced and used among CDOs, Agents, and Indian peoples
.
On a structural level, the CDP invoked the authority of academic studies and reports to
a much greater degree than the IAB had ever done in the past . As discussed in chapter 3, it
wasn't until the work of the Special Joint Committee of 1946, that the views of Aboriginal
people were formally included in the Canadian government's consideration of Aboriginal
issues - and even then the involvement was not great . In fact, the recent Royal Commission
on Aboriginal People (RCAP) states early on in their four-volume work that, "With few
exceptions, the official record of Canada's past . . . ignores and negates Aboriginal peoples'
view of themselves and their encounters . .." (RCAP, 1996a: 7) .
As an organization, the IAB had a history of disregarding the results of research into
itself, the Indian Act, and Aboriginal peoples . While many well-meaning recommendations
have been made through scores of studies, little has ever been done which resulted in gains
among Aboriginal people (Canada, 1996a : 5). The CDP, on the other hand, descended from
an impressive pedigree of research, albeit research which did not involve Aboriginal people
to a great extent . Community development was an international concern, with the import of
the United Nations behind it. In Canada, Hawthorn (1958) and Lagasse (1961) both
recommended that community development be employed in the area of Aboriginal issues .
Unlike his co-workers, Walter Rudnicki (the person who brought community development to
the IAB) had received his Master's degree in social work from the University of British
Columbia in the mid 1950s . In the early 1960s, he had been to Arizona, Mexico and South
America on a World Health Organization travel scholarship to study the international
approach to community development . Rudnicki's academic experience stood in sharp
contrast to the "mandarins at the IAB" who had often risen to their position through the
ranks of the IAB with little formal training (Gambill, 1994) .
The Cabinet Submission itself refers to the need to employ a "balanced, interdisciplinary
approach" in the practice of community development (Canada, 1964 : 5). This also stood in
sharp contrast with the IAB, which had isolated itself from other federal bureaucracies .
Further, community development would depend on "heavily skilled practitioners
. . . capable of
translating existing knowledge about the principles of social and cultural change into
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practical action," not just " . ..persons with sensitivity and good judgement . . ." (Canada, 1964 :
6). So great was the captivation with academic learning that a community development
school was contemplated at "one or more of the universities" (Canada, 1964 :6) .
Upon comparing the manner in which beliefs were produced, some major dissimilarities
emerge between the CDP and the rest of the IAB . The CDP training sessions were a radical
departure . It is probably difficult if not impossible to find a training process within the
federal civil service that came so close to "propagandizing" its employees . The one element
which prevents characterising the training as brainwashing is that it emphasized critical
and independent thought, as opposed to an uncritical acceptance of the status quo . The
sessions were intended to completely reorient the participants, forcing them to do away with
any preconceptions they had and entertain new definitions of the "Indian problem ." If the
Agents were administrators of the status quo, merely carrying out the policies provided by
headquarters, the CDOs were being trained to be independent thinkers who could
withstand both the pressures to conform, and the pressures associated with initiating
change .
The CDP training was a radical departure from the practices of the IAB not only
because of the content of the sessions, but for the mere fact that the training existed . Not
only did CDOs require at least a Bachelor's degree, but they received three months of
intensive training - all expenses paid . Never before had such importance been placed on the
qualifications required to be an IAB bureaucrat, and never before had the IAB placed so
much importance on the skills and abilities of the people who represented Canada in its
relations with First Nations .
The emphasis on learning continued in the CDP after the training sessions were over . A
community development library was maintained, and many CDOs produced papers and
briefs recounting their experiences in the community development process . In addition,
there were a number of community development workshops held to provide " . . .the
opportunity for all field community development staff to meet together to share experiences
and review the community development program" (Fraser, 1966) .
Taken together, the picture that emerges with respect to the production of beliefs is one
where CDOs produced and availed themselves of ideas and knowledge of a sort that was
foreign to Indian Agents . For instance, the CDOs' knowledge of workings on reserve came
almost exclusively from Aboriginal people, not from the Agents, the RCMP, or the local
religious figure . This owed both to the sort of persons who were selected to be CDOs, and
the fact that the Program was structured (early on, at least) to encourage independent and
innovative thinking .
While Indian Agents may have been required to produce numerous reports, the
information contained was closely prescribed, often quantitative in nature, and for the
express benefit of the IAB . CDOs on the other hand were encouraged to participate in the
ferment of ideas and possibilities with Aboriginal people for the benefit of Aboriginal people .
4.2.2
	
CONTEXT - IT's NOT WHAT You Do, IT's How You Do IT
Up to now, Part 2 of this chapter focused on what the CDP did . The remainder of the
chapter will be dedicated to looking at how the CDP did what it did . While the content
analysis concentrated on what was contained within the CDP, the context analysis turns to
the relations and situations in which the CDP occurred. In looking at the context in which a
policy occurs, Forester (1993) directs our attention to the related ideas of consent and trust .
Consent involves the acceptance of a situation, either through free will (with the
connotation that alternatives are available should a situation no longer warrant consent) or
through some form of coercion, in which consent to a situation may be granted in order to
satisfy others . The first form of consent is likely to involve trust - a belief in the honesty,
truthfulness and/or justice of a thing . In the second, coercive form of consent, trust is
absent .
The concept of communication plays a large role in a contextual analysis . Forester
understands planning as communicative action . He says that although we sometimes think
of our actions as tools, they are more than that because they involve communication (even
though planning is more than just talk) . Forester says that :
as a form of social or communicative action, the planner's actions shape
others' expectations, beliefs, hopes, and understanding, even though
planners do not strictly control any of these outcomes . The planners' work
may be threatening to some, but promising to others, for action shapes
meaning (1993: 24-5) .
In Forester's formulation, instrumental and communicative aspects of planning are not
separate, but integral . He states that,
as planners' actions communicate encouragement or discouragement to
others . . . .so will the dependency or autonomy of those citizens be influenced
as well . As a result of planner's actions, then, the ability of affected persons
to respond and act for themselves can be weakened or strengthened (1993 :
26) .
Forester's understanding of planning seems to be written for the study at hand . The policies
of the IAB had the effect of undermining the confidence, capacity and autonomy of
Aboriginal peoples, eventually making entire communities dependent on the state for
shelter and food, and in many cases rendering them politically impotent . The CDP, on the
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other hand, was a conscious attempt to change this . The entire Program was oriented
toward empowering Aboriginal peoples to take charge of the decisions affecting their lives
and their communities, and consequently ending their status as "bystanders on the national
scene ." This change was not to occur simply through doing different things on reserve, but
through doing them differently as well .
4.2.2.1
	
Elements of Consent & Trust
The concept of consent may be applied to a number of different relationships with
respect to the CDP, such as the state securing the consent of Indian people, or of its
employees. As I argue below, there are considerable differences between the CDP and the
rest of the IAB with respect to how that consent was requested and/or gained .
As I stated in chapter three, the reproduction of consent occurs via the institutions of
society - the legislatures, the courts, and the government agencies . Other commentators
would also include institutions such as the mass media (see Herman & Chomsky, 1988),
although this is beyond the scope of this investigation . For First Nations, the above noted
institutions generated and/or enforced policies of assimilation, protection and civilization,
and were carried out most notoriously through the IAB and by the Indian Agent . Regardless
of the assimilationist rhetoric that asserted that each policy was a step toward integration,
in reality the policies of the IAB accomplished the reproduction of patterns of consent and
deference among Aboriginal people to the Canadian State . It is worth recalling Walter
Rudnicki's recollection in the previous chapter of the IAB in 1962 as a place where "Indian
people showed up . . .with hats in hand, very deferential and intimidated . And so in this kind
of context we had to develop a kind of community development" (Rudnicki : 1994) .
On a structural level, political economic analyses provide a starting point for
understanding the reproduction of consent, after all, controlling the political and economic
circumstances of a community can be a very powerful tool in securing consent . There is
ample literature (see chapter three) asserting that the Canadian State has used political
and economic tactics to secure and maintain the consent or acceptance of Aboriginal people
to their situation. Frideres (1988 : 253-254) uses the terms control and regulation rather
than consent to describe state policies concerning Aboriginal people . Similarly, Wotherspoon
& Satzewich (1993) speak of the Canadian State balancing the contradictory objectives of
representation and control . While not using the term consent, there are obvious similarities
between securing consent and maintaining control . The IAB was able to use the relative
isolation experienced by Aboriginal communities to maintain control and consent . The CDP
on the other hand identified this isolation as problematic .
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The CDP Cabinet submission stated that one of the benefits of the community
development approach was that it would " . . .demonstrate to Indians on reserves the
possibilities of fruitful collaboration with the people and agencies of the outside world"
(Canada, 1964 ; emphasis mine). This is a very strong statement and it was likely made in
part for the benefit of the Cabinet ministers who would be considering the submission .
Rhetoric aside, it does point to the isolation experienced by many First Nations, and the
extent to which the peoples of these First Nations had to rely on the IAB and its Agents for
information . Rudnicki (1994) claims that First Nations were "totally isolated from each
other [and] out of communication with each other ." This might be overstated given that
groups such as the Union of Saskatchewan Indians (later to become the Federation of
Saskatchewan Indian Nations) began to form as early as 1946 . In fact, Indian leaders from
across Canada had met in Ottawa in 1944, to form a national Aboriginal organization which
was to become the North American Indian Brotherhood . Nonetheless, Rudnicki was likely
correct in his assertion that First Nations suffered from a dearth of information about fellow
First Nations and about the socio-political milieu of Canada . The IAB had done little to
change this - and may be credited instead with maintaining the situation
. The Community
Development Program, on the other hand, sought nothing less than a structural change to
this circumstance .
One of the things which occurred through the CDP, and which had a significant impact
on the ability of First Nations to access important information, was the establishment of the
Indian Advisory Committees (IACs) . While a discussion of the IACs could have been
undertaken as part of a discussion on the content of the CDP, it is included here because the
IACs played such a major role in changing the context in which Aboriginal people related
with the Canadian state. Although the committees were not essential to community
development, they were a key part of the CDP . The stated purpose of the committees was to
advise the Regional Supervisor and IAB headquarters staff on Aboriginal issues . As stated
earlier in this chapter, however, the committees were most notable because they became
conduits for the flow of information between First Nations across Canada. Thus, while the
CDP cannot be credited with providing the political education which First Nations leaders
gained through participating in these committees, it can be credited for providing the forum
in which the education occurred .
On a structural level, one measure by which the CDP may be evaluated is in terms of
how it affected the legislative framework which governed the lives of Aboriginal people, and
which helped to reproduce the patterns of consent among Aboriginal communities to the
operations of the IAB . In this, it is clear that the CDP did not change the Indian Act, or
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influence the legal or political interpretation of Treaties . While the CDP did not seek change
from the top down (i .e ., through legislation), but rather from the bottom up, it did leave a
mark in respect to the Indian Act . As Weaver (1981) states, the connections established
through the Indian Advisory Committees and the National Advisory Committees created
under the CDP were integral to opposition formed against Jean Chretien's 1969 White
Paper proposal to eliminate Canada's fiduciary obligation to Indians by radically altering
the Indian Act .
To reiterate, the IAB had done very little throughout its history to educate politically or
to empower Aboriginal people to a point where they could free themselves from the
domination of the IAB . The CDP, however, did do this, and one of the best examples was
through the Indian Advisory Committees .
Satzewich and Mahood (1994 : 40) write that "Max Weber's description of the ideal-
typical form of bureaucratic domination reads as if he had in mind the Canadian
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development." They further characterize this
bureaucratic rule as "the single most important obstacle to Indian peoples' social and
economic well-being" (41) . While Satzewich and Mahood were writing about the early
twentieth century, Walter Rudnicki echoes this description, but for the early 1960s .
Rudnicki describes a very restrictive environment that was run with the inflexibility and
rule boundedness of the military .
That the severe qualities of the IAB were detrimental to Indian people is well
documented by researchers . The implications that this had for the employees of the IAB has
understandably not received the same attention . Indian Agents were made to conform to the
strict rules on which the IAB thrived. Agents could exercise little discretion in the exercise
of their duties - having instead to follow closely their policy manuals . While the Agents
exercised considerable control over Indian people, by 1964 the IAB was "primarily an
administrative unit which refers to functional specialists based in regional offices for advice
and direction" (Canada, 1964 : 11). In fact, Agents who did try to initiate meaningful change
were, as is the case in many bureaucracies, shut down (see Satzewich and Mahood, 1995 ;
and Chapter 3, Determinants of State Policy) .
The CDOs on the other hand came from, and lived in, a completely different world .
Through a combination of selection and training, these young men and women could not
have been more different from their colleagues at the IAB . Where the Agents were
indoctrinated to toe the departmental line, the CDOs had been, through the benefit of
extensive training, indoctrinated to resist and even undermine the ravages of the
bureaucracy . They had been forewarned that in order to achieve their objectives they would
have to step outside the role of a typical bureaucrat, and at times employ something akin to
trickery to side-step authorities .
Organizationally, the IAB was structured in such a way that Indian Agents had
significant control over the lives of Indian people, but relatively little power or control
within their own organization . This is contrary to the popular belief that Indian Agents
were all powerful . Along with this popular belief has come the commonplace practice in
recent years to focus the blame for the ills in Aboriginal communities on Indian Agents
alone . While Agents certainly had an oppressive level of control over Aboriginal peoples,
Satzewich and Mahood (1995) point out that the Agent as all-powerful entity needs to be
rethought. They instead propose that Agents had to balance a number of competing
interests . For one thing, Aboriginal peoples often actively resisted the power of Agents . At
the same time, Agents were accountable to "The churches, the Hudson Bay Company, the
fisheries, energy, mines and resources people, and all these other groups who wanted
Indians to sit tight while they took everything away from them" (Kitchen, 1994) . One CDO
painted a portrait of the Indian Agent which fits well with Forester's description of planners
as people who occupy the `middle ground" between individuals acting in a vacuum and
accounts where structures wholly determine actions (1993 : 85) :
[the Agents were] administrators of the status quo, they had certain things
to do for Ottawa, they had forms to make and censuses to keep and, you
know, a lot of "bean counting ." They had books to keep, and to make sure
things were in good order so that when the regional superintendent came
everything was clean . Their world went around this, and the Indians were
simply an inconvenience . I don't think there were any real strong feelings
that they were even supposed to be offering any social benefits . . . . They were
very powerless in their organization - they would get called on the carpet in
Ottawa for having mis-added a column in one of their reports or something,
but that was balanced off by having extreme power over a great number of
people (Gambill, 1994) .
This was in stark contrast to the CDOs, whose jobs must have seemed wholly unbridled
to the Agents. Where the daily routine of the Agents was closely specified, the CDOs had no
set routine. Nor did they have set office hours or responsibilities . This organizational
departure in itself was a source of great friction between the CDOs and the Agents .
According to CDO Gerry Gambill the Agents were
really under the gun, making out time reports, showing up at 9 :00 and
leaving at 4 :30, accounting for every penny - the real old-style bureaucracy .
In come these CDO people who really don't have any schedule . They get up
in the morning when they want to and do their thing and, well, I kept
actually long hours, but it was a very different lifestyle (Gambill, 1994) .
In sum, the Indian Agents had very little control in their organization . In the words of
Walter Rudnicki, the Agents were
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part of the system . They didn't create it. If they were going to succeed in the
system they had to toe the line . Those who couldn't take it - who saw that
the whole thing was terrible - just left . So gradually, what happened was
that those who didn't care much were quite happy to remain, and they
stayed and prevailed (Rudnicki, 1994) .
With the CDP on the other hand, those who didn't care or who would accept the
injustices of the system were not `let in' in the first place . CDOs were likely to attempt to
change the system, and if they were forced out, as was the case with Gerry Gambill, they
often did not leave quietly .
CDOs enjoyed the relative shelter from the bureaucracy that the CDP provided . The
CDP was set up in such a way that the CDOs, unlike the Indian Agents, did not report to
the regional directors, but reported directly to Ottawa . This meant that the CDOs did not
have the same restrictions placed on their activities as did the Agents . This had important
consequences for the CDP - in fact the end of the CDP was signalled when its reporting
structure was changed to mimic that for the rest of the IAB . Most importantly, the less
formal reporting structure meant that CDOs had the freedom to practice community
development relatively unfettered by the bureaucracy .
It is this last point that is most interesting in the context of issues of trust and consent,
for it allowed the CDOs to build trust, where the Indian Agents were limited to carrying out
the policies of the IAB - a practice which often fostered mistrust and only grudging consent .
Clearly, one of the things that set the CDP apart from the IAB was the issue of trust .
Community development simply cannot happen without the trust and willing consent of the
community. So important is this that CDOs were implored to do nothing which would
jeopardize the trust of community members, even if it meant being uncooperative with the
Agent. This cannot be over-emphasized. For CDO Gerry Gambill, the trust he established
was so important that even after he had been fired as a CDO he stayed on in the
community, because all along he had been telling the community that he was, and would
remain, loyal to them .
Another point that sets the IAB and Agents apart from the CDP and CDOs was the
issue of control . As you might expect, the Agents kept tight control over activities on
reserve . Control is essential to securing coerced or unwilling consent. Conversely, for the
CDOs, control was only an issue to the extent that they insisted on working without it . In
the words of CDO Gerry Gambill, "The control that the Agent had over the community is so
total that they can frustrate anything that you tried to do, such as the use of a hall to have a
meeting - whatever . .." (Gambill, 1994). For the CDOs, a lack of control was the norm :
. . . if in fact, community development was doing what it was supposed to do,
we didn't know what the end result would be . People have to decide that . If
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you believe that over time, empowered people in a democratic environment
will, in fact, make the right decisions and do the right thing then you go
with that. That's all there is to it . . . . you accept the unpredictable . You never
make a prediction. You go with that and that becomes, you know, the
goal . . .(Gambill, 1994) .
It is worth noting here that in order to operate, the CDP required the consent of Aboriginal
people just as did the IAB . It is also worth noting that there is no evidence to suggest that
First Nations had a choice as to whether to allow the introduction of community
development into their communities, meaning that initially, the CDP must have relied upon
the consent which the IAB maintained and reproduced on-reserve . It is perhaps more
important, though, that once on reserve the CDP and the CDOs sought and earned the
consent of Aboriginal communities rather than demanding and coercing it as did the IAB .
4.2.3
	
WAS THE CDP DIFFERENT AND DID IT CHANGE THE LAB?
The question remains: Was the CDP another wrong-headed initiative from a retrograde
bureaucracy, or was it a departure for Canada and the IAB from the restrictive policies of
the past, towards something which promoted self-sufficiency? In short, the answer is that
the CDP was a departure from the previous policies of the IAB . This is not to say that the
CDP was different in every respect . Indeed, the CDP had many of the characteristics of an
IAB policy . It was created and implemented with little input from Aboriginal people .
Without exception, the CDOs were non-Aboriginal . Where Aboriginal people were employed,
it was in junior positions . And in many ways, the conflict created by the Program had more
to do with struggles between white bureaucrats than it had to do with Aboriginal issues (yet
another example of the interests of Aboriginal issues being of secondary importance in that
portion of the federal bureaucracy responsible for Aboriginal issues) . The importance of
these points of convergence between the CDP and previous policies of the IAB should not be
ignored or underestimated . The CDP was not perfect, and many CDOs were ineffective, and
likely even exhibited some of the more offensive characteristics possessed by the Agents .
Regardless of the Program's shortcomings, though, it cannot be denied that in the most
important respects, it was wholly uncharacteristic for the IAB . It sought in word and in
deed to empower Aboriginal people . It gave a voice to Aboriginal communities . It
undermined the power base of the IAB and sought even to change the IAB . The Community
Development Program augmented good intentions with meaningful action - a rare
occurrence anywhere, especially it seems within government . The worth of the program
might be summed up in the following manner : If it could all be done over again, could some
things have been done differently to make the program more effective? Yes . If one had to
choose between the Program having occurred the way it did and having not occurred at all,
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which would be preferable? Those interested in changing the way Aboriginal people were
treated by the state would answer that it was definitely preferable for the program to have
occurred than for it not to have .
A second question remains : Did the CDP change the IAB? The first word on this goes to
Walter Rudnicki, author of the Community Development Program, who says, "changing the
bureaucracy is virtually impossible" (Rudnicki, 1994) . Rudnicki has spent much of his
working life in or around one bureaucracy or another, and points out that,
. . .when one talks of bureaucracy, you can't just speak of the Indian Affairs
Branch, or the Indian Affairs Department today . You have to talk about the
whole mandarin system throughout the whole public service, and our
objectives of our civilization. So the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, or the
Minister, doesn't necessarily by himself, decide what policy direction to go
in. The Deputy Minister of Finance, the Secretary of the Treasury Board and
the Secretary of the Privy Council Office and so on and so on, are the people
who decide these things .
Others were not as cynical as Rudnicki . Former CDO Kris Uppal believes that the
community development approach made a tremendous contribution to the department, and
that any positive features of the department today can be traced back to the CDP (Uppal,
1994) . There is an explanation that accounts for the differing opinions between Rudnicki
and Uppal
. While the CDP may not have fundamentally changed the IAB, it changed the
way in which Aboriginal people related to the bureaucracy, and this in turn was responsible
for changes in the bureaucracy . For the sake of accuracy, community development
practitioners would point out that the CDP didn't change the people with whom it came into
contact. Rather, communities changed themselves as well as the demands that they made of
the IAB .
Forester uses as one measure for the success of a program or policy the question of
whether or not it changes the mediating institution that sponsored the program . It is clear
that the demands which Aboriginal people made of the IAB changed as a result of the CDP
from the demands that were made before the CDP . In answer to the question as to whether
the CDP was another wrong-headed initiative from a retrograde bureaucracy, or a
departure for Canada and the IAB, the answer must be the latter . That many old-school
bureaucrats thought the policy to be "wrong-headed" confirms that it was a significant
departure . The fact that the Program was created not by someone from within the IAB, but
rather from a person who may be best described as a perennial `outsider' who happened to
be working inside the IAB in 1963, merely bolsters this conclusion .
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS
Given the subject matter of this thesis, one might have mistakenly expected the
investigation at hand to have been about Aboriginal people . Even a casual reading would
show this not to be the case . Nowhere were the experiences that Aboriginal people had with
the Community Development Program documented. Likewise, there was no space provided
for an assessment of the Program by the communities in which it functioned. Both of these
would be necessary for a thorough examination of the Community Development Program -
an examination that was not undertaken here . What I attempted to accomplish was
different and much more modest . Indeed, the preceding work was an exploration into how
one policy decision was taken at the IAB in the early 1960s, and how the resulting program
stood apart from previous programs . As a result, the inquiry was hardly about Aboriginal
people at all . Many interesting areas of investigation remain, such as how different
Aboriginal communities responded to the Community Development Program, what the
major failings and successes of the program were, and why it worked in better in some
communities than in others .
5.1 CONCLUSIONS TO MY STUDY
The CDOs employed by the CDP were a keen lot - buoyed by the possibilities of change
characteristic to their time . They were quite unlike their counterparts at the IAB, whose
years of experience had dulled the enthusiasm they might have had . In fact, successful
community development workers embodied the approach which Forester advocates for
planners who have emancipatory interests . He says that such people :
seek to employ technical excellence while simultaneously diffusing and
spreading design responsibility, promoting critically constructive design and
policy criticism, and educating politically - rather than perpetuating
exclusion, ignorance, false expectations, deceptive myths of expertise, public
distrust, and apathy (Forester, 1993 : 29) .
Not all Community Development Officers were able to meet the standards that Forester
sets out, but many attempted to . Despite their best efforts though, even the most successful
CDOs were unable to effect the sort of change that the CDP had envisioned . In retrospect, it
was naive of Rudnicki and the CDOs to have thought that they could undo in a couple of
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years the effects of oppressive policies and practices which had been established over a
century. Indeed, there is little indication that the CDP improved the socio-economic status
of Indian people (with the possible exception of new housing for members of the Cowichan
First Nation). What did happen as a result of the CDP was a change in the sorts of demands
made of the state by Indian people, forcing a change at the Indian Affairs Branch (see the
conclusion to chapter four) .
In the words of Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993), the IAB was ill equipped to
represent the interests of Aboriginal peoples, but was equipped to control them. The CDP
precipitated a change in the balance between representation and control at the LAB, with
the former growing in relative importance .
In general, the CDOs' activities communicated encouragement, which resulted in ruffled
feathers at the IAB. In the words of Gerry Gambill " . . .you can't do the radical change that is
needed in the relationship between Indians and non-Indians in Canada without offending
vested interests, and one of those vested interests are people who are from Indian Affairs,
almost by definition" (Gambill, 13) .
After the second world war, a number of changes were taking place in Canada, among
them the way that Canadians thought about Aboriginal issues . In his research paper for the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, John Giokas refers to the 1960s as the "Decade of
Rediscovery" for Canadian people (Giokas, 1997 : record 28597) . Many people had begun to
suspect that the "Indian problem" was rooted not within Indian people, but in the way in
which Aboriginal people were treated by the Canadian State and by Canadians . The
community development approach was consistent with the "national mood of grass roots
community activism" (Giokas, 1995 : Record 28604) . While change was afoot in Canada, the
IAB had managed to lag behind the times . The CDP thrust the IAB into the milieu of the
1960s .
At the end of the first part of the second Chapter, I identified a number of themes that
characterized policies aimed at Aboriginal people in Canada before the Second World War .
The IAB was long overdue for a shift in the way it operated, but until the advent of the CDP
little change had occurred . The themes identified in chapter two provide a baseline against
which the community development approach may be compared .
The first theme was that the state had sunk its "institutional rhizomes" deep into the
lives of Aboriginal people . One of the central elements of Habermas's work concerns the
increasingly dominant role instrumental rationality has played in our societies since the
enlightenment, and the consequent effects this had on the lives of people . There are
powerful parallels between the changes brought on by the enlightenment in Europe and the
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changes for Aboriginal peoples brought on by colonization. According to Weber, the
purposive rationality of the enlightenment displaced traditional spiritual world views but
failed to replace them with anything which could give "meaning and unity to life"
(McCarthy, 1984 : xvii). This interference of the economic and bureaucratic subsystems with
the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld resulted in "loss of meaning, withdrawal of
legitimation, confusion of orientations, anomie, destabilization of collective identities,
alienation, psychopathologies, breakdowns in tradition, [and] withdrawal of motivation"
(McCarthy, 1984 : xxv; see also Siedman, 1989: 25). In Canada, Aboriginal peoples were
forced, more or less, to abandon their traditional systems while modern ways based on
purposive rationality were forced upon them by Agents of the Canadian state . The CDP
helped to change that . Even though the development of the CDP was still an example of
non-Aboriginal people doing something for (rather than with) Aboriginal peoples, the
activities spawned by the CDP led to Aboriginal peoples acting for Aboriginal peoples .
According to Habermas, lifeworld colonization occurs when "bureaucratic spheres
become hived off from the lifeworld, and thus also from the norms and values of the
lifeworld" (Habermas, 1984: 154)
. One of the results is that "social problems come to be seen
as 'technical' problems" (Giddens, 1982: 151) . Traditional practices and forms of social
reproduction among Aboriginal people were hindered, restricted, or completely destroyed . At
the IAB, and on Indian reserves all across Canada, technical matters such as road and
sewer construction came to be the focus of attention to the exclusion of traditional social
reproduction .
The CDP departed from this and instead concentrated on less tangible things such as
relations between the Indian Agent and the community, and who ought to be taking
decision making responsibility for the community . In a sense, the CDP attempted to
reattach the bureaucratic sphere to the lifeworld, and to establish a link between the
bureaucratic sphere which governed so much of the daily lives for Aboriginal people, and its
moral-political foundation . This would enable the activities of the IAB to be empowering,
rather than disempowering . If the IAB had sped the process of lifeworld colonization for
Aboriginal peoples, the CDP attempted to slow or reverse the process .
The second theme was that economic factors have figured prominently in the Canadian
state's treatment of Aboriginal peoples, whether during the fur trade, land surrender, or
more recently with respect to the on-going costs associated with Treaty rights and
programming. The CDP did not do much to change this
. In fact, the CDP promised to save
taxpayers money by making Indian peoples more self-sufficient . In the end, the fiscal goals
established but not met by the Program were part of its undoing. Community development,
especially over the short term, is by all accounts the wrong approach for reducing
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expenditures. Fiscal considerations aside however, it is likely that had the Program not
caused such a stir for the government it would have stood a better chance of survival .
The third theme was that racism and ignorance have influenced the nature of
Aboriginal policy in Canada. The CDP did not have a formal cultural awareness component,
nor did it explicitly seek to counter racist attitudes . CDOs, probably by simple virtue of their
age, were generally more culturally sensitive than their counterparts at the IAB . Besides,
the CDOs did not have the task of assimilating Indian peoples into the "dominant culture",
as did other officials of the IAB .
The fourth theme that characterized IAB policies was that they produced and
reproduced consent among Aboriginal peoples to the existing unequal power relations . In
the words of Wotherspoon and Satzewich (1993), the policies of the IAB placed more
emphasis on the social control of Aboriginal peoples than on their representation . The CDP
set this approach entirely on its head . It took control from bureaucrats and gave it to
Aboriginal communities. This helped to radicalize Aboriginal peoples to the degree that
coherent and effective opposition formed to government initiatives which were seen as
threatening, such as the 1969 White Paper.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, CDOs required the consent of Aboriginal peoples,
just as did other Agents of the IAB . The salient difference was that while CDOs earned
consent by earning trust, Indian Agents were more likely to force or demand consent.
The final theme relates also to consent . In addition to producing and reproducing
consent, allegiance, and deference among Aboriginal peoples, the IAB did the same with its
Agents. In the pre-CDP days, there was little organizational tolerance for change or
innovation, especially coming from workers in the field . With their altered reporting
structure the CDOs were able to operate outside of the control of the IAB - at least until
Wilf Churchman arrived at the IAB and brought CDOs to heel under the same chain of
supervision as Indian Agents . It was at this point, in the words of R .F. Battle, that the
Program changed from a revolutionary to an evolutionary one (Globe and Mail, 1966b) .
Finally, in answer to the question which guided this research: Was the CDP another
wrong-headed initiative from a retrograde bureaucracy, or did it represent a departure for
Canada and the IAB away from the restrictive policies of the past towards something which
promoted self-sufficiency? The answer must be that the CDP was indeed a departure from
the policies of the past .
5.1.1
	
DID THE CDP CHANGE THE LIVES OF ABORIGINAL PEOPLES?
Establishing that the CDP was different from the policies and programs that preceded it
at the IAB is one matter . Whether or not it actually changed the lives of Aboriginal peoples
for the better is quite another matter, and may be considered to be the real test of how good
and worthwhile the Program was .
To put the CDP and its ability to initiate change in perspective, it is helpful to examine
the nature of community development . As I have discussed previously, a community
development approach is entirely dependent upon the communities in which it is employed .
This applies both to the type and pace of change undertaken . The upshot of this is that
community development is likely not the approach to use if it is imperative that drastic
changes be effected over short time frames in easily measured terms (such as income or
rates of social assistance use) .
With the CDP in particular it must be noted that the program lasted for a very short
time by any standards, and for an especially short time by community development
standards. Rudnicki began laying plans for community development at IAB in 1963, and
managed to have a Cabinet approved policy by July of 1964 . It was another full year before
CDOs actually set foot on reserves, and a mere 10 months after that (May 1966) IAB
Director Wilf Churchman began inquiring about the possibilities of transferring the CDP
out of the IAB. By January of 1966, Rudnicki had departed the IAB for the Privy Council
Office, and the effective life of the CDP was drawing to a close . By the end of 1966, IAB
officials were publicly questioning the CDP, and a few months later, their Minister was
publicly criticising it (Globe & Mail, 1966b ; McFarlane, 1993 : 91 cites Laing, 1967) . This left
the CDP with 18 to 24 months in which to operate effectively, at least three months of which
were required by the CDOs to build a rapport with the community .
While a definitive, quantitative statement on the extent to which the CDP did or did not
effect a change in the lives of Aboriginal peoples is beyond the scope of this investigation, it
is safe to say that in readily measurable terms, the CDP could only have had a minimal
effect. That stated, however, some things did change as a result of the CDP .
For starters, under the CDP government officials listened to Aboriginal peoples. While it
may not have been the first time this happened, it was the first time that a major program
was based on listening to what Aboriginal peoples had to say . More importantly, the CDOs
acted in accordance with what they heard from Aboriginal peoples .
In addition to listening and acting, the CDOs were showing respect for and valuing the
opinions, ideas, and culture of Aboriginal peoples . Unlike their counterparts at the IAB, the
CDOs were agents of the people more than they were agents of the state, which meant that
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they were agents of change rather than agents of the status quo . This was a monumental
turnabout. It was an admission, even if unintended, that IAB and its bureaucrats did not
possess all of the answers, or know what was best for Aboriginal peoples .
Taken together, while these things are difficult to measure, they do represent change .
The CDP occurred at a national level and was directed towards thousands of people . As
such, it is sometimes overlooked that while change occurs one community at a time, it also
occurs one person at a time . Through the CDP, people were receiving encouraging messages
from officials of the IAB . It is doubtless that this made people feel and behave differently
. It
is relatively straightforward to speak about the change a particular program might have in
terms of a particular cohort (like educational attainment among 18-24 year old reserve
dwelling Status Indians) . It is more difficult to speak of how a particular policy might affect
individuals . The change in the lives of Aboriginal peoples that was generated through the
CDP may be summed up in the following manner :
. . . as planners' actions communicate encouragement or discouragement to
others . . . . so will the dependency or autonomy of those citizens be influenced
as well . As a result of planners actions, then, the ability of affected persons
to respond and act for themselves can be weakened or strengthened
(Forester, 1993 :26) .
5.2 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE INVESTIGATION
In the introduction to this chapter, I stated that a thorough examination of the CDP
would require an investigation into the experiences of Aboriginal people vis-a-vis the CDP
as well as an assessment of the concrete ways in which the CDP changed the communities
in which it operated . A study of this sort might likely yield useful information about how a
community development approach may be most effective and about which characteristics
make for an effective community development practitioner. Such a research project might
take a look at quantitative and qualitative aspects of life for Aboriginal peoples before and
after the CDP and between communities in which the CDP was and was not active . This
would allow a more definitive conclusion on whether or not the CDP effected a meaningful
change in the lives of Aboriginal peoples . For sure, an extensive examination of the
experiences of Aboriginal peoples would be invaluable to understanding more fully the
strengths and weaknesses of the CDP and how community development approaches may be
best used in the future .
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5.3 INSIGHTS FOR POLICY-MAKING
C. Wright Mills stated in The Sociological Imagination (1959) that one cannot hope to
understand contemporary social structures and their effects on individual actors without
comparative and historical analyses . Similarly, the starting point for understanding the
forces influencing contemporary policy decisions is with a historical analysis of government
policy development. As Weaver (1981 :xiii) states,
When ministers and civil servants leave the portfolio, they often take with
them their individual experiences . As a result, the collective experience is
not synthesized and lessons from even the recent past remain unlearned .
Thus, policies promoted as innovative often arouse a strong sense of deji vu
in Indians and longstanding government employees .
This research provides an opportunity to re-awaken some lessons learned in the past about
social policy in general and aboriginal issues in particular .
While this investigation was decidedly historical in nature, there are some insights that
may inform present and future policy-making and implementation . The first point is that
change is more difficult to sustain than is stasis . While stating this may seem so obvious as
to be a waste of time, the point is an important one to make given the implications it has for
public policy development within the context of organizations such as the IAB .
Bureaucracies, like people, are often challenged by change . Similarly, some are better
adapted than others to accommodate or even thrive on change . One implication of this is
that an intransigent bureaucracy may scuttle a public policy initiative that depends upon a
fundamental change in an organization . In fact, one of the reasons for the CDP's eventual
demise was that the bureaucratic inertia at the IAB was allowed to take precedence over
the objectives of community development . Indeed, when CDOs were required under the
supervision of Wilf Churchman to follow the same reporting structure of other IAB field
staff, the Program was finished . However, in the words of Walter Rudnicki, by that time it
was too late to stop the change that had been started : "[t]he genie had been let out of the
bottle." The lesson here is that a more fruitful approach than requiring an organization to
change to deliver a new type of service might be for policy makers to initiate a process
whereby clients demand change from the bureaucracy, especially where that bureaucracy
has a history of `backwardness' . The CDP tried both tacks, and in the end it was the latter
which was the most successful .
Another option with respect to changing a bureaucracy is to " . ..come in with superior
power from the outside and cancel them and start over again - you know tell them that the
airplane is landing and that they are all getting off, and you are issuing new boarding
passes, and they aren't getting on again" (Rudnicki, 1994) . This is more or less the approach
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that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) has recommended in order to get
the Canadian government to fulfil its Treaty and other obligations . RCAP has
recommended :
. . . an Aboriginal Relations Department Act and an Indian and Inuit Services
Department Act to create new federal departments to discharge federal
Crown obligations to recognized Aboriginal nations and replace the existing
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (RCAP, 1996B :
Record 6898) .
It remains to be seen if this or any of the recommendations for RCAP will be
implemented by federal or provincial governments in Canada. In the summation to Part 2 of
Chapter 3, I stated that in the early 1960s there was a novel and increasing belief among
Canadians that there existed a problem in the relationship Canada had with Aboriginal
peoples. The popularity of community-based community development approaches and the
relative absence of alternative courses of action saw the Canadian government select
community development as a way to alter its relationship with Aboriginal people . In 1997,
there is no longer widespread agreement that a problem even exists . In fact, the only
consensus among Canadians seems to be that there aren't really any problems with regards
to Aboriginal peoples in Canada, in spite of ample indications to the contrary . A 1996 poll
conducted for DIAND showed that almost half of Canadians believe Aboriginal peoples are
as well or better off than the average Canadian citizen (Star Phoenix, 1997: A10). Further,
fully 40% of Canadians believe that Aboriginal peoples have "only themselves to blame for
their problems" (Star Phoenix, 1997 : Al0) .
Not surprisingly, there is little agreement in Canada on what should be done in the area
of Aboriginal issues . What is surprising is this lack of consensus exists so soon after the
release of the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples . The Globe and Mail
(1997: D9) reported that a mere three months after the release of the Commission's report,
only 1% of Canadians cited Aboriginal issues as a concern (this is even more surprising
given that Aboriginal peoples make up at least 3% of Canada's population) .
While RCAP undoubtedly contains much interesting and useful information and
recommendations, there has, as of summer 1997, been no indication from the federal
government that the RCAP findings will be acted upon in a meaningful way . This issue
relates to the second area of insight that might be gained from the historical investigation of
the CDP. This is that the best ideas and plans for change will not be acted upon in the
absence of a convergence of the right person, place and time . On the first count I am
referring to the characteristics required by an individual to initiate change (these might
include tenacity, confidence, creativity, and some disregard for the status quo) . Place refers
to the bureaucratic or political position of the individual in question . Quite simply, one's
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position must provide the license to undertake change . Finally, time encompasses those
elements that I referred to as background consensus in Part 2 of Chapter 3, including the
"mood" and popular ideas of the time, all of which influence the content and nature of
political will and thus the sorts of policies that may be implemented .
Opportunities for major changes in policy tend to be few and far between . Unless this
pattern changes, the implications are that those who are interested in being involved in or
generating policies that empower and educate politically will have to bide their time until
an opportunity arises . It doesn't hurt to cast proposals in the language of the day either .
Planners who are interested in these sorts of policies must patiently wait, and above all be
well prepared for the opportunity to do something to make a change . In the case of RCAP,
all the money, time and thought involved will be wasted if a political climate cannot be
created in which the implementation of the report is the thing to do . Of course this all
implies that to be involved in developing and implementing a policy which departs from the
norm and empowers a marginal group, a person must be able to sustain a critical
perspective throughout a career that might offer few creative opportunities to make a
difference .
The third area of insight concerns the evaluation and demise of a program . The first line
of the CDP Cabinet Submission read, "The purpose of this submission is to obtain approval
for a community development program which would be a major instrument for improving
the economic, social and cultural life of Indians ." A few lines later, the submission states
that "this program would. . . reduce costs in such palliative areas as welfare assistance
payments" (Canada, 1964 : 1). These were promises that the CDP could never, over the short
term, hope to keep (nonetheless, they were promises that likely had to be made if the federal
Cabinet was to approve the Program) . If one were to evaluate the program based on
economic criteria, you could reach no conclusion other than that the Program was a failure .
As I argued in the previous chapter, however, this was not the case . There are many reasons
to view the CDP as a success . The contradiction that arises is that while the program failed
to meet its own stated objectives, it can still be viewed as a success because it met many
unstated and arguably more important objectives . The inherent danger in this is that it
provides ready justification for the cancellation of a program that presents an uncomfortable
challenge to the status quo .
The challenge for policy-makers is either to get done the important objectives of a
program before it is discontinued or to state the objectives of a program in such a way as to
be achievable (which in the area of community development likely means staying away from
economic goals) . This all seems to imply that policy-makers must employ a level of
subterfuge - not seemingly appropriate behaviour for public servants
. It is probably more
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accurate to say that policy-makers must be able to balance the requirements of the system
(using the language of the day) while keeping an eye on other, possibly unstated or even
unpopular, but important objectives .
The final, most general, and most important insight concerns the possibilities for
change . In the second chapter, it was pointed out that the work of Jurgen Habermas allows
"one to articulate the positive side of the achievements of modern civil society without
closing off the possibility of an immanent critique of its specific institutional configurations"
(Arato and Cohen, 1992 : 200). I have, throughout this thesis, contrasted the CDP with the
IAB in a manner that might lead one to believe that they were separate entities . It is
essential to remember that community development was an initiative of the Indian Affairs
Branch and the Government of Canada . The message here is that it is possible for an
organization, even an oppressive one (as the IAB has been come to be characterized) to
initiate emancipatory programming even though it may flow against the organization's
traditional direction .
Even though the IAB eventually eliminated the CDP because it posed too great a threat
to the overall integrity of the system, the bureaucracy was never able to go back to its pre-
CDP character . Forester (1993
:45) claims that all policies "either enable or disable, empower
or disempower, specific possibilities of popular political debate and mobilization, of popular
challenge or traditional class struggles ." The CDP enabled and empowered Indian people
. It
changed their expectations . This in itself is unremarkable, because heightened expectations
do not provide food, shelter, education, employment, or even change the way that others
(including the government) treat you . The remarkable part of the CDP is that it increased
expectations among Aboriginal peoples while at the same time enabling the skills within
Aboriginal peoples required to fulfil those expectations .
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